Exporters & Traders Compress & Wrhse. Co. v. Steele, 1969.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1937
• Docket Number: No. 1969.,1969.
• Parties: EXPORTERS & TRADERS COMPRESS & WAREHOUSE CO. v. STEELE.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

111 S.W.2d 867

EXPORTERS & TRADERS COMPRESS & WAREHOUSE CO. v. STEELE.

No. 1969.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

December 16, 1937.

Appeal from District Court, Falls County; Terry Dickens, Judge.

Action by Annie Steele against Exporters & Traders Compress & Warehouse Company. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Cecil R. Glass, of Marlin, for appellant.

Rogers & Rogers and Prentice Oltorf, all of Marlin, for appellee.

GALLAGHER, Chief Justice.

This suit originated in a justice court of Falls county. An appeal from the judgment of that court was taken to the district court of said county, where, on a trial before the court, judgment was rendered in favor of appellee, Annie Steele, a feme sole, against appellant, Exporters & Traders Compress & Warehouse Company, for the sum of $177.70.

Appellant maintained a warehouse in Marlin, Tex., in which it stored baled cotton for hire. The compress property was about 300 feet long from north to south. The space used for storing cotton occupied about 280 feet of the east front and extended westward nearly a block. A railroad switch track ran parallel with said warehouse on the east side, and cotton was received from and delivered to cars standing thereon. The main line of the railroad was a short distance east of said switch track. The east side of said warehouse was open at the time of the fire. Transients from time to time in considerable numbers occupied and rode in empty box cars. A public school was located in the immediate neighborhood and school children from time to time entered the warehouse, but, when observed by appellant's employees, they were required to leave. There were about 3,300 bales of cotton stored in the warehouse, and the charges for such storage amounted to approximately $1,000 per month. Bales were set on end in tiers 7 bales wide, extending westward. There was supposed to be a 12-foot aisle between each tier, but, as one witness testified, it did not always work out that way. Loose cotton continuously accumulated in the aisles and between the bales. Some effort was made to remove such accumulations, but the testimony as a whole indicates it was only partially successful. There was an emergency fire protection system installed and its sufficiency is not questioned. The compress was not running the day of the fire. A general inspection by the manager of the compress and two other employees had been made between 1 and 2 p. m. After such inspection, all the employees of appellant except one left the plant. His regular duties were those of an engineer, but he also worked in the office when the compress was not running. The fire occurred about 4:30 p. m. and its origin was unknown. It was first discovered among the bales near the east side.

The foregoing recitals are a mere outline of the general situation. The court filed twenty-seven separate findings of fact. Appellant assails the sufficiency of the evidence to support certain of the findings so made. The findings so assailed are, in substance, that the location of appellant's warehouse, the magnitude of its business, and the income arising from its operation justified and required the employment of watchmen; that there was no effective watch to discover possible danger from fire for nearly three hours preceding its actual occurrence; that, had a watchman been on duty where he could have seen the fire at its origin, he would have discovered the same in time to extinguish it or hold it under control until the arrival of the fire department; that appellant's employee, after having been notified by neighbors of the existence of the fire and having arrived at the scene, did not utilize the emergency fire extinguishing equipment in the manner, to the extent, and for the length of time that a person of ordinary prudence would have done, but abandoned the effort and returned to the office to put the books and papers in the vault; that, had he continued such effort, he could probably have held the fire under control until the arrival of the fire department, and that the acts and omissions aforesaid constituted negligence and were the proximate cause of the destruction of appellee's cotton. We are required, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain such findings, to view the same in the light most favorable thereto, disregarding all evidence to the contrary. No question of conflict in the evidence or of the preponderance thereof is involved. Williams & Chastain v. Laird, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 502, 505, par. 1, writ refused, and authorities there cited; Wininger v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co., 105 Tex. 56, par. 1, 143 S.W. 1150; Underwood v. Security Life & Annuity Co., 108 Tex. 381, par. 3, 194 S.W. 585.

The accuracy of the testimony of...