Ex Parte Steele, 7886.
| Decision Date | 15 October 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 7887.,No. 7886.,7886.,7887. |
| Citation | 155 S.W.2d 355 |
| Parties | Ex parte STEELE (two cases). |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
R. H. Cocke, of Wellington, and Small, Arney & Small, Clint C. Small, and Clint C. Small, Jr., all of Austin, for relators.
Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., and M. C. Martin, and Geo. W. Barcus, Asst. Attys. Gen., opposing granting the writ.
These are two separate habeas corpus proceedings, instituted directly in this Court by Leo Steele and his wife, Mrs Leo Steele, to obtain their respective liberation from alleged illegal restraint by the sheriff of Collingsworth County, Texas. The facts and record in each case are identical. We therefore dispose of both cases in one opinion.
On July 2, 1940, the State of Texas, acting through its proper officers, filed in the District Court of Collingsworth County, Texas, a petition against both of these relators. We shall not attempt to completely detail the contents of such petition. It is sufficient to say that it alleged that these relators were occupying a private residence at 609 Dalhart Street, in the city of Wellington, Collingsworth County, Texas, on Lots 20 and 21, Block 202, of the original townsite of said city. The petition then alleged that these relators, and each of them, were maintaining a nuisance at and on the above-described premises, by possessing and selling therein and thereon intoxicating liquor, in violation of what is known as the Liquor Control Act of this State. The petition prayed that the court issue a temporary injunction, restraining and enjoining these relators from maintaining a nuisance on the premises above described, and from violating the provisions of the Texas Liquor Control Act on said premises and at any place in Collingsworth County, Texas. Also, the petition prayed that "the defendants and each of them be cited to appear and answer herein and that on final hearing hereof judgment be granted abating said nuisance, and making said temporary injunction final * * *."
On the same day the above petition was filed, Judge A. S. Moss, Judge of the District Court of the above-named county, entered his fiat or order granting the temporary injunction, "as prayed for by the plaintiff's petition," and enjoining and restraining relators from possessing and selling alcoholic beverages
Pursuant to the above fiat or order, a writ of injunction was duly issued and served upon each of these relators. Such writs were made returnable to the next term of the District Court of Collingsworth County, Texas, to be held on the 11th day of November, 1940. We gather that no further action or hearing has been had in the above injunction cause, and nothing has been done to either vacate or make same permanent. On August 22, 1941, after the return date above mentioned, the State, acting through its proper officers, filed an affidavit in the above cause, in which it was alleged that these relators, on certain premises altogether different from the particular premises described in the original petition, had violated the above injunction by doing certain acts prohibited by the Liquor Control Act of this State. In this connection, the State agrees that none of the acts complained of in the contempt affidavit occurred at or on the particular premises described in the original petition. Also, for the purposes of this opinion, we will assume that such acts occurred after the 11th day of November, 1940, the return date of the above notice of injunction.
Acting on the above affidavit of contempt, and after notice and hearing, the district court found both of these relators to be in contempt of court, in that they did "violate the order of this court heretofore entered in this cause, * * * at the place set out in the plaintiff's affidavit for contempt filed herein, and in Collingsworth, County, Texas." At this point we note that the contempt affidavit does not charge that these relators committed any unlawful act at the particular place or premises set out in the original injunction order. It does allege a particular but different place in such county. The district court imposed a fine of $100 and three days in jail as punishment for each relator herein. Relators each applied to this Court for writ of habeas corpus. Both writs were granted, and both relators released on bail pending final decision by this Court.
Before proceeding further we pause to say that the only authority for invoking injunctive jurisdiction of the district court to enforce the liquor laws of this State is found in Section 29 of Article I and Section 27 of Article II, of what is known as the Texas Liquor Control Act. These statutes are carried as Articles 666—29 and 667—27,...
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Jeter v. State
...the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in Trent v. Kennedy, 109 S.W.2d 327, and the decision of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Steele, 137 Tex. 508, 155 S.W.2d 355, to establish their contention that the District Court had no jurisdiction, since (as they contended) said Article 4664 had ......
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Pitman v. State
...similar to Article 667-27 of our Texas Liquor Control Act, Vernon's Ann.P.C., an action in personam, discussed in Ex parte Steele, 137 Tex. 508, 155 S.W.2d 355. Judgment is reversed and temporary in junction is ...
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Suttle v. State, 4922
...will not entertain actions to enjoin the commission of a penal offense in the absence of specific statutory authorization. Ex parte Steele (1941) 137 Tex. 508, 155 S .W.2d 355; Ex parte Hughes (1939) 133 Tex. 505, 129 S.W.2d 270. Here, by Art. 286a, there is direct legislative Writs of inju......
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Parker v. State, 2464.
...filed, but a complete statement of facts accompanies the record. Appellants contend that since our Supreme Court has held (Ex parte Steele, 155 S.W.2d 355, 356) that the only authority for invoking injunctive jurisdiction of the district court to enforce the liquor laws of this state is fou......