Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen

Decision Date07 July 1975
Docket NumberNo. B--5168,B--5168
PartiesEXXON CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Sue BRECHEEN et al., Respondent.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Fulbright & Jaworski, L. S. Carsey, David J. Beck and Adele Black, Judy L. R. Fernald, Eino Zapata, Robert D. McGee, Houston, for petitioner.

Frank Stovall, Houston, Glenn & Thomas, Allen D. Glenn, Abilene, for respondent.

STEAKLEY, Justice.

On March 10, 1970, William D. Brecheen, Jr., a tank truck driver for Oil Transport Company, was injured by being sprayed in the face with oil while waiting for his truck to be loaded on the premises of Exxon's Baytown Refinery. On August 17, 1971, he filed suit to recover for his personal injuries. On December 19, 1972, Brecheen committed suicide with a rifle, leaving a note to his wife, Sue Brecheen. A suggestion of death was thereafter filed and Sue Brecheen moved that the suit proceed as an action for damages under the Survival Statute, Vernon's Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5525, and as a suit under the Wrongful Death Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4671 et seq.

Upon trial, the jury found that Exxon was guilty of negligence proximately causing 'the occurrence in question.' Additionally, the jury found 'that the oil spray incident in question caused William Brecheen to have the mental illness or disease made the basis of this suit'; and 'that the oil spray incident in question caused the death of William Brecheen.' Based upon these findings, the trial court rendered judgment for Sue Brecheen in the capacities which she sued, and against Exxon, in the respective sums of $6,000.95, for hospital, medical and funeral charges; $55,000 under Article 5525; $166,000.95 under Article 4671; and for Transport Insurance Company in the sum of $18,680.56 under its subrogation claim for sums paid Brecheen for Workmen's Compensation, medical and hospital benefits. This judgment has been affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, Exxon Corporation v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170. Exxon is our Petitioner here.

Exxon presents three groups of points. Two of these, which if sustained would require a reversal and a rendition for Exxon, are first considered and these we overrule; the third group, which we sustain, requires that we reverse the judgments below and remand the cause for a new trial.

Exxon's first group of points presents its suicide defense. The basic argument as to this is that Exxon is not liable for the suicide under any theory because there was no jury finding and the evidence failed to conclusively establish that Brecheen was without conscious volition and under an uncontrollable impulse at the time he took his life. Exxon cites principally Jones v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 599, 169 S.W.2d 160 (1943); Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1881), and Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal.App.2d 898, 5 Cal.Rptr. 28 (1960).

In oral submission, and by post-submission briefs, Exxon argues further that it could not reasonably have anticipated that Brecheen would commit suicide following the oil spray incident; that there must be evidence that the mental illness caused Brecheen's suicide in the particular manner in which it occurred; and that the facts must establish that Brecheen's act of suicide did not flow from a conscious, deliberate choice on his part.

Sue Brecheen, on the other hand, says that the question is whether there is any evidence of probative value that Exxon's negligence proximately caused Brecheen to become insane, and, if so, whether such insanity caused him to take his life through an uncontrollable impulse. She argues that where there is a negligent act under common law that proximately causes insanity, and in turn, such insanity leads to the suicide of the injured person, then the actor cannot be relieved of liability for the death as it flows naturally and foreseeably from the original act. So here, she says, the evidence establishes that the negligent act of Exxon caused Brecheen to become psychotic and rendered him devoid of realistic reasoning facilities; that this caused him to take his life through an uncontrollable impulse; and that his suicide was a part of an unbroken chain of events. She asserts that the recoveries here are consistent with Jones v. Traders & General Ins. Co., supra, and she relies particularly on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 455 (1965), later considered.

The posture in which we are to consider the suicide defense of Exxon should be initially established. As noted before, the jury found that the negligence of Exxon proximately caused the oil spray incident that originally injured Brecheen and there is no attack on these findings. The jury further found that the oil spray incident caused Brecheen to suffer a mental illness or disease and that the oil spray occurrence caused his death. The only special instructions given to the jury in the court's charge were the accepted definitions of negligence, ordinary care and proximate cause; the latter included the Texas elements of cause in fact and foreseeability. There was no objection to the manner of submission and no request by any party for additional or different issues or instructions. With respect to deemed findings thus arising, Exxon acknowledges in its post-submission brief that it is before this Court 'as if there was a finding in the trial court that Mr. Brecheen's death was proximately caused by Petitioner's negligence.' As later stated, we adopt the Restatement view and upon trial following the remand we shall order, the case should be submitted in its terms.

We first review the evidence which is outlined in detail in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Brecheen's injury occurred on March 10, 1970, when he was unexpectedly, and with severe impact, sprayed in the face by oil. He was standing on a platform engaged in conversation with another truck driver at which time a loading chute came lose from a nearby railroad tank car hatch and began to spray him and his companion. Brecheen testified by deposition prior to his death that he was hit 'flush in the face' by the spray of oil, that the force of the impact knocked him against the rail of the loading platform and onto his hands and knees, that when the spray hit it was 'like an explosion in my head' which 'felt like it went in my eyes and out my ears' and that he was temporarily blinded and had to be led to the plant dispensary where he was cleaned and given pills for headaches.

Following treatment by the plant personnel, Brecheen picked up his loaded truck and proceeded to a Baytown motel where he spent the night. With the exception of a ringing in his ears, Brecheen's night was uneventful, and he left for Abilene early the next morning. About 70 miles outside of Abilene, Brecheen took a headache pill which had been given to him at the Baytown plant dispensary, and from then until sometime after that night, Brecheen had no recollection of his activities. His wife testified that Brecheen's behavior was extremely peculiar that night, that he talked of needing help in dressing himself so as to get on the road early, that he kept falling down and lacked coordination and that she finally had to call her brother to help in calming him down. Following this, Brecheen's behavior became more unnatural and erratic and he was plagued with medical problems for which several doctors could find no physical cause. He had no history of mental, psychotic or nervous problems prior to the accident.

In June, 1970, Brecheen commenced a series of consultations with Dr. Larry B. Summers, a family medical practitioner with special training in psychiatry. He was hospitalized in the West Texas Medical Center from September 16 through October 13, 1970, during which time Dr. Summers diagnosed his condition as being a conversion reaction with an underlying schizophrenic reaction; and that his schizophrenia was a form of psychosis. He considered him to have a severe mental illness in which there had been no improvement 'over a long period.' On December 30, 1970, Brecheen was admitted to Timberlawn Psychiatric Hospital where he was treated by Dr. James Peden, a certified psychiatrist specializing in the practice of psychiatry. With respect to Brecheen, Dr. Peden found '. . . The content of his thinking had a paranoid tenor to it, but primarily was made up of ruminations about changes in his body, his vision, the fusion of his vision, migrating type of headaches and other what appeared to be distortions of his image of himself.' He stated that Brecheen at that time did not have the capacity to adequately differentiate between that which was real and what his interpretation was of what was going on. He gave his impression that the patient was suffering from schizophrenia, which is 'characterized by certain changes in the feeling and expressed feeling of the individual, certain changes in the way they associate things with each other, changes in the way they make decisions.' Those suffering from this illness are ambivalent and have 'a tendency toward withdrawal or investment of their feelings within themselves, primarily, sort of living in a dream world or fantasy world.' He felt that the majority of the symptoms that Brecheen presented had a paranoid tenor or paranoid flavor to them. He gave an opinion that there was a causal relationship between the schizophrenia that he observed in Brecheen and the oil spraying incident which occurred in March of 1970.

Dr. Peden's discharge diagnosis was of schizophrenia residual type, i.e., there continued to be evidence of defective functioning of Brecheen's personality. Dr. Peden further testified that the stress and intense fear experienced by Brecheen was probably related to the fear that he was going to die, or be blind, or that he was going to be brain damaged.

Brecheen continued to be treated by Dr. Summers who last saw him on December 12, 1972. It was his view that Brecheen's condition then was the same as during...

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