F.G. v. MacDonell

Decision Date14 June 1996
Citation677 A.2d 258,291 N.J.Super. 262
Parties, 65 USLW 2010 F.G., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rev. Alex MacDONELL, in his capacity as former Rector, and Rev. Fletcher Harper, in his capacity as Rector of All Saints' Episcopal Church, Bergenfield, New Jersey and St. Luke's Episcopal Church, Haworth, New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Herbert D. Friedman, Boston, MA, and Alan L. Zegas, West Orange, for appellant.

Gregory D. Winter, Livingston, for respondents (Felzenberg, Winter & Winkler, attorneys).

Before Judges HAVEY, D'ANNUNZIO and BRAITHWAITE.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

D'ANNUNZIO, J.A.D.

This action for damages is based on a sexual relationship between plaintiff, an adult female, and defendant Rev. Alex MacDonell. The action against defendant Rev. Fletcher Harper is based on his disclosure to the congregation of the relationship between plaintiff and MacDonell.

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e). The court granted the motion on all counts against MacDonell and on Count IX against Harper. The three counts against MacDonell allege causes of action for negligence as a provider of "pastoral care and pastoral counseling," negligent infliction of emotional distress "in committing pastoral care and pastoral counseling malpractice," and breach of fiduciary duty. Count IX charged that Harper breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiff by "exploiting [her] trust and confidence by invading her privacy, making negligent misrepresentations to her ... defaming her, and by depicting her in a false light." The remaining counts against Harper allege invasion of privacy, negligent misrepresentation, defamation and depicting plaintiff in a false light.

The trial court determined that the counts against MacDonell and Count IX against Harper asserted causes of action described as clergy malpractice and that such a cause of action is not recognized, citing Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.1991). In Schmidt the court ruled that clergy malpractice was not actionable under New York law. The court held that recognition of such a cause of action would unduly entangle the courts with religion, in violation of the First Amendment.

We granted plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal, and we now reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The standard under which motions to dismiss are considered is well-established in New Jersey. Trial courts should "approach with great caution applications for dismissal under R. 4:6-2(e) for failure of a complaint to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 771-72, 563 A.2d 31 (1989). The test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is whether a cause of action is "suggested" by the facts. See Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988). In reviewing a complaint dismissed pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e), the inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. See Rieder v. State Department of Transp., 221 N.J.Super. 547, 552, 535 A.2d 512 (App.Div.1987). However, a reviewing court "searches the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary." Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Memorial Park, 43 N.J.Super. 244, 252, 128 A.2d 281 (App.Div.1957). For purposes of analysis plaintiffs are entitled to every reasonable inference of fact. See Independent Dairy Workers Union v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 23 N.J. 85, 89, 127 A.2d 869 (1956). "The examination of a complaint's allegations of fact required by the aforestated principles should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach." Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 746, 563 A.2d 31.

Applying these principles, we glean from the complaint the following allegations. Plaintiff was a parishioner at All Saints' Episcopal Church, and MacDonell was the rector there and at Saint Luke's Episcopal Church. Plaintiff sought counseling from MacDonell. The nature and scope of the counseling is not defined in the complaint. MacDonell assumed the role of counselor and thereby became aware of plaintiff's emotional vulnerabilities. MacDonell exploited those vulnerabilities to induce plaintiff to engage in sexual acts with him. The complaint describes the counseling relationship between plaintiff and MacDonell as "a special relationship in which MacDonell owed a special duty of care not to engage in unethical and harmful behavior towards [plaintiff]." Plaintiff alleges that MacDonell violated that duty of care causing physical, emotional and psychological injury.

Count III alleges that MacDonell had a fiduciary duty to act in plaintiff's best interests and "to refrain from conduct which carried with it the foreseeable and unreasonable risk of mental or emotional harm to her," and that MacDonell breached his fiduciary duty "by wrongfully and unlawfully exploiting [plaintiff's] trust and confidence by engaging in inappropriate sexual behavior with plaintiff."

The complaint also alleges that plaintiff filed a complaint with the "Standing Commission on Clergy Ethics of the Diocese of Newark," and that the committee determined that MacDonell "violated his pastoral relationship with plaintiff ... by engaging in inappropriate sexual behavior toward her." The committee "sanctioned" MacDonell in March 1994.

In Count IX, the count against Harper dismissed by the court, plaintiff alleges that Harper breached a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff by the manner in which he informed the congregation of plaintiff's relationship with MacDonell.

The trial court's dismissal of the counts against MacDonell was consistent with a line of decisions resistant to the concept of "clergy malpractice." As previously indicated, the trial court cited Schmidt v. Bishop, supra, 779 F.Supp. 321. Schmidt was a member of a New York Presbyterian church. In 1960, when she was twelve, her parents brought her to Reverend Bishop, the church's pastor, for " 'emotional, spiritual and familial counseling.' " Id. at 324. Schmidt alleged that she became emotionally dependent on Bishop and that he initiated sexual contact with her shortly after the counseling relationship began. According to Schmidt, defendant "invoked God as supporting the conduct ... and informed her that 'the relationship was special and acceptable in the eyes of the Lord.' " Ibid. The relationship between Schmidt and Bishop continued until 1989 when Schmidt terminated it as a result of psychotherapy she had begun in 1988.

The Schmidt court characterized Bishop's conduct as a crime of sexual abuse in the second degree under New York's penal code. Ibid. The court observed that the allegations of the complaint "support clearly an action for a battery or some similar intentional tort, for which the statute of limitations is one year." Ibid. The court, however, granted summary judgment to defendant on the complaint which alleged negligence, malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The court viewed those counts as sounding in clergy malpractice and rejected them.

The court saw the First Amendment of the United States Constitution as the major obstacle to a cause of action for clergy malpractice. Id. at 327. The court agreed with Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644, 104 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989), that defining and imposing a duty of care on pastoral counselors would unduly entangle the courts in religious philosophy or ecclesiastical teachings. Ibid. The court in Schmidt stated:

Any effort by this Court to instruct the trial jury as to the duty of care which a clergyman should exercise, would of necessity require the Court or jury to define and express the standard of care to be followed by other reasonable Presbyterian clergy of the community. This in turn would require the Court and the jury to consider the fundamental perspective and approach to counseling inherent in the beliefs and practices of that denomination. This is as unconstitutional as it is impossible. It fosters excessive entanglement with religion.

[779 F.Supp. at 328.]

Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, supra, relied on by the Schmidt court, is inapposite. There, the Supreme Court of California upheld a "nonsuit" granted by the trial court, i.e., a trial court determination that the evidence was insufficient to permit a jury to find in plaintiffs' favor. Nally, supra, 253 Cal.Rptr. at 104-05, 763 P.2d at 955. Plaintiffs sought damages resulting from the suicide of their son. Plaintiffs sued the church, a Protestant Christian congregation, and four church pastors who had participated in counseling decedent. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had failed in their duty to recognize that decedent was suicidal and to refer him to psychiatric care.

In affirming the nonsuit, thereby reversing the intermediate appellate court, the California Supreme Court held that defendants, as nontherapist counselors, had no duty to refer a counselee to psychiatric care. The court refused to extend the duty to prevent suicide, previously imposed on psychiatrists and hospitals caring for a suicidal patient, to non-licensed nontherapist counselors who provide counseling on "secular or spiritual matters." Id. 253 Cal.Rptr. at 110, 763 P.2d at 961. The court observed that "it would certainly be impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors. Such a duty would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity." Id. 253 Cal.Rptr. at 109, 763 P.2d at 960.

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