Ex Parte Sterling

• Decision Date: 01 October 1932
• Docket Number: No. 6322.,6322.
• Citation: 53 S.W.2d 294
• Parties: Ex parte STERLING et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 294

53 S.W.2d 294

Ex parte STERLING et al.

No. 6322.

Supreme Court of Texas.

October 1, 1932.

Original proceeding by W. W. Sterling and others for writs of habeas corpus to obtain release from custody.

Writs granted, and relators ordered discharged.

James V. Allred, Atty. Gen., and T. S. Christopher, Neal Powers, and Elbert Hooper, Asst. Attys. Gen., for relators.

Swartzberg & Rawlings, of Fort Worth, W. H. Lipscomb and C. H. Tupper, Jr., both of San Angelo, and J. S. Callicutt, of Corsicana, for respondents.

LEDDY, C.

This is an original habeas corpus proceeding. We adopt the following from the brief filed by the Attorney General in behalf of relators as a correct statement of the facts involved:

"On August 31, 1932, J. H. McCulloch and J. L. McCulloch, and others, all residents of Navarro County, Texas, presented a bill in equity to the Honorable H. F. Kirby, Judge of the 77th Judicial District, who was sitting temporarily in the 13th Judicial District of Navarro County. Petitioners were complaining of Rufus Pevehouse as Sheriff of Navarro County, L. G. Phares as Chief of the Highway Patrol, Cleo G. Miller as county attorney of Navarro County, W. W. Sterling as Adjutant General of Texas, and of all sheriffs, deputy sheriffs and constables in the State of Texas without naming them, and of all county attorneys, all highway patrolmen, all State rangers, all county highway officers, and of all weight and license inspectors in the State without naming any of them.

"In brief, the bill alleged that petitioners were then engaged, and expected to continue to engage, in the business of hauling cotton over the public highways from points in Navarro County to the ports of Houston, in Harris County, and Galveston, in Galveston County; that they had invested considerable sums of money in their trucks which they expected to use in the business of transporting over the highways; that if they were limited to a net load of 7,000 pounds they could not earn enough profit to justify operations and their trucks would be of little value, but that if they were permitted to haul a maximum net load of 11,000 pounds, or twenty bales of cotton, they could each of them earn a reasonable profit or wage.

"As further grounds for the relief sought the bill alleges that other persons have secured injunctions allowing them to haul loads exceeding 7,000 pounds; that the act is discriminatory because the load limit does not apply to motor busses; that it is discriminatory because of the 14,000 pound exception in favor of short hauls between points of origin and common carrier stations, and that the act in limiting the load to 7,000 pounds is unreasonable and deprives them of their property without due process of law.

"The petitioners prayed for temporary injunction restraining the officers named, and all other members of their class, from interfering with their truck operations over the highways when their load did not exceed 11,000 pounds and, further, to restrain said officers from filing complaints against, arresting or prosecuting them in any manner for any violation of the 7,000 pound load limit.

"Without notice or hearing the judge of said court granted the injunction as prayed for.

"Thereafter, on the 11th day of September, 1932, certain of the petitioners in said cause, by their attorney, filed a motion to rule the relators in contempt of court for violating said restraining order in arresting and filing complaints against the drivers of their trucks for transporting a load in excess of 7,000 pounds over the highways of Harris County. Thereupon the Honorable H. F. Kirby ordered that the relators be taken in custody by the sheriffs of the several counties of their residence, and that they be delivered at the court house in Corsicana, Texas, at 10 A. M. on September 16, 1932, to show cause why they should not be punished and imprisoned.

"All of the relators, except Ross Dickey, were detained and arrested on September 14, 1932 in obedience to said order. Relator Ross Dickey was arrested by the Sheriff of Navarro County on September 12th, and was released upon bond conditioned for his appearance before said court on Friday, September 16, 1932.

"The relators, on September 14, 1932, applied to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for writs of habeas corpus, and they were granted in behalf of all except Ross Dickey."

It is the general rule that courts of equity deal only with vested property rights; hence they will not by injunction stay prosecution of criminal proceedings. High on Injunctions (3d Ed.) vol. 1, § 68; Chisholm v. Adams, 71 Tex. 678, 10 S. W. 336; City of Galveston v. Mistrot, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 63, 104 S. W. 417.

There is a well-recognized exception to this rule, to the effect that where the statute under which the complainant is being prosecuted is unconstitutional, or for any other reason void, and the prosecution involves a direct invasion of property rights which will result in an irreparable injury thereto, an injunction may be granted to restrain the commencement or continuance of criminal proceedings based on such statute. C. J. vol. 32, § 447.

"Equitable jurisdiction exists," says the Supreme Court of the United States in Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 258, 68 L. Ed. 596, "to restrain criminal prosecutions under unconstitutional enactments, when the prevention of such prosecutions is essential to the safeguarding of rights of property."

The reason for the limitation upon the power of courts of equity to restrain officers from enforcing criminal statutes is well stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 113 F. 616, 625, 51 C. C. A. 122, 65 L. R. A. 864, in the following excerpt from the opinion: To hold otherwise "would be to subvert the administration of the criminal law, and deny the right of trial by jury, by substituting a court of equity to inquire into the commission of offenses where it would have no jurisdiction to punish the parties if found guilty."

Courts of equity are not concerned with the enforcement of criminal laws. Courts of law are created for this purpose. Courts of equity are concerned only with the protection of civil property rights. Therefore, when a court of equity issues an injunction which operates to stay the hand of law enforcing officers, its primary purpose is not to enjoin the criminal proceeding. That is merely incidental to the main ground upon which equity jurisdiction protects vested property rights from threatened and irreparable injury. Such jurisdiction is exercised solely with reference to the effect of the enforcement of a void law upon vested property rights. Winn v. Dyess (Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 294; Ex parte Castro, 115 Tex. 77, 273 S. W. 795; State v. Clark, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 559, 187 S. W. 760; Jones v. Whitehead (Tex. Civ. App.) 278 S. W. 305; City of Breckenridge v. McMullen (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 S. W. 1099.

Under the well-established rules of equity jurisprudence, it is clear that the district judge was without authority to issue the writ of injunction to prevent the enforcement of the law regulating the operation of motor-trucks upon the highways of this state unless the petition for such injunction clearly showed the existence of two facts, viz.: First, that such law is unconstitutional and void; second, that its enforcement constitutes a direct invasion of a vested property right of the complainants. Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 23 S. Ct. 498, 499, 47 L. Ed. 778; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482, 31 L. Ed. 402; Box v. Newsom (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S.W.(2d) 981.

We are of the opinion that the allegations of the petition in the case in which the injunction was issued do not show the existence of either of said facts. It is true that complainant's petition challenges the validity of the motortruck law for various reasons. All of these grounds, however, were urged in the case of Sproles v. Binford [see (D. C.) 56 F.(2d) 189, and (D. C.) 52 F.(2d) 730], which originated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It finally reached the Supreme Court of the United States. The validity of the act against the assaults there made was fully upheld in an exhaustive opinion delivered by Chief Justice Hughes, on May 23, 1932, 286 U. S. 374, 52 S. Ct. 581, 76 L. Ed. 1167. It was determined that the act (Vernon's Ann. P. C. art 827a, § 1 et seq.) was not subject to any of the objections made against its constitutionality and that its enactment was a valid exercise of the legislative power of this state to regulate the operation of motor vehicles using the highways for profit. That opinion so fully and completely answers every ground upon which the constitutionality of the law is here assailed that we need do no more than to say that the conclusions reached by that tribunal, which are so ably and forcibly expressed by its eminent Chief Justice, meet with our hearty approval....