F. W. Woolworth Co., Inc. v. Haynie

• Decision Date: 19 October 1936
• Docket Number: 32316
• Citation: 170 So. 150,176 Miss. 703
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: F. W. WOOLWORTH CO., INC., v. HAYNIE

170 So. 150

176 Miss. 703

F. W. WOOLWORTH CO., INC., v. HAYNIE

No. 32316

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 19, 1936

Division A

1 EVIDENCE.

Testimony of soda fountain clerk, in suit against employer for injuries, that condition of clerk's hands and feet was caused by chemical in dish water, should have been excluded as unsupported opinion of nonexpert witness.

2. MASTER AND SERVANT.

Unsupported evidence of soda fountain clerk, suing employer for injuries that condition of clerk's hands and feet was caused by chemical used in dish water, held insufficient for jury in view of undisputed testimony that product was extensively used for antiseptic and sterilization purposes and expert opinion that product containing same chemicals as one used would not be harmful.

HON. W A. WHITE, Judge.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Harrison county, HON. W. A. WHITE Judge.

Action by Mrs. F. L. Haynie against F. W. Woolworth Company, Incorporated. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered for defendant.

Reversed and judgment for appellant.

Leathers, Wallace & Greaves, of Gulfport, for appellant.

As shown by the record, the questions of appellee's counsel seeking information from appellee as to what effect the Pur-a-fac had on appellee's hands and feet, were objected to by appellant for the reason that the appellee, a lay-witness, was not qualified to testify relative to the effects of the chemical, and, in addition thereto, the appellant, at the conclusion of the testimony of the appellee, herself, moved the court to exclude all the testimony of the appellee relative to the harmful effects of Pur-a-fac or with reference to any injury to appellee's hands and feet from Pur-a-fac for the reason that appellee had not qualified to testify with reference to these matters, and for the further reason that there was no charge in the declaration that Pur-a-fac was harmful or injurious to the human skin. These objections and motion were all overruled by the trial court. Jones on Evidence, sees. 359, 360.

The testimony of the appellee, the only witness in this case who attempted to say that the condition the appellee complained of was caused by the use of the chemical Pur-a-fac, as to the effect of appellee's using and standing in water treated with Pur-a-fac, could not possibly be more than a conjecture or haphazard guess on the part of the appellee.

It is fundamental that wherever opinion evidence is admitted, one of the first essentials is that the witness should be possessed of adequate knowledge regarding the subject matter to which his testimony relates, and, where the testimony is as to an inference, it must also appear that (he witness is qualified to draw the correct inference.

22 C. J., page 516; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Short, 74 So. 123.

The appellee in this case did not attempt, as we have already stated, to qualify as an expert in order that she might testify what effect her using and standing in the chemical Put-a-fac had upon her physical make-up; nor did she ever attempt to show that she possessed any knowledge whatever regarding the effect of her standing in and using the Pur-a-fac; nor did she attempt to qualify herself so as to be allowed to testify properly that her using and standing in the chemical had caused the physical condition she was complaining of.

F. W. Woolworth Co., Inc., v. Volking, 100 So. 3.

The lower court committed reversible error in refusing to grant the appellant a peremptory instruction.

There were no facts proved upon which a verdict might rest, and the verdict in this case rests solely upon surmise, speculation and conjecture.

23 C. J., sec. 1795; Y. & M. V. R. Co. v. Boone, 72 So. 777; I. C. R. Co. v. Humphries, 155 So. 421; M. & O. R. R. Co. v. Clay, 125 So. 819.

T. J. White and Bidwell Adam, both of Gulfport, for appellee.

It is our contention that appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict, for the reason, that, leaving out entirely the chemical composition of Put-a-fac, the appellee was still entitled to go to the jury on the question of the negligence of the appellant.

Appellant contends that it was necessary for appellee to be an expert before she should be allowed to tell the physical condition of her hands and feet. We submit that there is no expert knowledge involved and no necessity for the same; that she had the same right to...