Ex parte Williams
| Decision Date | 20 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 69970,69970 |
| Citation | 748 S.W.2d 461 |
| Parties | Ex parte James Carol WILLIAMS, Applicant. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
After being convicted of capital murder in connection with the fatal shooting of a Shamrock service station attendant during the course of a robbery, and receiving the death penalty, applicant, James Carol Williams, has requested habeas corpus relief from this Court pursuant to Art. 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. This case was originally tried in Harris County, and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by this Court on June 11, 1980. Williams v. State, 604 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The applicant's request for rehearing was later denied on September 17, 1980. On April 10, 1987, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. This Court on January 5, 1988, granted applicant's stay of execution pending the disposition of this post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus.
As in Ex parte Hughes, 728 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), the passage of time has proven to be a true ally to applicant. Since applicant's trial and conviction the United States Supreme Court decided Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980).
It is the contention of applicant that the trial court impermissibly granted the State's challenge for cause and excused prospective juror Manuel Balles. Although the voir dire examination of venireperson Balles, was conducted two years before the Supreme Court decided Adams v. Texas, supra, this Court has given retroactive effect to Adams and is bound by that decision. Ex parte Hughes, supra; Ex parte Bravo, 702 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Mead v. State, 645 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
At the outset of the voir dire examination of Balles, the trial court and the attorneys attempted to detail the Texas capital murder scheme and procedure relevant to Art. 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P. 1 After Balles indicated that he possessed some conscientious scruples in regard to the death penalty the following occurred:
Mr. Nettles [prosecutor]: Knowing that, the fact that you do have certain objections, knowing that when you go back there--I'll explain a little about a criminal case. There are two phases to it. The first phase is to decide whether or not the man is guilty. Play like you are on the jury. You have already been picked and we've selected you; okay?
Mr. Balles: Right.
Mr. Nettles: You are on [sic] there. On the first phase of the trial you're going to hear the facts of the case which in this particular case involved a robbery and a murder altogether, at the same time; okay?
Mr. Balles: Okay.
Mr. Nettles: You are going to listen to evidence on that case. Now, after we've put on the evidence and they've put on the evidence, you have to go back in a jury room with eleven other people and you've got to decide based on that evidence that you heard whether or not he is guilty; okay?
Mr. Balles: Okay.
Mr. Nettles: All right. Now, knowing that when you go back there and you find the man is either guilty or not guilty, based on the evidence you heard--I can't tell you what the evidence is. The Judge doesn't know what it is. Lawyers each have their own versions of what that evidence is. But knowing if you find this man guilty, if you decide he is guilty of this offense as alleged, that there is only two ways the jury can go. Either he's going to get life or get death. But knowing death is one of the possible punishments, knowing this man can die for it and knowing you are opposed to it, the way you stated to the Court and the rest of us, you have opposition to the death penalty, will that effect you in voting on whether or not he is guilty or not guilty?
In other words, sir, is it going to have some effect on your deliberating knowing if you find the man guilty he can possibly die and you have stated that you are opposed to the death penalty? Is that going to affect you in your deliberations in making that decision?
Mr. Balles: Yes.
Mr. Nettles: It will affect you?
Mr. Balles: Yes.
Mr. Nettles: Challenge for cause, Your Honor.
The Court: You are excused.
Mr. Crow [defense attorney]: May we have questions before the challenge is accepted by the Court? There is a possibility this person doesn't understand.
The Court: Go ahead. Ask your questions.
Responding to the inartful questions posed by defense counsel, Mr. Balles agreed that he would not have any qualms about giving "a guy" the death penalty in the proper case, 2 and had previously indicated to the trial court that his conscientious scruples concerning the death penalty would not cause him to "... disregard the facts in the case and vote for something less than death[.]"
Eventually the trial court sustained the State's challenge for cause as originally interposed, 3 and based upon the record it can only be concluded that the exclusion of prospective juror Balles was solely grounded upon V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 12.31(b), which provides:
Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the Supreme Court decreed that the State infringes on a capital murder defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it excuses for cause all veniremembers who express conscientious objections to capital punishment. As indicated in both Ex parte Russell, 720 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) and Knox v. State, 744 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), the proper and exclusive basis upon which a prospective juror could be excluded for cause appeared to be the reasons set forth in Witherspoon 's footnote 21, when it was shown that said juror made it
unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty might prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. at 522, n. 21 88 S.Ct. at 1722, n. 21. [Emphasis original.]
Adams v. Texas, supra, suggested that the standard enunciated in Witherspoon 's footnote 21 was not as rigid as first believed, and established as a general proposition "that a juror may not be challenged for cause based upon his views of capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath." Id., 100 S.Ct. at 2526. The pertinent holding of Adams v. Texas, id., was that the State could not, consistent with the Federal Constitution, utilize § 12.31(b) of the Texas Penal Code to exclude from capital murder jury service those jurors "who stated that they would be 'affected' by the possibility of the death penalty, but who apparently meant only that the potentially lethal consequences of their decision would invest their deliberations with greater seriousness and gravity or would involve them emotionally." Adams v. Texas, id., at 2528; see also Ex parte Hughes, supra, at 374.
In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the Supreme Court clarified its decision in Witherspoon, and reaffirmed the standard suggested in Adams, as "the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment." Id., 105 S.Ct. at 851. This Court, in Ex parte Hughes, supra, aptly summarized the effect of the Witt decision on the previous standards announced in Witherspoon:
The decision in Wainwright v. Witt, id., did basically three things: '(1) modified Witherspoon to the extent that "automatically" ... [voting] against the imposition of capital punishment,' id., 105 S.Ct. at 845, as set...
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