Executive Town & Country Services, Inc. v. City of Atlanta

• Decision Date: 23 May 1986
• Docket Number: 85-8444,Nos. 85-8396,s. 85-8396
• Citation: 789 F.2d 1523
• Parties: 1986-1 Trade Cases 67,114 EXECUTIVE TOWN & COUNTRY SERVICES, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, a Municipal Corporation, Andrew Young, in his capacity as the Mayor of the City of Atlanta, George Napper, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety, Abdul Haadee Muhammed, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Taxicabs & Vehicles for Hire, Morris Redding, in his capacity as Chief of the Bureau of Police Services and Carolyn Long Banks, in her capacity as Councilmember of the City of Atlanta, Defendants-Appellees, Sun Belt Limousine, Inc., Intervenor-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1523

789 F.2d 1523

1986-1 Trade Cases 67,114

EXECUTIVE TOWN & COUNTRY SERVICES, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, a Municipal Corporation, Andrew Young, in his capacity as the Mayor of the City of Atlanta, George Napper, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety, Abdul Haadee Muhammed, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Taxicabs & Vehicles for Hire Morris Redding, in his capacity as Chief of the Bureau of Police Services and Carolyn Long Banks, in her capacity as Councilmember of the City of Atlanta, Defendants-Appellees Sun Belt Limousine, Inc., Intervenor-Appellee.

Nos. 85-8396, 85-8444.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 23, 1986.

Robert J. Dorfman, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

Herbert P. Schlanger, Roy Mays, George Ference, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before VANCE and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and BOWEN ^*, District Judge.

BOWEN, District Judge:

Executive Town & Country, Inc. ("Town & Country") brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendants from enforcing Sec. 14-8020(g) and Sec. 14-8218 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Atlanta. Section 14-8020(g) ¹ regulates the fares which licensed limousine service companies may charge for trips to and from the Atlanta Hartsfield Airport. Section 14-8218 ² prohibits the advertising of any fares that are not in compliance with the provisions of Sec. 14-8020(g). Town & Country, a duly licensed limousine transportation company operating within the corporate limits of Atlanta, contends that these ordinances are violative of the commerce clause and fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Park'n Fly of Texas, Inc. v. City of Houston, 327 F.Supp. 910 (S.D.Tex.1971). Town & Country also claims that the ordinances are violative of federal antitrust laws.

The federal district court for the Northern District of Georgia temporarily restrained the City of Atlanta from enforcing Secs. 14-8020(g) and 14-8218 as to Town & Country. After a bench trial, the district court dissolved the restraining order and found in favor of the defendants on all counts. It is from that final order that Town & Country appeals. 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1291. We AFFIRM.

I

A threshold question in this appeal is whether Town & Country's limousine service is a part of interstate commerce. The commerce clause ³ to the United States Constitution restricts states and municipalities from imposing unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727-28, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-24, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2534-36, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978). If Town & Country's limousine business does not constitute a part of interstate commerce, the court will not interfere with the city's legitimate exercise of its police powers. ⁴ Airport Taxi Cab Advisory Committee v. City of Atlanta, 584 F.Supp. 961, 964-65 (N.D.Ga.1983); c.f., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 91 L.Ed. 2010 (1947).

Town & Country argues that it is a part of interstate commerce. Approximately ninety percent (90%) of Town & Country's business consists of prearranged trips to and from the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport. It naturally follows that at least ninety percent of Town & Country's passengers are making or completing interstate journeys. The fact that Town & Country's limousines may operate wholly within the State of Georgia does not, in and of itself, take Town & Country out of the stream of interstate commerce. ⁵ Charter Limousine v. Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 678 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir., Unit B, 1982). ⁶

The district court assumed, for the purpose of its final order, that Town & Country was a part of interstate commerce. Executive Town & Country Services, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, No. C85-2499A, slip op. at 4 (N.D.Ga. May 21, 1985). Because the court would have reached the same result regardless of whether vel non Town & Country is a part of interstate commerce, the court below decided that it did not need to resolve that issue. It is necessary for our review of this case, however, that the issue of whether Town & Country is a part of interstate commerce be resolved.

Generally, taxicab service between airports and businesses and homes is not within the stream of interstate commerce. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 230-33, 67 S.Ct. at 1566-68; Evanston Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.1963); Airport Taxi Cab Advisory Committee v. City of Atlanta, 584 F.Supp. at 964. The typical taxicab service to and from an airport is only "casual and incidental" to the taxicab's normal course of business, which is to service the needs of any passenger requesting transportation, not just those passengers traveling on an interstate journey. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 231-32, 67 S.Ct. at 1567; c.f., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-86, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2011-12, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975). A taxicab does not transform into an integral part of interstate commerce if, within the scope of its normal course of independent local service, the passenger happens to be beginning or completing an interstate trip. Id., 332 U.S. at 233, 67 S.Ct. at 1568.

Town & Country's limousine service is distinguishable from the typical taxicab service discussed above. The vast majority of Town & Country's business consists of prearranged trips to and from the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport. The district court found that:

[m]any of these trips are for multi-national corporate clients. [Town & Country] receives reservations both on a local telephone number and two 800 number lines. [Town & Country] receives approximately twenty-one thousand incoming calls per year on the 800 numbers for limousine service. Most of [Town & Country's] business, though, is arranged within the State of Georgia through local numbers. Some passengers are picked up at the airport without having made a reservation and [Town & Country] advertises in the Atlanta airport to attract customers. [Town & Country] has a referral sister company in Chicago.

Executive Town & Country Services, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, No. C85-2499A, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D.Ga. May 21, 1985). We have reviewed the evidence in this case and are satisfied that Town & Country has established the nexus between its business and interstate commerce as required by Yellow Cab and its progeny.

II

The issue involved sub judice is whether the city can regulate the minimum fare for limousine service to and from the airport. ⁷ At the outset, it is important to note that the commerce clause "protects the interstate market, not particular firms, from prohibitive or burdensome regulations." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2215, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). The scope of the commerce clause includes legislation related to local concerns if the legislation imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover-Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 470-71, 101 S.Ct. at 727-28; Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36, 100 S.Ct. 2009, 2015, 64 L.Ed.2d 702 (1980); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535; Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 445-46, 98 S.Ct. 787, 796, 54 L.Ed.2d 664 (1978); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2444-45, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 96 S.Ct. 923, 47 L.Ed.2d 55 (1976); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529, 79 S.Ct. 962, 967, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex. rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1519, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945). We will uphold a state regulation if it regulates "evenhandedly," if it imposes only an "incidental" burden on interstate commerce, and if the "burden imposed on such commerce is [not] clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). Furthermore, "the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Id.; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 471-73, 101 S.Ct. at 727-29; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1733-34, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979).

Town & Country contends that the City's new rate structure for limousine service unreasonably burdens interstate commerce for a number of reasons. First, the interstate traveler who desires to be transported in a limousine now must pay $50.00 instead of the former fare of $18.00. Second, Town & Country argues that the increased price for limousine service somehow will result in a decrease in the city's tourism trade. Third, Town & Country argues that the new regulations will allow the taxicab industry to regain a portion of the transportation market that the limousine service had held as a result of competition in the free market. The present situation, it is argued, will burden interstate commerce because the interstate traveler will have no choice but to ride with a transporter which the traveler had chosen not to use when there were no minimum fare regulations for limousine service.

None of these arguments explains how the minimum fare regulations for limousine service burden interstate commerce. As explained above, our inquiry is limited to whether interstate commerce in general, and not a particular entity, is burdened by the regulations promulgated by the City of Atlanta. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. at 127-28, 98 S.Ct. at 2215. These...