Ex parte Voight

Decision Date04 June 1924
Docket Number18631.
Citation226 P. 482,130 Wash. 140
PartiesEx parte VOIGHT.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Department 1.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus by William Voight, Jr., demanding his discharge from imprisonment. Writ denied.

E. H Kohlhase, of Kelso, for plaintiff.

John H Dunbar and E. W. Anderson, both of Olympia, for respondent.

HOLCOMB J.

Petitioner convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to imprisonment for life in and by the superior court for Cowlitz county, on March 11, 1918, presents his petition in this court for a writ of habeas corpus, demanding to be discharged from imprisonment. It is alleged in his petition that the imprisonment, confinement, and restraint are illegal, in that the superior court for Cowlitz county had no jurisdiction, right, or power, by reason of the provisions of section 2116, Rem. Comp. Stat., to assess the punishment upon petitioner, because the statute cited provides that a jury shall fix the punishment therefor.

It is attempted to be shown by the copy of the judgment and sentence attached to the petition that the judgment was based only upon the plea of guilty of the petitioner to the offense charged in the information, which was murder in the first degree, and that the record does not show that any jury was impaneled which found the degree of the crime charged of which petitioner might be guilty.

The Attorney General demurs to the petition upon the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction of the person nor subject-matter of the action, and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or to allow the relief prayed for or any relief.

The statute relied upon by petitioner reads:

'If, on the arraignment of any person, he shall plead guilty, if the offense charged be not murder, the court shall, in its discretion, hear testimony, and determine the amount and kind of punishment to be inflicted; but if the defendant plead guilty to a charge of murder, a jury shall be impaneled to hear testimony, and determine the degree of murder and the punishment therefor.'

Upon this, the petitioner contends, the lower court had no jurisdiction whatever to enter the judgment in question, that the judgment is void, and, being so, is incurable by amendment or otherwise, and petitioner is entitled to discharge.

No proposition is better settled in this state than that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to collaterally attack a judgment, even though the judgment is erroneous, if not utterly void. In re Casey, 27 Wash. 686, 68 P. 185; In re Newcomb, 56 Wash. 395, 105 P. 1042; In re Miller (Wash.) 225 P. 429.

There can be no doubt, under the record brought up by petitioner, that the superior court for Cowlitz county had jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter involved in the prosecution against petitioner. The information in the case charged that the crime was committed on November 28, 1917, in the county of Cowlitz, state of Washington; that the crime charged was that of murder in the first degree, an offense of which the court, a court of general jurisdiction, assuredly had jurisdiction, and was competent to proceed to final determination and judgment. Upon this information petitioner was arrested upon a warrant, and taken into custody. He was thereafter taken before the court, arraigned, and pleaded guilty. The person, place, and crime were within the jurisdiction of that court. It is therefore uncontrovertably shown that the lower court had jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter of the prosecution.

The contention that the judgment was void on its face cannot be sustained, in view of our decision in Re Casey, supra, where the law was ably discussed.

A judgment may be erroneous and not void. It may be erroneous because it is excessive or deficient, or because of some irregularity in the procedure occurring at or before the trial; but a judgment or...

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18 cases
  • In re Coats
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 17, 2011
    ...on its face ” where court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter (emphasis added)); In re Habeas Corpus of Voight, 130 Wash. 140, 143, 226 P. 482 (1924) ( Voight I ) (“ ‘[a] judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, valid upon its face, and a valid commitment under it, i......
  • Voigt v. Webb
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Washington
    • November 13, 1942
    ...to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington two petitions for habeas corpus. The first was in 1924. It was denied. See In re Voight, 130 Wash. 140, 226 P. 482. The second was presented in 1941. It also was denied. See Voigt v. Mahoney, 10 Wash.2d 157, 116 P.2d 300. This petition is base......
  • Ex parte Hulet
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • October 15, 1930
    ...of an act cannot be tested by habeas corpus, but must be presented to this court on appeal. As stated in the opinion in Re Voight, supra, quoting from opinion in the case of Smith v. Hess, 91 Ind. 424: "A judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, valid upon its face,' and a valid commi......
  • Ex parte Higdon
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 15, 1948
    ...the time limited by statute, or by a suit setting up some equitable ground for its vacation.' (Italics ours.)' We again quote from In re Voight, supra: judgment may be erroneous and not void. It may be erroneous because it is excessive or deficient, or because of some irregularity in the pr......
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