Ex parte Tindall

Decision Date09 September 1924
Docket NumberCase Number: 14674
Citation1924 OK 669,102 Okla. 192,229 P. 125
PartiesEx parte TINDALL.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Original Action in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Application by A. L. Tindall for writ of habeas corpus. Writ denied.

Syllabus

¶0 1. Carriers--Motor Vehicles as Common Carriers on Highways--Statute Regulating.

Chapter 113, Sess. Laws 1923, page 188, is an act, the purposes of which are the regulation and control of motor vehicles, operating as common carriers for hire and profit over the public highways, and conferring upon the Corporation Commission the power to supervise, regulate, and control such common carriers.

2. Same--"Public Service Enterprise"--State Control.

The operation of motor vehicles, for the purpose of carrying passengers and freight, for hire and profit over the public highways as a transportation roadbed, is a "public service enterprise" within the constitutional definition of such an enterprise, and as such, subject to regulation and control by the state.

3. Corporation Commission--Powers--Regulation of Public Service Corporations.

Sections 18 and 19 of article 9 of the Constitution, specifically confer upon the Corporation Commission authority to supervise, regulate and control "public service corporations," and section 19 specifically provides that the commission may be vested with such additional powers and charged with such other duties as may be prescribed by law.

4. Carriers--Transportation by Motor Vehicles--Control by Corporation Commission--Constitutionality of Act.

An act, the purposes of which are to supervise, regulate, and control the operation of motor vehicles, doing a transportation business over the public highways for compensation and profit, and to vest the Corporation Commission with authority to enforce the provisions of such act, does not violate the provision nor the spirit of the Constitution, if such act confers no powers substantially different from those specifically conferred by the Constitution itself.

5. Constitutional Law--Guaranties of 14th Amendment to U.S. Constitution.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States contains three distinct protective provisions, guaranteed to citizens of the United States as such, to wit:

(1) That no state shall pass any law abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.

(2) No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

(3) No state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction of equal protection under the law.

6. Constitutional Law--"Police Power"--Origin and Nature.

The police power is an attribute of sovereignty, inherent in every sovereign state, and not derived from any written Constitution, nor vested by grant of any superior power.

The term "police power" comprehends the power to make and enforce all wholesome and reasonable laws and regulations necessary to the maintenance, upbuilding, and advancement of the public weal, and protection of the public interests.

It is plastic in its nature and will expand to meet the actual requirements of an advancing civilization and adjust itself to the necessities of moral, sanitary, economic, and political conditions.

No principle in our system of government will limit the right of government to respond to public needs and protect the public welfare.

7. Same--Police Power of States--Effect of 14th Amendment to U.S. Constitution.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police power of the several states.

8. Constitutional Law--Due Process of Law.

The provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the provision in section 7, art. 2, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, to wit: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," are fully met by due notice and complete hearing under established rules of procedure before a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction.

9. Corporation Commission--Powers--Public Service--Regulation--Constitutionality of Act.

The limitations in section 32, art. 2, and section 51, art. 5, of the Constitution against granting exclusive rights and privileges and creating monopolies, are not exceeded by an act which confers upon the Corporation Commission the power to make and enforce certain rules, where the power to enforce such rules is made conditioned upon the fact of public convenience and necessity.

It is a fundamental principle that persons or corporations engaged in occupations in which the public has an interest or use may be regulated by statute. In such case the test of power is found in the effect which the pursuit or calling has upon the public weal.

10. Same--Review of Findings.

Where the exercise of powers conferred upon the Corporation Commission by an act, is conditioned upon the actual existence of a public necessity, and the finding as to such necessity is subject to review by a judicial tribunal of authorized jurisdiction, the commission is thereby shorn of arbitrary or capricious powers, should it in any instance attempt to exercise such powers.

11. Same--Right of Appeal.

Sections 18 and 19 of art. 9 of the Constitution specifically confer certain powers upon the Corporation Commission, and specifically authorize the Legislature to confer additional powers upon such commission; and section 20, Id., grants an appeal from orders of the Corporation Commission to this court, hence the provisions of an act conferring certain powers of the same nature and character as those specifically conferred by the Constitution itself are not rendered unconstitutional merely because the act fails to provide for an appeal, inasmuch as the right of appeal provided for in section 20, Id., automatically vests in any party aggrieved by the enforcement of such power.

12. Same--Act Empowering Corporation Commission to Regulate Motor Vehicle Carriers.

The act in question does not specifically provide for an appeal, but the powers conferred by such act, being of the same nature and character as those specifically conferred by sections 18 and 19 of art. 9 of the Constitution, the right of appeal granted by section 20, Id., automatically vests in any party aggrieved by the enforcement of powers conferred by the act.

13. Same.

The act in question being no more nor less than the granting of additional powers, authorized by section 19, art. 9, of the Constitution, the right of appeal provided for in section 20, Id., automatically vests in any party aggrieved by an order of the commission, whether the act itself provides for an appeal or not, and the reasonableness of any order of the commission thereby becomes subject to review by this court, and the act itself not void because of its failure to provide for appeal.

14. Highways--Regulation of Use--Licensing Carriers.

The public highways of the state being built and maintained by means of taxation, the public has a two-fold interest in such highways, viz.:

1st. From the standpoint of public convenience and necessity.

2nd. From a property interest in highways built and maintained at public expense, and as a consequence the public has a right to regulate the use of such highways.

It has a right to demand a license fee from persons or corporations seeking to use the highways as a transportation roadbed for hire, and has a right to say whether its conveniences and necessities and property interests in such highways demand the licensing of one or more than one of such enterprises, and the right to license one and reject all others.

15. Statutes--"Revenue Bills"--Act Requiring License Fee from Motor Vehicle Carriers.

The real purpose of the act being to regulate the use of public highways by transportation companies, a provision in such act requiring payment of a tax or license fee for the privilege of operating such business, such fee or tax being merely incidental to the enforcement of the real purpose of the act, does not render the act void under section 33, art. 5, of the Constitution, which requires all revenue bills to originate in the House of Representatives.

16. Constitutional Law -- Distribution of Powers Among Distinct Departments of State--Powers of Corporation Commission--Delegation by Legislature.

Article 4 of the Constitution divides the powers of state government into three separate and distinct departments, viz., executive, legislative, and judicial, and provides that neither department shall exercise the powers given to the other, but contains this express exception, to wit., "except as provided in this Constitution."

The creation of the Corporation Commission and the vesting of it with specific administrative powers partaking of the nature of executive, legislative, and judicial functions, is a concrete example under such exception, and with the authority expressly given the Legislature by section 19, art. 9, removes all questions of the authority of the Legislature to delegate to the Corporation Commission powers similar in nature and character to those specifically conferred upon it by the Constitution.

17. Statutes--Sufficiency of Title--Act Regulating Motor Vehicle Carriers.

The title to the act in question, as well as the provisions of the act itself, examined, and held, that the purposes of the act are expressed with sufficient clearness in the title to cover all of the provisions of the act, and to meet the requirements of section 57, art. 5, of the Constitution.

Giddings & Giddings, H. C. Hargis, W. H. Bingham, and Fred H. Thompson, for petitioner.

Clark Owsley, Corporation Commission Atty., Geo. F. Short, Atty. Gen., and N.W. Gore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

J. B. Dudley and K. W. Shartel, amici curiae.

HARRISON, J.

¶1 This is an application of A. L. Tindall for writ of habeas corpus and involves the constitutionality of chapter 113, Sess. Laws 1923, page 188, known as the "Motor Vehicle Act."

¶2 Petitioner alleges...

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