Ex parte Woodruff, 8125

Decision Date25 July 1972
Docket NumberNo. 8125,8125
Citation483 S.W.2d 951
PartiesEx parte William Rex WOODRUFF.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Merritt Gibson, Longview, for relator.

Ralph Prince, Dist. Atty., Longview, for respondent.

John Smith, Smead, Roberts, Harbour, Smith, Harris & French, Longview, for intervenor.

PER CURIAM.

Pending a hearing on the merits of William Rex Woodruff's application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, an original proceeding in this Court, 1 one of the Court's judges ordered Woodruff released from the custody of the Sheriff of Gregg County, Texas, upon posting bail bond. The Woodruff application, exclusive of the instrument annexed to it, is as follows:

'THE STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF GREGG

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS:

Now respectfully comes WILLIAM REX WOODRUFF, and making this petition for a writ of habeas corpus shows the Court:

That petitioner is illegally confined and is illegally restrained in his liberty in the county jail in Longview, Gregg County, Texas, by Noble Crawford, the Sheriff of said county; that such illegal restraint and confinement is by virtue of a certain Order of Commitment, a copy of which is annexed to this petition and made a part hereof.

Wherefore petitioner prays that this court grant and issue a writ of habeas corpus forthwith and that petitioner be released on bail pending a hearing on the merits of this petition, and that petitioner be discharged.

William Rex Woodruff

William Rex Woodruff,

Petitioner

THE STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF GREGG

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority on this day personally appeared William Rex Woodruff, who being by me duly sworn, upon oath says that he is the petitioner in the above and foregoing petition, that he has read said petition and that the allegations of the same are true according to the belief of the petitioner.

William Rex Woodruff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by the said William Rex Woodruff this the 5th day of June, 1972.

Margie Crnkovic

Notary Public in and for

Gregg County, Texas'

The annexed instrument is a photographic reproduction of a document that purports to be a certified copy of an order signed by the Judge of the Domestic Relations Court, Gregg County, Texas. The instrument is copied in a subsequent paragraph.

The sufficiency of the Woodruff application 2 and supporting data is doubtful. It is observable that the application speaks in conclusory terms and merely sets out a conclusion that Woodruff is illegally restrained. The instrument annexed to the application does not on its face show illegality of Woodruff's restraint or confinement. But neither these nor other possibly defective constituents of a sufficient application will be pursued as jurisdiction has been assumed and a full scale hearing concluded. Little would be gained by dismissing the application because of form at this juncture as it is probable that a new or amended application would be promptly filed.

The trial court motion to hold Woodruff in contempt alleged that Woodruff 'failed and refused' to pay child support arrearage. The instrument labeled 'Order of Commitment,' which is copied hereafter, recited that Woodruff 'willfully' disobeyed the support order when he was 'well able to have obeyed.' Woodruff cites Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 123 S.W.2d 306, 126 S.W.2d 626 (1939), for the proposition that contempt proceedings are criminal in nature and that willfulness is an essential element of contempt. From this base it is reasoned that an allegation of willfulness is a prerequisite to jurisdiction of the trial court. The motion is in substantial compliance with Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 308--A. Though contempt proceedings are frequently said to be criminal in nature, the mentioned rule governs pleading and practice in cases where the contemptuous conduct is alleged to be disobedience of a child support order. The rule requires a verified written statement describing the claimed disobedience and expressly dispenses with other written pleadings. Simplicity in pleading and practice is so characteristic of the rule that a construction requiring a written complaint to use particular or artful words or allegations would run counter to the rule's spirit and purpose. Reading into the rule a requirement that the complaint contain allegations of ability to pay and willful disobedience would violate the rule's express policy that no written pleadings be required except a statement describing the claimed disobedience.

The point is additionally made and argued that the trial court judgment did not conform to the allegations in the pleadings and that as a result the judgment is void as a violation of Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 301. Woodruff's argument assumes that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs this procedural aspect of the action in the trial court. Consistent with such assumption, other pertinent rules on the same subject would necessarily have effect also. Failure to object to the pleadings constitutes a waiver of defects threin under Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 90 and trial of issues outside the pleadings is authorized by Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 67. In the absence of a record showing the contrary, the implication of the judgment is that any defect in pleadings was waived and that the issues of willfulness and ability to pay were tried outside the written pleadings. Woodruff's first and second points of error are overruled.

Briefed as Woodruff's third point of error is the contention that Woodruff was 'illegally confined and is illegally restrained because no writ or other written instrument was issued and directed to the Sheriff of Gregg County ordering or directing him to confine Woodruff in jail.' The previously mentioned instrument attached to the Woodruff application in this Court and labeled Order of Commitments is in this language, to-wit:

'NO. 416--F1DR

IN THE COURT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN AND FOR GREGG COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER OF COMMITMENT

BE IT REMEMBERED that on this the 2nd day of June, 1972 came on to be considered the statement and affidavit of Leverne Woodruff to adjudge William Rex Woodruff to be in contempt of Court for failure to observe and obey the Order, Judgment, and Decree in the above styled and numbered cause recorded in Minute Book Volume 99, pages 101--108 of the minutes of this Court, and Respondent having full notice of said hearing, the notice to show cause having been served on May 10, 1972;

AND William Rex Woodruff came (By Counsel);

AND, the Court having heard the evidence and read the pleadings herein is of the opinion that the said William Rex Woodruff has;

1. Willfully disobeyed and failed to observe the above cited Order, Judgment, and Decree of this Court, which Order he was well able to have obeyed prior to the hearing herein, and that he should be adjudged, and he is hereby adjudged to be in contempt of this Court for such willful failure and disobedience and;

A. It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that William Rex Woodruff be, and he is hereby adjudged to be in contempt of this Court for such failure and disobedience, and the punishment therefor is fixed and assessed at confinement by the Sheriff of Gregg County, Texas, in the County Jail at Longview, Gregg County, Texas for a period of 72 hours; and he is ordered further confined in jail until he has fully purged himself of such contempt by the payment of all child support arrearages under the above cited order into the Registry of this Court, the balance of said arrearages at the date of this order being in the amount of $340.00 and by the payment in full to the clerk of this Court of all costs to date.

Wm. C. Martin, III
Judge, Court of Comestic Relations In and For Gregg County, Texas

I certify that the above and foregoing is a true copy of the order of this Court entered by this Court and filed with this Court at 5:55 p.m. on the 2nd day of June, 1972.

Wm. C. Martin, III
Wm. C. Martin, III
Judge, Domestic Relations Court In and For Gregg County, Texas

A printed form was used in preparing the order in which blanks were filled in and portions marked out. Only the operative portion is copied. Examination of the instrument confirms that it is of a dual nature. It clearly embodies a judgment of the Court. It also fixes punishment and orders confinement in jail. In Ex parte Arapis, 157 Tex. 627, 306 S.W.2d 884 (1957), it is said: 'A 'commitment' is a warrant, order or process by which a court or magistrate directs a ministerial officer to take a person to jail or to prison and to detain him there. 7A Words and Phrases, Commitment, p. 577, et seq. It is the written authority under which the officer acts. 'There is no particular form prescribed by law for a commitment.' Ex parte Palmateer, 150 Tex. 510, 243 S.W.2d 160, 161....

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8 cases
  • Ex parte Barnett
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • May 14, 1980
    ...parte Smart, supra; Ex parte Palmateer, supra; Ex parte Lazaro, 482 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1972); Ex parte Woodruff, 483 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1972). In this case, no order or judgment of contempt was signed by the judge coincidently with the signing of the commitm......
  • Ex parte Barlow
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 25, 1995
    ...to follow these cases because they have converted an incorrect assumption into law. All three cases can be traced back to Ex parte Woodruff, 483 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1972, orig. proceeding). The Occhipenti case relies on Stephens and Blackmon. Stephens relies on Blackmon and ......
  • Ex parte Jones
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • October 24, 1985
    ...510, 243 S.W.2d 160 (1951); Ex parte Snow, 677 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, original proceeding); see also Ex parte Woodruff, 483 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana), writ dism'd per curiam sub nom. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 487 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.1972); Ex parte Lazaro, 482 S.......
  • Ex parte Stephens, 2-87-076-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 12, 1987
    ...object at the trial court. See Ex parte Blackmon, 529 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex.Civ.App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ); Ex parte Woodruff, 483 S.W.2d 951, 954 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana), writ dism'd w.o.j., 487 S.W.2d 692 Therefore, we overrule Stephens' first complaint. Second, Stephens c......
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