Ex parte Tri-State Motor Transit Co.
| Decision Date | 22 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | TRI-STATE |
| Parties | Ex parteMOTOR TRANSIT COMPANY. Re Ronald MILLS v. MOTOR TRANSIT COMPANY. Ex parteMOTOR TRANSIT COMPANY. Re James TUCKER v. MOTOR TRANSIT COMPANY. Civ. 6743, Civ. 6744. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
William Anthony Davis III and J. Bentley Owens III of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, for appellant.
Hoyt Elliott of Elliott & Elliott, Jasper, for appellee.
The defendant, Tri-State Motor Transit Company (Tri-State), petitions this court to issue writs of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss two pending workmen's compensation suits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Our scope of review is limited to deciding whether the trial court is legally required to dismiss either case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ex parte CSX Transportation, Inc., 533 So.2d 613 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Ex parte State Health Planning & Development Agency, 500 So.2d 1149 (Ala.Civ.App.1986).
The record reveals that Tri-State, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Missouri, hired two Alabama residents, James Tucker and Ronald Mills (claimants), as over-the-road drivers. The claimants' jobs entailed hauling specialized freight cross-country from a dispatch point in Tennessee. In 1987, the claimants sustained alleged injuries in Tennessee and Illinois, respectively, but filed separate workmen's compensation suits in Alabama.
The claimants' right to workmen's compensation benefits under Alabama law is governed by § 25-5-35, Ala.Code 1975. Under this statute, an employee who sustains an alleged job-related injury out of state is entitled to benefits provided by Alabama's workmen's compensation act only if he meets certain prerequisites set forth in § 25-5-35(d), Ala.Code 1975 (1986 Repl.Vol.). This section reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Under § 25-5-35(d)(1), a claimant's employment must be "principally localized" in Alabama. This term is defined in § 25-5-35(b) as follows:
"(b) For the purposes of this section, a person's employment is principally localized in this or another state when his employer has a place of business in this or such other state and he regularly works at or from such place of business, or if he is domiciled and spends a substantial part of his working time in the service of his employer in this or such other state." (Emphasis added.)
We note that the phrase "spends a substantial part of his working time in the service of his employer in this ... state," which is set forth in § 25-5-35(b), "implies a current, ongoing employment status where it is foreseeable that the employee will continue to spend a substantial part of his working time in this state." Seales v. Daniel Construction Co., 469 So.2d 629 (Ala.Civ.App.1985).
The claimants, seeking jurisdiction under § 25-5-35(d)(1), contend they spent a substantial part of their employment with Tri- State in Alabama. The evidence, however, does not support this contention. The record indicates Mills spent only 5 days in Alabama of the 341 days he hauled freight for Tri-State. The record further indicates that Mills spent only 42 days at his home in Cordova, Alabama, on stand-by status. No freight was hauled from Cordova. There is also evidence that only 3 percent of Tucker's trips were made to destinations in Alabama. He, like Mills, also spent part of his time on stand-by at his home in Alabama.
In the alternative, the claimants argue they can invoke jurisdiction by way of § 25-5-35(d)(2). This section, as noted previously, allows recovery for out-of-state injuries when (1) the contract of hire is made in Alabama; and (2) the employment is not principally localized in any state.
It is clear that claimants' contracts of hire were subject to approval in Missouri, not Alabama. The employment applications filled out by the claimants were expressly conditioned upon the following language set forth in the contract:
"Your references will not be checked until you attend our orientation school and if your references or qualifications do not check out to Tri-State's standards, you will not...
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