Ex Parte Young

• Decision Date: 23 March 1906
• Citation: 95 S.W. 98
• Parties: Ex parte YOUNG.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

95 S.W. 98

Ex parte YOUNG.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 23, 1906.

Application by Tom Young, alias Jack Wade, for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from custody after sentence on a conviction of murder. Writ refused.

J. F. Taulbee and Sandbo & Shelton, for applicant. Howard Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROOKS, J.

This is an application for the writ of habeas corpus, under the following facts: Applicant was prosecuted in the district court of Williamson county under an indictment charging him with murder; and upon the trial was convicted, and his punishment assessed at death. He appealed to this court, and the judgment was affirmed at the present term, and a motion for rehearing overruled. See Young v. State (decided at present term) 92 S. W. 841. The mandate was issued, but was not delivered to the clerk of the district court of Williamson county, until the regular term had expired. Thereupon the judge of said district court called a special term of said court, under the provisions of chapter 83, p. 116, of the Acts of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature (Gen. Laws 1905), for the sole purpose of sentencing applicant to death. He applies to this court for the writ of habeas corpus because the district judge of Williamson county cannot call a special term for the sole purpose of sentencing relator.

Article 1113, c. 4, Sayles' Rev. Civ. St reads: "In any county in this state where it may become necessary in the opinion of the district judge of the district in which said county is situated, on account of an accumulation of business, which cannot be disposed of in the time provided for the regular term of the district court, there may be held a special term or terms of the district court for the transaction and disposition of the accumulated business undisposed of as hereinafter provided for." Article 1115 provides, that the clerk shall make up six notices containing the name, style, and number of each case appearing upon the docket of said court. Article 1116 provides, that the sheriff shall post the copy of said notices at six public places, etc. A careful reading of chapter 4 leads to the irresistible conclusion that it does not provide for the holding of a special term for any business save and except undisposed of business. However, applicant insists that chapter 83, p. 116, of the Acts of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature (Gen. Laws 1095), does not change chapter 4 of Sayles' Rev. Civ. St., in reference to the cases that can be tried at the special term. This is not correct. The Acts of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature provide for the organization of a grand jury, and the trial of new cases. This being true, we take it, that the district judge could call a special session of the district court for the specific purpose of sentencing applicant. The Acts of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature provide, that nothing herein contained shall be held to repeal any part of the provisions of chapter 4, tit. 28, Sayles' Rev. Civ. St. of Texas, except so far as the same may be inconsistent with the provisions of this act. Section 1 of the act of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature provides: "When it may become advisable in the opinion of the judge of the district in which any county in the state of Texas may be situated, to hold a special term or terms of the district court therein, such special term or terms may be held." No clause in said act indicates that nothing but old business shall be disposed of at the special term; but every provision of the act of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature shows that any and all matters can be tried at said special term that could be tried at the regular term. The act of 1895 authorizing the special term of the district court of Travis and Williamson counties, has no application to the question here considered. Nor do we think the act of 1905 is unconstitutional on the ground that the same is ex post facto. We do not see fit to discuss the matter further, but hold that it was clearly within the power granted by the Twenty-Ninth Legislature, for the judge to call the special session of the district court in Williamson county for the specific purpose of sentencing applicant. The application for the writ of habeas corpus is accordingly refused.

HENDERSON, J. (concurring).

This is an original application for the writ of habeas corpus. It shows that applicant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and given the death penalty in the district court of Williamson county, which judgment on appeal was affirmed at a previous day of this term. The mandate issued and was forwarded to the district court of Williamson county, which reached there after the adjournment of the regular term of that court. The district judge of the Twenty-Sixth judicial district (including Williamson and Travis counties) called a special term of the district court for the sole purpose of passing the death sentence on applicant. Applicant contends that the district judge of the Twenty-Sixth judicial district court was without authority to call said special term for the purpose of passing such death sentence; and that therefore his action in passing said sentence at the special term was null and void, and he invokes the authority of this court by the writ of habeas corpus to sustain his contention.

It may be stated that in 1895, two acts of the Legislature were brought forward in Sayles' Revised Civil Statutes with reference to special terms of the district courts. One was the act of 1879, which was a general act, authorizing all district judges throughout the state to call special terms of their district courts in their respective counties under certain contingencies named in said act. See articles 1111-1119, inclusive, Sayles' Rev. Civ. St. The other was the act of 1893, which authorized the judge of the Twenty-Sixth judicial district (composed of the counties of Travis and Williamson) to call special terms in the counties composing said district, in accordance with the provisions named in said act, applicable to the said district. Reviewing these two acts it will be seen that the general act authorizes the district judges throughout the state to call special terms of courts in their respective counties for the purpose of disposing of business on their dockets, both of a civil and criminal character, and appears to have been enacted on account of the accumulated business in the district courts which gave authority to call special terms. The other act related to the Twenty-Sixth judicial district, and may be treated as a special act, and gave authority to the district judge of said district to call special terms of his court under the circumstances mentioned in said act for the disposition of civil cases alone. The question arises as between said acts: If there be a conflict, which prevails? We hold that there is a conflict between said acts as to civil cases, and that under the rules of interpretation applicable to the construction of special and general acts, that the special act is paramount, unless there is a manifest purpose by the general act to repeal or nullify the special act. There is no such purpose manifested here. Therefore, the special act must prevail as to the disposition of civil cases in the Twenty-Sixth judicial district. Sutherland on Stat. Con. §§ 157, 158, 159; Black, Inter. of Laws, p. 116; Endlich on Inter. of Stat. §§ 230, 231.

We further hold that there is no conflict between said acts as relates to criminal cases; and the rule being in such case, where there is no conflict, that said acts are construed in pari materia, consequently the general act remains in force as to the trial and disposition of criminal cases. Now, in 1905, the Twenty-Ninth Legislature (page 116) passed an act evidently intended to amend the general act of Sayles' Revised Civil Statutes of 1895, and especially article 1113 of said act. It may be observed that under the general act of 1895, authorizing special terms, that article 1113 provides, "In any county in this state where it may become necessary in the opinion of the district judge of the district in which said county is situated (on account of an accumulation of business which cannot be disposed of in the time provided for the regular term of the district court) there may be held a special term or terms of the district court (for the transaction and disposition of the accumulated business undisposed of as hereinafter provided for)." The act of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature authorizes, "the judge of the district court in which a county may be situated, in which it is deemed advisable by such judge that a special term of the courts should be held, may convene such special term of the court at any time which may be fixed by him." This is a re-enactment of article 1113 with the provisions in said act inclosed in our parentheses above left out. That is, it will be seen that formerly the judge of the district court could only call a special term for the transaction and disposition of the accumulated business undisposed of, while under the new act he is authorized to call a special term whenever it may become advisable in his opinion. Other differentials between said general act and the amendment relate to the power of the district judge with reference to grand juries and the disposition of new business. Under the former act no grand jury was authorized, while under the amendment the judge is authorized to impanel a grand jury, and is also authorized at such special term to try cases indicted by said grand jury. It may also be stated that the act of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature refers to said general act, and indicates that the provisions of said general act inconsistent with said amendment are only repealed; leaving the other portions of said general act standing in connection with the amendment. We think it will be conceded when a district court is constituted; that, is organized for a term, general or special, it can do anything which a district...