Ex parte White

• Decision Date: 15 February 1935
• Docket Number: A-8794.
• Parties: Ex parte WHITE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

41 P.2d 488

56 Okla.Crim. 418

Ex parte WHITE.

No. A-8794.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

February 15, 1935

Syllabus by the Court.

The provisions of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the solicitation within the city of funds for charitable or benevolent purposes by any one not in possession of a permit from the solicitations' committee appointed by the mayor of the city is not unconstitutional as granting an arbitrary power to municipal officers.

Original habeas corpus proceeding by Maude White against the Chief of Police of Tulsa.

Writ denied.

Joe W Simpson, of Tulsa, for petitioner.

H. O Bland, E. M. Gallaher, Bert E. Johnson, and Carl H. Ravis all of Tulsa, for respondent.

EDWARDS Judge.

This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges she is unlawfully restrained by the chief of police of Tulsa that she was convicted in the municipal court of violating sections 16, 18, and 19, art. 3, c. 35, Ordinances of the city of Tulsa, which forbid soliciting contributions for certain purposes without a permit; that said ordinance is unconstitutional, for the reason it vests in ministerial officers an arbitrary power to grant or refuse license without providing rules and regulations, and that it is too vague, indefinite, and uncertain to define an offense.

The chief of police in response states he is holding petitioner by commitment of the municipal court on a conviction for violation of an ordinance prohibiting soliciting funds for charitable and benevolent purposes without having obtained a permit.

The ordinance in question creates a city solicitations' committee of three members, appointed by the mayor, consisting of the chief of police, secretary of the retail merchant's association, and secretary of the ministerial alliance. It provides that no person shall solicit for charitable, religious, or benevolent purposes, or sell or offer tickets or advertising for benefit performances to finance work of charity, religion, or benevolence, without having first obtained a permit and providing for written application for permit to be made to the secretary of the committee, stating the name of the person desiring to solicit and the purpose for which the funds are to be solicited; that said committee shall then investigate such applications, and, if they find the person desiring to solicit funds is in good faith for a bona fide charitable, religious, or benevolent purpose, the permit shall be issued by the secretary; if not, it shall be refused, and appeal may then be had to the full committee, where a majority may issue or refuse permit. The ordinance exempts from its application any church or charitable, religious, or benevolent association which solicits funds or advertises or sells tickets within the membership of its organization or subdivision or subordinate organization, but provides that solicitation outside of its membership shall not be conducted without the approval of the solicitations' committee.

Petitioner relies mainly on Ex parte Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 155 P. 63, L. R. A. 1916D, 905, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1127, which held unconstitutional an ordinance of Los Angeles quite similar to the ordinance here. That court appears to have been more impressed with the manner in which the ordinance was attempted to be enforced than with the question of its validity. It appears the charities' commission of the city demanded that the Salvation Army, of which petitioner was an officer, as a condition precedent to obtaining the permit, should be governed by a local board, residents of the city, and that all the property of the Salvation Army in the city should be conveyed to its local board and its financial work conducted by such local board, and that no budget or funds should be prepared and enforced for other than work in Los Angeles; that all its offerings and contributions should be for local purposes and none used by the general officers. That this was an arbitrary and unreasonable requirement is evident. It no doubt influenced the opinion, for the court expressly held the soliciting contributions for charitable purposes might be regulated, providing reasonable supervision of the person engaged and restrictions on the use of the contributions received to prevent unscrupulous persons from obtaining money or to prevent the wrongful conversion of such funds. The California court has receded from the Dart Case. See Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 166 P. 348, 349; Carter v. Stevens, 211 Cal. 281, 295 P. 28; Ex parte Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 203 P. 398; Bleuel v. City of Oakland et al., 87 Cal.App. 594, 262 P. 477.

In Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, supra, the court said "Even a casual observer of governmental growth and development must have observed the ever-increasing multiplicity and complexity of administrative affairs-national, state, and municipal-and even the occasional reader of the law must have perceived that from necessity, if for no better grounded reason, it has become increasingly imperative that many quasi legislative and quasi judicial functions, which in smaller communities and under more primitive conditions were performed by the legislative or judicial...