Ex parte Tonya BLACKSTOCK. .
Decision Date | 19 February 2010 |
Docket Number | 1061445. |
Citation | 47 So.3d 801 |
Parties | Ex parte Tonya BLACKSTOCK. (In re Mark Davis v. Tonya Blackstock). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lindsey Mussleman Davis of Holt, Mussleman, Holt & Morgan, Florence, for petitioner.
Heath F. Trousdale, Florence, for respondent.
This case involves a dispute between Tonya Blackstock (“the mother”) and Mark Davis (“the father”) concerning the custody of their daughter (“the child”).
The Court of Civil Appeals in Davis v. Blackstock, 47 So.3d 796(Ala.Civ.App.2007), summarized the history of this case:
“The father and the mother married on November 11, 2000. Four months later, while they were residing in Tennessee, the father and the mother separated. The mother was pregnant with the child at the time of the separation.
Subsequently, a petition for divorce was filed in the Chancery Court for Lawrence County, Tennessee (‘the Tennessee trial court’). Before the Tennessee trial court ruled on the divorce petition filed with that court, the father and the mother moved to Alabama, where the mother gave birth to the child on December 27, 2001.
47 So.3d at 797. The mother appealed, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the custody-modification order but remanded the cause for further proceedings relating to ancillary matters. Id. When the parties moved to Alabama, the mother moved to Florence and the father moved to Decatur.
In February 2006, the mother filed a petition in the Lauderdale Circuit Court seeking a modification of custody and child support. 1 Reiterating statements from her sworn answers to interrogatories, the mother testified at trial as to several allegedly material changes in circumstances that, she claimed, warranted a change in the September 2003 custody award, including that the child would begin attending pre-kindergarten classes (“the pre-K program”) in the fall of 2006; that the pre-K program was a “structured” program and the child would be required to attend every day; 2 that the child would need daily “structure and stability” at that time; that the four-day rotating-custody arrangement (“the four/four custody arrangement”) “minimize[d] stability” for the child and would make it more difficult to stay on a routine with regard to the pre-K program; that as “[the child's] gotten older, she's shown increased anxiety over the constant change of environment, and has voiced dissatisfaction with the constant change”; and that the father “told the Tennessee court he would move to Florence when [the child] got older” and he has not done so.
The father opposed the mother's modification petition, and, a few days before trial, he filed a counterpetition seeking “primary physical custody” of the child on the grounds that the mother had attempted to alienate the child from the father and that she had
After an ore tenus hearing, the Lauderdale Circuit Court entered a judgment in September 2006 that (1) maintained the joint-legal-custody award to the parents, (2) awarded the mother primary physical custody, (3) awarded the father “standard visitation,” 3 with the addition of visitation “every Tuesday from when the child is discharged from school until 8:00 p.m.,” and (4) ordered the father to pay child support. The father appealed.
In reversing the judgment of the Lauderdale Circuit Court, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
“Accordingly, we reverse the Alabama trial court's modification of the 2003 custody judgment.”
In her petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari, the mother contends, in part, that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with prior precedent. Specifically, she argues (1) that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicts with Lamb v. Lamb, 939 So.2d 918 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), because, she says, the Court of Civil Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence and did not give effect to the presumption of correctness afforded the trial court's judgment in ore tenus cases and (2) that the decision conflicts with, or misapplies, the holding in Watters v. Watters, 918 So.2d 913 (Ala.Civ.App.2005), on which the Court of Civil Appeals relied. We agree.
[1] [2] Where, as in the present case, there is a prior judgment awarding joint physical custody, “ ‘the best interests of the child’ ” standard applies in any subsequent custody-modification proceeding.
Ex parte Johnson, 673 So.2d 410, 413 (Ala.1994) (quoting Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987, 989 (Ala.1988)). To justify a modification of a preexisting judgment awarding custody, the petitioner must demonstrate that there has been a material change of circumstances since that judgment was entered and that “ ‘it [is] in the [child's] best interests that the [judgment] be modified’ ” in the manner requested. Nave v. Nave, 942 So.2d 372, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (quoting Means v. Means, 512 So.2d 1386, 1388 (Ala.Civ.App.1987)).
[3] Also, we note the presumption of correctness accorded to a trial court's judgment:
Ex parte Fann, 810 So.2d 631, 633 (Ala.2001).
[4] As this Court stated in Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So.2d 1322 (Ala.1996), quoted in part in Lamb, in an ore tenus proceeding,
“ ‘ ’ ”
676 So.2d at 1324; see Lamb, 939 So.2d at 922; see also Ex parte Foley, 864 So.2d 1094, 1099 (Ala.2003) ( .
[5] [6] “ ‘[T]he trial court is in the better position to consider all of the evidence, as well as the many...
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