Eyak River Packing Co. v. Huglen
| Decision Date | 07 April 1927 |
| Docket Number | 20080. |
| Citation | 255 P. 123,143 Wash. 229 |
| Parties | EYAK RIVER PACKING CO. v. HUGLEN et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Renald, Judge.
Action by the Eyak River Packing Company, a corporation, against Alme Huglen and others. Judgment for plaintiff against defendants Alme Huglen and R. J. Boryer, and against plaintiff and for the defendants James W. Parks and the Pioneer Sea Foods Company, a corporation, notwithstanding the verdict. The defendants Alme Huglen and R. J. Boryer appeal from the judgment against them and the plaintiff cross-appeals from a judgment for the other defendants. Affirmed in part and in part reversed, with directions.
R. J Boryer, of Seattle, for appellants.
Martin J. Lund and Tucker, Hyland & Elvidge, all of Seattle, for respondent and cross-appellant.
G. E Steiner, of Seattle, for respondents.
In this action, at the trial in the court below, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Eyak River Packing Company, and against the defendants Alme Huglen, R. J Boryer, James W. Parks, and Pioneer Sea Foods Company, in the sum of $17,500. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was interposed on behalf of all of the defendants, which the trial court sustained as to the defendants Parks and Pioneer Sea Foods Company, and overruled as to the other defendants. A judgment on the verdict was entered against the defendants Huglen and Boryer, and a judgment of dismissal was entered in favor of the other defendants. Huglen and Boryer appeal from the judgment entered against them, and the plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered notwithstanding the verdict.
The action against the defendants was founded on a charge of conspiracy. The substance of the complaint is that the plaintiff was organized as a corporation for the purpose of catching and canning salmon; that in the year 1916 it built a salmon cannery on the Eyak river in the territory of Alaska, bought and built fishing boats and nets and other appliances, and entered upon the business for which it was organized; that it conducted its business during the years 1916, 1917, 1918, and 1919 at a good profit, investing a part of its gains each year in the betterment of its business; that during the year 1918 the defendant Huglen and one Finkelstein became stockholders in the plaintiff corporation; that the principal stockholder in the corporation was one Martin J. Lund, who was at all times its president and financial backer; that in the fall of the year 1919 the defendants Huglen and Boryer and the stockholder Finkelstein, together with others, some of whom had been employees of the plaintiff, entered into a conspiracy, the object and purpose of which was to compel the principal stockholder, Lund, to buy the stock of Huglen and Finkelstein at a grossly excessive price, or to cause the ruin of the plaintiff's business so that they might obtain its property and business at a price less than its value. The complaint then sets out the acts and conduct of the defendants named in pursuance of the conspiracy. It is alleged that they began a number of unfounded actions against the plaintiff, all of which were dismissed when issue was taken on the allegations of the complaints and the causes pressed for trial; that one of such actions was an attempt to have a receiver appointed for the plaintiff, which proceeding was dismissed at the preliminary hearing; that, notwithstanding they represented a minority of the stock in the corporation, they held a purported stockholders' meeting, at which they pretended to elect certain of their number as officers and trustees of the corporation; and that they brought actions against the president of the corporation falsely charging him with embezzling the corporation's funds, and falsely charged him with wrecking the corporation, which actions were likewise dismissed without trial. It is also alleged that the defendants interfered with the business of the plaintiff by falsely misrepresenting its financial condition, thereby preventing it from making contracts with fishermen--contracts necessary to the successful conduct of its business.
The allegations against Parks and the Pioneer Sea Foods Company are that they joined the conspirators in the winter of 1921 and 1923, and thereafter furnished financial aid to the other conspirators; that they supplied them with boats, nets, and other fishing gear with which to harass and injure the plaintiff's business, and aided and abetted them in placing nets and weirs in front of the nets and weirs of the plaintiff, and in closer proximity thereto than the federal statutes and the custom of fishermen in that locality permitted. It is then alleged that the combined acts of the conspirators so far injured the plaintiff's business that it could not operate other than at a loss, and was compelled to sell its property and business for the sum of $10,000, which was $30,000 less than its actual value.
The answers of the defendants were in the main general denials, only the defendant Huglen setting up an affirmative defense.
This defense was to the purport that the actions set forth in the complaint were instituted in good faith and for the purpose of protecting and securing the rights of the answering defendants; that there had been mismanagement of the corporation on the part of the corporation's president Lund; and that the suits were dismissed only after Lund had agreed to right the wrongs complained of in the suits.
The general objection is made by all of the defendants that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We have, however, no doubt that a cause of action is stated. A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to commit a criminal or unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means. Plainly, the complaint alleges a combination among the defendants to so hamper and injure the plaintiff's business as to make it unprofitable to the plaintiff, and either compel its entire abandonment or compel its sale at a price less than its actual value. A combination for such purposes is unlawful, and, when carried into fruition, constitutes an actionable wrong. Nor is it less a wrong that the processes of the courts are used in the accomplishment of the purposes. While every one who deems himself aggrieved by another may lawfully resort to the courts for relief when he acts honestly and in good faith, no matter how unfounded may be his belief that a wrong has been done him, he has no lawful right to use the processes of the courts when his sole purpose is to wrong and injure another, or to compel that other to do some act against his will. Nor is it material that the wrongdoers did not enter the conspiracy at the same period of time. Every person who enters into a conspiracy, no matter whether at its beginning or at a latter stage of its progress, is in law a party to every act of the conspirators, and is liable for all of the acts done in pursuance of the conspiracy in the same manner that they would be had they been a party to all of the wrongful acts. The complaint in this instance alleges facts which bring the defendants within these rules, and, we repeat, we have no hesitancy in holding that it states a cause of action against all of the defendants.
The appellants Huglen and Boryer next urge that the evidence does not substantiate the allegations of the complaint. The testimony is in itself massive, and is accompanied by numerous exhibits. There is an abstract on the part of the appellants and supplemental abstracts on the part of the respondent, yet these do not contain all of the record which the respective parties deemed material for the court's consideration. In the briefs of counsel references are made alternatively to the abstract and to the record as certified by the trial judge, with the result that we have been compelled to go through the record, as certified, in order to obtain a just comprehension of the facts as disclosed thereby. But we shall not review the evidence at length. To do so would but unduly extend this opinion, and would add nothing of value as a precedent. As to Huglen, there was abundant evidence from which the jury could find that his purpose was what the plaintiff alleged it to be. The evidence was conflicting, it is true, but the record presents a question of legal cognizance, in which it was the sole province of the jury to determine on which side the evidence preponderated. We have therefore no rightful authority to question their findings.
As to Boryer, the evidence is not so clear. Boryer is an attorney at law, and acted as the legal adviser of the alleged conspirators, other than Parks and the Pioneer Sea Foods Company, and seems to have had no financial interest in the consummation of the conspiracy. But there is evidence tending to show that in advising his clients, and in the institution of the actions of which complaint is made, he went beyond his duties as a mere attorney, and counseled and advised acts not in line with his duties. It was doubtless because of this that the jury held him liable. Furthermore, the trial judge refused to set aside the verdict against him, and we feel that we should not ourselves interfere.
The further assignments on the part of the appellants question the correctness of the instructions of the court to the jury. A part of the court's instruction numbered 2 reads as follows:
'A combination which is lawful within itself may become a conspiracy when the purpose in view is unnecessarily to ruin or damage the business of another merely because of the other's refusal to do an act against its own will or judgment.'
Objection is made to the use of the word 'unneces...
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