Ex parte Welch

• Decision Date: 06 November 1987
• Citation: 519 So.2d 517
• Parties: Ex parte Don Alan WELCH. (Re Don Alan WELCH v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.) 86-595.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 517

519 So.2d 517

Ex parte Don Alan WELCH (Re Don Alan WELCH v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.)

86-595.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 6, 1987.

W. Wheeler Smith, Birmingham, for petitioner.

Ray Acton, Legal Unit, Dept. of Public Safety, Montgomery, for respondent.

ALMON, Justice.

This Court granted a petition for certiorari to review this case because there appeared to be a material question of first impression that was erroneously decided by the Court of Civil Appeals, 519 So.2d 514. The case involves the Driver License Compact, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 32-6-30 through -36, and specifically, whether the licensing authority of this State can, in any circumstances, issue a license before the expiration of a revocation period imposed by the State of an applicant's former residence.

Petitioner Welch had his Florida license revoked for five years after his second conviction there for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Thirteen months later, he moved to Alabama, where a second conviction of DUI requires a one-year license revocation. See Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5A-191(d). Thus, under the licensing provisions of this State, he would have been able to apply for an Alabama license when he moved here.

The Driver License Division of the Department of Public Safety refused to issue him a license, however, whereupon he requested an administrative hearing. The chief of the license division wrote his attorney a letter in reply, stating:

"Under the Driver License Compact Act, this Department is prohibited from issuing your client a driver license until the withdrawal against his driver license in any other state is terminated.

"I realize Mr. Welch's need for a license; however, I am sure you realize my position in that we are unable to issue him a driver license until he obtains a letter of clearance from the State of Florida.

"Therefore, he is not entitled to a hearing in this state."

The record contains no further mention of a "letter of clearance." On the contrary, after the filing of this suit, the Department of Public Safety admitted that it had not "formulated, propounded, or proscribed [sic] written rules and regulations for the administration and implementation of the Alabama Driver License Compact Act."

Welch filed this suit against the Department of Public Safety, its director, and the chief of the driver license division. The complaint sought a judgment declaring that Welch is entitled to an investigation as to whether it will be safe to grant him driving privileges and for an injunction requiring the Department to conduct such an investigation. He contended that the refusal to issue a license "imposes an unfair and unreasonable burden on his ability to maintain employment in his profession and earn his livelihood"; that "a five year period of revocation is extraordinarily severe, especially in light of Ala.Code § 32-5A-191(d) which would impose a maximum period of only one year for the second offense"; and that

"such continued denial of his driving privileges ... constitutes ... an unwarranted and abusive violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Alabama, by arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating between citizens of the State of Alabama in that [the] maximum length of revocation that Alabama would impose on its citizens for a second offense is one year, which is in excess [sic] of the period of deprivation of driving privileges the State of Alabama is imposing on the plaintiff by refusing to issue him a driver's license."

Welch executed and attached to his complaint an affidavit stating that he was not afflicted with any physical or mental disability that would prevent him from driving, that he was familiar with the driving rules and regulations of Alabama, and other things tending to show his capacity to be a safe driver, including:

"I am not now, nor have I ever been a habitual drunkard or addict to the use of narcotic drugs. I have not consumed any alcoholic beverages or any other intoxicant in over 6 months."

The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Defendants have not filed a brief in this Court.

Congress passed a resolution in 1958 giving its consent for the states to enter into agreements or compacts

"for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the establishment and carrying out of traffic safety programs, including, but not limited to, the enactment of uniform traffic laws, driver education and training, coordination of traffic law enforcement...."

P.L. 85-684, 72 Stat. 635. The Driver License Compact stems from this enactment and has been adopted by at least 30 states.

The Alabama legislature enacted the Compact in 1966. See Ala.Code 1975, §§ 36-6-30 through -36. The terms of the Compact itself are included in § 36-6-31. The provisions pertinent to this case are in Article V, "Application for New Licenses":

"Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held or is the holder of a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:

"(1) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been suspended ¹ by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such suspension has not terminated.

"(2) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways."

The Court of Civil Appeals held that the language "if permitted by law" brings in a reference to § 32-6-7: "A driver's license shall not be issued to the following persons: ... (3) Any person whose driving right or privilege is revoked."

This Code provision has not been amended since 1947, so the legislature necessarily did not have the Compact in mind when it wrote this provision. Thus, there is no reason to read § 32-6-7(3) as incorporating extraterritorial revocations, which are entirely outside the control of the legislature of this state. To give this section the reading applied by the Court of Civil Appeals would make any revocation by a Compact state, however severe, binding on the licensing authority of this state.

Furthermore, the interpretation by the Court of Civil Appeals requires a deviation from the terms of the Compact itself. That court's analysis makes two references to the law of the state that revoked the license. First, under the Compact, the Department looks to other jurisdictions, and if the applicant has had his license revoked, he may not apply, except that he may do so after a year if permitted by law. Second, to determine if an application is "permitted by law," the Court of Civil Appeals would have the licensing authority look again to the revocation made by the former licensing state. If the revocation is still in force under its own terms, an application for a new license could never be permitted by law under the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion until the original revocation expires.

The opinion of the Court of Civil appeals and the practice of the Department have the effect of changing the Compact language from "The licensing authority ... shall not issue a license ... if such revocation has not terminated, except ... after the expiration of one year ...," to "The licensing authority ... shall not issue a license ... if such revocation has not terminated, except ... after the termination of the revocation ...," and the exception allowing application after one year becomes meaningless and has no field of operation. Thus, the inquiry would end as soon as it is discovered that the license is revoked and the revocation has not expired. The drafters of the Compact cannot be presumed to have done a futile thing by inserting the exception in article V(2).

"A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error."

Sutherland Stat. Const. § 46.06 (4th ed.).

Thus, an examination of the terms of the Compact and the law of this state leads to the conclusion that the exception should be construed as allowing an application and investigation after a year even if a prior revocation has not expired.

This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, to achieve the meaning found by the Court of Civil Appeals, the Compact drafters could simply have combined (1) and (2) as follows:

"(1) The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been suspended or revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such suspension or revocation has not terminated. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any applicant whose license has been revoked if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways."

Because of the strong reciprocity policy of the Compact, we have researched the cases of other member states. No case directly on point has come to our attention, but to the extent the cases are analogous or contain dicta regarding this provision, they are consistent with the conclusion we have reached.

The case most closely on point is People v. Klaub, 130...