Ezratty v. Ezratty

• Citation: 450 N.Y.S.2d 694,114 Misc.2d 22
• Parties: Martin EZRATTY, Plaintiff, v. Sara Marion EZRATTY, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 05 May 1982
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New York)

Page 694

450 N.Y.S.2d 694

114 Misc.2d 22

Martin EZRATTY, Plaintiff, v. Sara Marion EZRATTY, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term New York County, Part V.

May 5, 1982.

Lichtenberg & Goss, P. C., New York City, for plaintiff.

Scoppetta & Seiff, New York City, for defendant.

MARTIN B. STECHER, Justice:

In this action for a conversion divorce the plaintiff husband moves for summary judgment of divorce. The wife opposes the motion and in her answer asserts four affirmative defenses and counterclaims which essentially allege duress and fraud in the inducement of this agreement.

The separation agreement was executed on March 24, 1980. There is no substantial dispute that, since its execution, the parties have lived separate and apart for more than a year and it is established that the plaintiff has substantially performed his obligations under the agreement.

Prior to the execution of the agreement, Mrs. Ezratty utilized the services of an attorney, a second attorney who acted as consultant to the first, and a certified public accountant. The attorneys for Mrs. Ezratty appeared to have been of the opinion at the time of the execution of the agreement that if Mr. Ezratty truthfully represented his earnings "then the agreement, while not generous, might be within reason."

It is obvious that throughout the negotiations and to this day, Mr. Ezratty withheld from his wife, her accountant and her attorneys financial information concerning himself and his business in which he was either a proprietor or the sole proprietor. He disingenuously refers to himself as an employee and refers to the vehicles which he and his wife presently drive as cars owned by his employer. The suspicion is fairly well supported that Mr. Ezratty is his own employer.

Mr. Ezratty does not appear to have misrepresented his financial status to his wife. The truth is that he declined to make any financial representations to her other than what his income, as revealed by his tax returns, was. There is no proof whatever that these figures are misrepresented. Mrs. Ezratty's attorneys advised her not to sign the agreement in the absence of fuller financial disclosure. She signed it nonetheless, she says, because of the extreme emotional strain she was undergoing and the pressures put upon her by her husband who alternately brow-beat her and treated her tenderly. [It is clear from the reply affidavit that there, at least, is some truth in Mrs. Ezratty's description of the parties' relationship during the negotiating period.]

Were this the ordinary commercial transaction, there is no question that the court would waste little time with Mrs. Ezratty's protestations. Her counsel were competent and they warned her not to sign the contract. Ordinarily, it is not the function of the law to protect people from their own foolishness. Here, however, we are dealing with a marriage, "a status with which the State is deeply concerned." "Agreements between spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary relationship requiring the utmost of good faith. There is a strict surveillance of all transactions between married persons especially separation agreements. Equity is so zealous in this respect that a separation agreement may be set aside on grounds that would be insufficient to vitiate an ordinary contract" [Christian, supra, pg. 72, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 365 N.E.2d 849, citations omitted].

"To warrant equity's intervention, no actual fraud need be shown, for relief will be granted if the settlement is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other's overreaching" Mr. Ezratty's income tax returns demonstrated income of about $85,000 a year and the agreement provided Mrs. Ezratty with about $31,000 a year. If that is the sum of it,...