Eystad v. Stambaugh

Decision Date07 October 1938
Docket Number31,676,31,677,31,678
Citation281 N.W. 526,203 Minn. 392
PartiesJOE EYSTAD v. W. F. STAMBAUGH; GEORGE FARWELL, JR. v. SAME; FRED PODTBURG v. SAME
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Three actions in the district court for Stevens county, tried together and consolidated on appeal, by the respective administrators of the estates of William Erwin Eystad, Mark Farwell, and Mike Rahrlien, to recover for their deaths arising out of a collision between an auto in which they were riding and a truck owned and operated by defendant. The cases were tried before Albert H. Enersen, Judge, and a jury. A verdict of $6,000 was returned for plaintiff in the Eystad case and separate verdicts of $5,500 each in favor of plaintiffs in the other two cases. From an order in each case denying his alternative motion for judgment or a new trial defendant appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Automabile -- head-on collision in fog -- negligence of driver.

1. Upon facts stated in opinion, held that question of defendant's negligence was for the jury and that its verdicts finding liability are sustained by the evidence.

Negligence -- acts in emergencies.

Appeal and error -- review -- instructions -- prejudicial effect.

2. Rule applicable to sudden emergency is that one suddenly confronted by a peril, through no fault of his own, who in the attempt to escape does not choose the best or safest way should not be held negligent because of such choice unless it was so hazardous that the ordinarily prudent person would not have made it under similar conditions. Tested by this rule, held that court's instructions were not prejudicial to defendant.

Appeal and error -- review -- rulings on admission of evidence.

3. Certain rulings of court on admission in evidence of certain statements claimed by plaintiffs as admissible under res gestae rule held, upon facts set forth in opinion, not reversible error.

Trial -- arguments of counsel.

4. Certain statements made by counsel for plaintiffs in oral examination of jury panel held, upon facts stated in opinion, not such as to require appellate court to reverse trial court's order denying defendant new trial.

Death -- actions for death -- damages -- not excessive.

5. Verdicts held not excessive.

Murphy, Johanson & Winter, for appellant.

T. J. Mangan and Clayton A. Gay, for respondents.

OPINION

JULIUS J. Olson, Justice.

Three men died as the result of injuries received in a collision between the automobile in which they were riding as guest passengers and a large cattle truck owned and driven by defendant. Administrators of their respective estates brought separate actions to recover damages under the death by wrongful act statute. The cases were tried together, resulting in verdicts for the mentioned administrators as plaintiffs. Defendant's blended motion for judgment notwithstanding or new trial was denied, and he appeals from that order. The three cases have also been submitted together here.

From the evidence adduced the jury could find the following facts: The accident happened sometime between 3:30 and 4 o'clock on the morning of June 7, 1936, upon state highway No. 28 immediately west of Morris. There was dense fog so that travel at the time and place mentioned was extremely dangerous insofar as visibility was concerned. The passenger car was proceeding westerly, defendant's truck easterly, on this highway, which is more than 25 feet in width with shoulders about nine feet wide on its north side and about seven feet on the south. When the driver of the passenger car reached a point near where the accident occurred he observed lights approaching him from the west, some 200 feet distant. Immediately upon observing the oncoming lights he drove his car over onto the north shoulder, i.e., to his right, and then stopped. His testimony is that his lights were burning and were in good condition. His claim is that defendant drove his truck at an unreasonable rate of speed in view of the heavy fog then prevailing, something like 40 miles or more per hour, and that defendant's truck collided with the passenger car on the north side of the road. The force of the impact was terrific; every person in the car was rendered unconscious by the impact. The three passengers died within a few hours. The car in which they road was pushed backward at least 40 feet. Defendant, too, was badly shocked but regained his mental equilibrium in a few minutes. We have only the two drivers as eyewitnesses to the accident. Their claims conflict to some extent, but there is no dispute that the place of accident was upon the north said of the highway and considerably beyond the center line.

For defendant it is claimed that the reason he swung to his left and onto the wrong side of the road was that he was faced with a sudden emergency arising by reason of an unlighted car having been left upon his lane of traffic; that he did not discover it until he was within eight or ten feet of it; that to avoid running into it he swung sharply to his left; that immediately upon passing that car he swung back to his right but before being able to get back to his own lane of traffic met with the passenger car, which he claims was unlighted and in motion; that by reason of the facts mentioned he was not guilty of actionable negligence, hence that there should be no recovery. It is appropriate to remark that the driver of the passenger car saw no car in defendant's traffic lane, although he saw defendant's lights at least 200 feet away. Many people who came upon this scene shortly thereafter saw nothing of this car, and what became of it is left in a fog of mystery.

1. From what has been stated it seems clear that a fact issue was presented in respect of defendant's negligence. If the jury accepted as true, as they evidently did, the testimony of the driver of the passenger car, and i that car was lighted with adequate lights as claimed by its driver, then clearly the jury could find that defendant should have seen the stalled car in his pathway in time to avoid making the left-hand turn. Similarly, even if that car were obscured because of the fog, it would seem that the lights of the oncoming automobile from the opposite direction would likewise afford notice to defendant that a car was approaching from the other direction. We think, without further discussion on this phase of the case, that a jury question was presented and that the verdicts are sustained by the evidence.

2. The court carefully instructed the jury in respect to defendant's emergency claim. Among other things the court said:

"Some collisions or accidents happen when no one is to blame, when no one is at fault, and if you find the collision in this case was one for which no one was to blame, then the defendant is not liable in this case.

"If you find the collision in this case was the result of an unavoidable accident, that is, an accident which the defendant could not have avoided by the use of the degree of care known under the circumstances in which he was placed because of the sudden emergency which confronted him, the parked car he claims he suddenly discovered in his lane of travel, the emergency not having been caused or produced by himself, then the defendant is not liable. * * *

"Where the operator of a motor vehicle is by a sudden emergency not produced or caused by himself placed in a position of imminent danger to himself or otherwise without sufficient time to carefully determine with certainty the best course to follow, he is not held to the same accuracy of judgment as is required of him under ordinary circumstances, and he is not liable for damages caused by his car if an accident occurs even though a different course of action might be more...

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