Schmidt v. Bishop
Decision Date | 06 December 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 91 Civ. 4125 (CLB).,91 Civ. 4125 (CLB). |
Citation | 779 F. Supp. 321 |
Parties | Christine SCHMIDT, Plaintiff, v. Joseph P. BISHOP, Rye Presbyterian Church, Presbytery of Hudson River, Presbyterian Church (USA), Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Jeffrey R. Anderson, Reinhart & Anderson, St. Paul, Minn., for Christine Schmidt.
Barry Strutt, Keegan, Keegan & Associates, White Plains, N.Y., for Joseph P. Bishop.
Henry Weisburg, Shearman & Sterling, New York City, for Rye Presbyterian Church.
Lawrence T. D'Aloise, Jr., Clark, Gagliardi & Miller, White Plains, N.Y., for Presbytery of Hudson River.
Mark Seisel, David E. Worby, P.C., White Plains, N.Y., for Presbyterian Church (USA).
In this diversity case controlled by New York law, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), on various grounds. Because affidavits and other information were received and considered, the Court on October 9, 1991 converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56, and opened the record to further submissions from the parties.
The complaint pleads four separate claims against the individual defendant, Joseph P. Bishop, framed as claims for negligence (count I), malpractice (count II), breach of fiduciary duty (count III) and fraud (count IV).
The complaint also charges the remaining defendants (the "Church Defendants") with (Count V) responsibility for the wrongful conduct of Bishop under the doctrine of respondeat superior, with (Count VI) negligent placement, retention or supervision of Bishop and (Count VII) with simple negligence.
Our analysis must be based on the facts well pleaded as amplified by the affidavits, without regard to the legal theories or labels attached by the pleader. The facts, denied by defendants, but assumed to be true for purposes of the motion, are found in the plaintiff's complaint and in her affidavit docketed October 1, 1991.
Ms. Schmidt was born in 1948 and became a member of the Rye Presbyterian Church in 1957. Complaint at ¶¶ 8-9. Three years later, when she was twelve years old, her parents brought her to the defendant Bishop for "emotional, spiritual and familial counseling". Schmidt Affidavit at ¶ 2. At that time Rev. Bishop was the pastor of the Rye Presbyterian Church. Thereafter, Schmidt alleges, she became emotionally dependent on Bishop, since he gave her the "emotional support and guidance" which she believed she needed. Schmidt Affidavit at ¶ 3.
Shortly after the counseling relationship began, she asserts that Joseph Bishop initiated "sexual contact". The contact, described in some detail, did not involve rape or sexual intercourse, but essentially reflects the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 130.60 as presently in effect. This statute, adopted as part of a comprehensive revision by the legislature in 1965, was derived from former §§ 483-a and 483-b of the Penal Law of 1909.
According to Ms. Schmidt's affidavit, Bishop invoked God as supporting the conduct in which he allegedly engaged, and informed her that "the relationship was special and acceptable in the eyes of the Lord" and that "it was not something she could share with others...." Schmidt Affidavit at ¶ 5. Although plaintiff left Rye in 1977, the counseling relationship between plaintiff and defendant Bishop continued until June 17, 1989, because plaintiff "continued to believe that the relationship with Joseph Bishop was a special relationship and that there was nothing wrong with it...." Schmidt Affidavit at ¶ 6.
The reason that the relationship was ultimately terminated was that Ms. Schmidt had entered psychotherapy in January 1988. According to her affidavit, it was in the fall of 1989 that, as a result of her therapy, she "began to understand that the contact with Joseph Bishop was wrong, that he sexually abused me and that I suffered severe damage as a result of that abuse." Schmidt Affidavit at ¶ 6.
The nature of the relationship between Ms. Schmidt and defendant Bishop, as well as her failure to perceive the wrongfulness of Bishop's actions until she was forty-one years old, is addressed in the affidavit of Dorothy Miller. Ms. Miller, a licensed clinical social worker and Ms. Schmidt's primary treating therapist, avers that Ms. Schmidt "believed Bishop to be her sole confidant", that she therefore "was incapable of pulling away from Joseph Bishop" and "was necessarily forced to succumb to Joseph Bishop's wishes." Miller Affidavit at ¶¶ 5-6.
Ms. Schmidt filed this action on June 17, 1991, and defendant Bishop answered the complaint on July 17, 1991.
The facts alleged in this complaint support clearly an action for a battery or some similar intentional tort, for which the statute of limitations is one year, N.Y.Civ. Prac.L. & R. § 215(3) (McKinney 1990); it is equally clear that had the plaintiff or her family notified the authorities in a timely fashion — specifically, within two years of the initial incident — the defendant Bishop might well have been prosecuted for criminal sexual abuse. N.Y.Penal Law § 130.60 (McKinney 1987); N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 30.10(2)(c) (McKinney 1981).
Count I of the complaint, however, pleads a negligence claim against defendant Bishop, alleging specifically that he breached a duty owed her by entering into the relationship at all, knowing of his propensities, and that he breached that duty further by engaging in sexual exploitation of her and failing to reveal the wrongful nature of that conduct. Complaint at ¶ 20.
Even if the Court were to invite a trial jury to engage in the Constitutionally dubious task of setting a standard of reasonable care for clergymen engaged in counseling, the obstacle remains that New York courts have rejected uniformly such attempts to transmogrify intentional torts into "negligence". See, e.g., Rafferty v. Arnot Ogden Memorial Hospital, 140 A.D.2d 911, 913, 528 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (3d Dep't 1988) ( ); Mazzaferro v. Albany Motel Enterprises, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 374, 375, 515 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (3d Dep't 1987) (); Trott v. Merit Department Store, 106 A.D.2d 158, 160, 484 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (1st Dep't 1985) (same). It is thus legally impossible to claim that the alleged perpetrator of deliberate sexual abuse injured the plaintiff negligently.
Similarly, to the extent that the plaintiff's negligence claim is founded on Bishop's mishandling of the counseling relationship generally, that claim is properly treated as one for malpractice, see infra at 326-328. This particular aspect of defendant's conduct involves a purported breach of professional standards by an ordained minister, and as such is cognizable only as a malpractice claim. Papa v. Brunswick General Hospital, 132 A.D.2d 601, 517 N.Y.S.2d 762 (2d Dep't 1987) ( ).
Count III of the complaint charges Bishop with a breach of fiduciary duty. In perhaps the most widely quoted and farreaching New York case on the definition of a "fiduciary" relationship, the court held:
Penato v. George, 52 A.D.2d 939, 942, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902 (2d Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed, 42 N.Y.2d 908, 366 N.E.2d 1358, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1977). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 comment a.
Despite this expansive characterization of the term, it is clear that not every confidential relationship or joint venture involves as a "fiduciary" relationship. See, e.g., Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F.Supp. 741, 769 (S.D.N.Y.1990) ( ); Kirkland v. American Title Insurance Co., 692 F.Supp. 153, 157 (E.D.N.Y.1988) ( ); Sobol v. E.P. Dutton, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 99, 104 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (Weinfeld, J.) ( ).
On the other hand, although the term generally implies the existence of a professional or commercial relationship,1 the term as defined in New York also comprehends "informal relations". Compare MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (4th Dep't 1982) ( ) with DiMaio v. State, 135 Misc.2d 1021, 517 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Ct.Cl.1987) ( ) and Hector M. v. Commissioner of Social Services, 102 Misc.2d 676, 425 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Fam. Ct.1980) ( ).
Irrespective of whether the pastoral relationship may generally be characterized as a "fiduciary" relationship, the Court is persuaded that defendant Bishop should prevail on this count. First, the duty allegedly violated by the defendant was not so much a special "fiduciary" duty, which may be imposed on an individual as a matter of social policy, Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 137 A.D.2d 50, 55, 529 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (1st Dep't 1988), but rather the general...
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