Excise Bd. of Marshall County v. School Dist. No. 34 of Marshall County
| Decision Date | 25 March 1932 |
| Docket Number | 23256. |
| Citation | 10 P.2d 643,156 Okla. 261,1932 OK 230 |
| Parties | EXCISE BOARD OF MARSHALL COUNTY et al. v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 34 OF MARSHALL COUNTY. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied April 26, 1932.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. By the provisions of section 9, article 10, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, a majority of the voters of a school district voting at an election held for that purpose was made the proper authority of the school district to increase the annual rate of levy on an ad valorem basis therein provided for school district purposes by an amount not to exceed ten mills on the dollar valuation.
2. Section 9, article 10, of the Constitution, is both a limitation and a grant of power. It is a grant of power to a majority of the voters of a school district voting at an election held for that purpose to increase the annual rate of taxation on an ad valorem basis for school purposes by an amount not to exceed ten mills on the dollar valuation.
3. Procedure for the fixing of rates of school district levies and for the holding of elections authorized by the provisions of section 9, article 10, of the Constitution, was provided by extending in force the territorial statutes under the provisions of section 2 of the Schedule of the Constitution. That procedure has been changed from time to time. As to common school districts it is now provided by sections 9708 and 10339, C. O. S. 1921.
4. Qualified electors at a school district election held for the purpose of determining whether or not the rate of levy for school district purposes shall be increased by an amount not to exceed ten mills on the dollar valuation are those defined by article 3 of the Constitution of Oklahoma. The Legislature is without authority to provide other qualifications or to provide that the authority granted by the provisions of section 9, article 10, of the Constitution, to the voters of school districts may be exercised only by "taxpaying voters" of the school districts.
5. Section 9696, C. O. S. 1921, violates the provisions of section 9, article 10, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, and is ineffective and void.
6. There is nothing in the statutes of Oklahoma requiring an estimate of needs of a common school district to be approved by a majority of the voters of the school district.
7. Sections 9708 and 10339, C. O. S. 1921, relate to common school districts. The special provisions thereof prevail over the general provisions of section 9698, C. O. S. 1921.
8. There is no authority in a county excise board to determine the number of teachers necessary to be employed by a school district, that authority being vested in the school district and a county excise board is without authority of law to reduce an estimate of a school district for salaries of teachers though, in the judgment of the excise board, the number of teachers employed by the district is in excess of its needs.
9. The refusal of a trial court to permit taxpayers to intervene in an action involving the rate of levy for school district purposes is not reversible error where it is shown that no prejudice resulted from the denial of the request to intervene. In the instant case no prejudice resulted therefrom.
10. Section 9708, C. O. S. 1921, is not within the inhibition of section 57, article 5, of the Constitution; it is in harmony with the provisions of section 19, article 10, of the Constitution; it is a valid enactment, and is in full force and effect.
11. The several items of an estimate prepared pursuant to the provisions of section 9708, C. O. S. 1921, and duly certified to the county excise board by a common school district, when approved by the excise board, constitute appropriations of funds for the several and specific purposes named in such estimate.
12. An estimate made by a common school district for the conduct of a school may not be reduced by the excise board, if the rate of levy authorized by the voters of the district under the statutory and constitutional limitations is sufficient to produce the amount of the estimate made.
13. Where a writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the performance of a statutory duty which is plain and definite, the refusal to perform such statutory duty is sufficient to authorize the issuance of the writ.
Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; Porter Newman, Judge.
Suit by School District No. 34 of Marshall County against the Excise Board of Marshall County and others. Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Rehearing denied; LESTER, C.J., and HEFNER and KORNEGAY, JJ., dissenting.
Reuel W. Little and E. S. Hurt, Co. Atty., both of Madill, for plaintiffs in error.
Don Welch, of Madill, for defendant in error.
At the annual meeting of school district No. 34, Marshall county, Okl., a majority of the voters thereof voting at the meeting voted to increase the rate of levy for the school district by an amount of 10 mills above the 5-mill limitation. Thereafter the school board, at a meeting called for that purpose, prepared, executed, and certified to the county excise board a financial statement and estimate of the needs of the school district for the ensuing fiscal year. They attached thereto their certificate showing the result of the election as to the rate of levy. The certificate showed that twenty-seven voted for the increased levy and that none voted against it. Thereafter the excise board revised the statement of estimated needs certified to it by the school board and reduced the amount thereof for current expenses from $4,322 to $2,804. The excise board fixed the rate of levy at 4.53 mills. Upon the application of the school district, as plaintiff, the district court of Marshall county granted a writ requiring the excise board to approve the estimate certified to it by the school board and to make a levy accordingly. From that judgment the county excise board has appealed.
Among other things, the county excise board contends that it had the authority to reduce both the estimate and the rate of levy for the reason that the action of the school district was void because the estimate certified to and filed with the county excise board by the school board was not voted on and approved by the voters of the school district.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of Oklahoma, the Legislature of the Territory of Oklahoma had made provision for the levying of taxes. It had provided a maximum and minimum rate of general territorial tax (section 5995, Wilson's Statutes 1903) to be fixed by the territorial board of equalization, the territorial auditor, or the board of county commissioners (section 5998, Wilson's Statutes 1903). Cities had been authorized to levy and collect taxes for general revenue purposes not exceeding a maximum rate fixed. Sections 370 and 466, Wilson's Statutes 1903. The boards of trustees of incorporated towns had been authorized to determine the general amount of tax for the current year. Sections 519 and 521, Wilson's Statutes 1903. The inhabitants of school districts qualified to vote at a school meeting had been authorized to vote annually a tax on all the taxable property in the districts at the annual school meetings for school purposes. Section 6154, Wilson's Statutes 1903. Boards of education of independent school districts had been authorized to levy a tax for the support of schools. Section 6262, Wilson's Statutes 1903. The taxes so levied were required to be certified to the county clerk, who was authorized and required to place the same on the tax roll to be collected by the treasurer of the county.
By the provisions of section 2 of the Schedule of the Constitution, the laws of the territory of Oklahoma, at the time of the admission of the state into the Union, which were not repugnant to the Constitution and which were not locally inapplicable, were extended to and remained in force in the state of Oklahoma until they expired by their own limitation or were altered or repealed by law. By that provision the constitutional convention and the people of the state took notice of the statutes of the territory of Oklahoma. They doubtless had those statutes in mind when they provided by section 20, article 10, of the Constitution, that the Legislature should not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation. That was but a continuation of the territorial policy whereby the territorial Legislature did not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation. Legislation respecting the imposition of taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, is subject to that provision of the Constitution. It was further provided in section 20, article 10, supra, that the Legislature might, by general laws, confer upon the proper authorities of counties, cities, towns, or other municipal corporations, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes. That was but a continuation of the existing territorial practice. Legislation with reference to the assessing and collecting of taxes for counties, cities, towns, or other municipal corporations, is subject to that provision of the Constitution and the two limitations therein contained: First, it must be by "general laws"; and, second, the power may be vested only in "the proper authorities thereof."
Under the territorial statutes the "proper authorities" of a common school district to levy a tax for the school district were the inhabitants of the school district qualified to vote at a school meeting. Those statutes were extended in force by the Schedule of the...
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