Heartland Exp. v. Gardner

• Decision Date: 17 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-0993.,02-0993.
• Citation: 675 N.W.2d 259
• Parties: HEARTLAND EXPRESS, Appellant, v. James GARDNER, Jr., Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

675 N.W.2d 259

HEARTLAND EXPRESS, Appellant, v. James GARDNER, Jr., Appellee.

No. 02-0993.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 17, 2003.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing February 27, 2004.

Stephen W. Spencer and Joseph M. Barron of Peddicord, Wharton, Spencer & Hook, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

D. Brian Scieszinski of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

In this appeal, we must decide whether the workers' compensation commissioner had subject matter jurisdiction over an employee's claim for benefits. If the commissioner had jurisdiction over the claim, we must further consider whether a new hearing date should have been granted and whether the commissioner's determination as to the employee's industrial disability was supported by substantial evidence. Ultimately, we do not reach these latter issues because we find the first issue—relating to subject matter jurisdiction—dispositive.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

James Gardner (Gardner), a Georgia resident, was an over-the-road truck driver for Heartland Express, Inc., (Heartland), an Iowa corporation. Gardner's employment included leasing his tractor and providing driving and delivery services to Heartland for the transport of goods. Gardner entered into a contractual relationship with Heartland in Coralville, Iowa, where Heartland maintains its corporate offices.¹ His pre-employment physical, new employee orientation, and initial equipment inspections each occurred in Iowa. During his employment with Heartland, Gardner was largely managed from Iowa. He received his work assignments and paychecks from the Iowa offices, and any other paperwork related to his employment was apparently sent to or from Iowa. However, Gardner's actual transportation work for Heartland took him to approximately forty states—including Georgia and Iowa—and he spent no more or less time in any one state.

On February 16, 1994, Gardner sustained an injury to his back while attempting to adjust a pin in one of the axle areas of his tractor-trailer at a delivery location in Georgia. Gardner completed his route and then notified Heartland of the injury. He was eventually referred to an occupational medicine specialist, Domenic Esposito, M.D. Dr. Esposito diagnosed Gardner's injury as a "large ruptured disc" in his spine. He recommended Gardner undergo a specific corrective surgery.

Gardner requested and received permission from Heartland to get a second opinion from another physician, Alfred Bonati, M.D. Dr. Bonati recommended a different surgery that he believed would hasten Gardner's healing time. He performed two surgeries on Gardner's back in July 1994. After the surgeries, Gardner began experiencing lower extremity pain, which he had not experienced before.² The combined effect of his back injury, back surgery, and lower extremity pain kept Gardner from returning to work. He was soon forced to sell his tractor due to his inability to make payments on it.

Sometime during this period, Heartland transferred Gardner's care to another physician, Charles Wingo, M.D. Dr. Wingo suggested further surgery, and yet another physician, Gary Lowery, M.D., confirmed his diagnosis. Dr. Lowery performed two more surgeries on Gardner's back. On December 11, 1996, it was determined that Gardner had reached his maximum medical improvement. Except for limited employment at his father's convenience store, Gardner had not worked for almost three years.

In July 1997, Gardner underwent a functional capacity evaluation to determine whether he would be able to return to work full time. Although the evaluation revealed that Gardner could work up to eight hours a day and was "highly motivated to return to work," it also indicated that he might be unable to meet all of the physical requirements of the truck driving profession. Not surprisingly, when Gardner attempted to return to trucking full time, he was prevented from doing so by his inability to sit comfortably for long periods of time or lift heavy objects. He held several trucking jobs for short periods of time, but could not establish employment similar to that which he had held with Heartland.

On February 8, 1999, Gardner filed for workers' compensation benefits with the Iowa workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner). A hearing was held before a deputy workers' compensation commissioner in November 2000. During the course of the hearing, Heartland challenged the commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction over Gardner's claim for benefits. To resolve the issue, the deputy commissioner looked to the statutory extension of jurisdiction in effect at the time of Gardner's injury and determined that subject matter jurisdiction existed. The deputy commissioner went on to decide that Gardner was entitled to three hundred seventy-five weeks of permanent partial disability and additional healing period benefits.

Heartland's subsequent motion for rehearing was granted. The deputy commissioner later issued an amended and substituted decision that reached the same result pertaining to benefits. Heartland then appealed the deputy commissioner's decision to the workers' compensation commissioner. The commissioner affirmed the decision of the deputy commissioner, noting that subject matter jurisdiction existed at the time of Gardner's injury and continued to exist. Heartland then sought and was granted judicial review of the commissioner's decision. The district court affirmed the commissioner's decision, also finding that the subject matter jurisdiction statute in effect at the time of Gardner's injury continued to apply to his claim. Heartland appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review.

II. Standards of Review.

We typically review a district court's decision on judicial review for correction of errors at law. Greenwood Manor v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, State Health Facilities Council, 641 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Iowa 2002). This standard dovetails with our review of jurisdictional questions, which is also for correction of errors at law. In re Marriage of Engler, 532 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Iowa 1995). "Thus, our review is limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law." Greenwood Manor, 641 N.W.2d at 830.

In construing a statute, "[w]e focus on the intent of the legislature ... looking first and foremost to the language it chose in creating the act" to determine its intent. In re Detention of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 2003). "We read the statute `as a whole and give it "its plain and obvious meaning, a sensible and logical construction,'" which does not create an `impractical or absurd result.'" Id. (citation omitted). If necessary, we may also "`look to prior decisions of this court and others, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common usage' to aid our interpretation." Id. at 574-75 (citation omitted). Our review of a district court's construction of a statute is also for correction of errors at law. Id. at 575.

III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Injuries.

1. Background and Underlying Principles.

Subject matter jurisdiction "`is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings belong.'" Shirley v. Pothast, 508 N.W.2d 712, 714 (Iowa 1993) (citation omitted). Through its adoption of Iowa Code chapter 85, "the legislature removed from the district court's general, original jurisdiction, the power to hear claims involving the `rights and remedies of an injured employee against an employer for industrial injuries' and placed them within the exclusive jurisdictional purview of the [commissioner]." Id. at 715 (citation omitted). Thus, subject matter jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims is vested in the commissioner subject to any further circumscription by the legislature. See id. at 714-15.

One example of such circumscription is Iowa Code section 85.71, which "governs the [commissioner's] subject matter jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims based on injuries sustained outside the state."³Heartland Express, Inc. v. Terry, 631 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2001); see also George H. Wentz, Inc. v. Sabasta, 337 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 1983)

("The purpose of Iowa Code section 85.71 is to identify those employees who are entitled to benefits under the Iowa act despite occurrence of an injury out of state."). Prior to the adoption of section 85.71, workers' compensation claimants who had been hired in Iowa could file for benefits in Iowa even if they were injured outside of Iowa. See Harry W. Dahl, The Iowa Workmen's Compensation Law and Federal Recommendations, 24 Drake L.Rev. 336, 351-52 (1975) (citing Haverly v. Union Constr. Co., 236 Iowa 278, 284-90, 18 N.W.2d 629, 633-36 (1945)). However, while Iowa jurisdiction could be invoked based on the sole factor of hiring, many other states' laws were more restrictive in extending jurisdiction over a claimant's claim for benefits arising from an "extraterritorial" injury. See The Council of State Governments, Workmen's Compensation & Rehabilitation Law § 7 cmt. at 97-98 (1973) [hereinafter Model Act]. For this reason, some workers' compensation claimants injured outside of the territorial limits of their "home" state found themselves unable to bring a claim for benefits in any state. See id.

This inequitable result moved the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws to recommend "that an employee or his survivor be given the choice of filing a workmen's compensation claim in the State where the injury or death occurred, or where the employment was principally localized, or where the employee was hired." The Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on State Workmen's Compensation Laws R2.11, at 48 (1972). Not long after this recommendation was made, the Council of State Governments proposed a model workers' compensation statutory provision "to ensure that [the] tragedy of complete failure of coverage cannot possibly take place." Model...