Fagan v. Boggs
| Decision Date | 21 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10CA17 |
| Citation | 2011 Ohio 5884 |
| Parties | LINDA FAGAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ROBERT J. BOGGS, DIRECTOR OHIO DEPARTMENT of AGRICULTURE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND
JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Mike DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and James R. Patterson, Ohio Assistant Attorney General, Reynoldsburg, Ohio, for the Appellant.
David G. Cox, Columbus, Ohio, for the Appellees.
{¶1} Appellant, Robert J. Boggs, Director, Ohio Department of Agriculture, appeals the decision of the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which issued a declaratory judgment and injunction in favor of Appellees, Linda Fagan and Donna Betts, with regard to a stop sale/withdrawal from distribution order issued in connection with Appellees' manufacture and distribution of pet food. Appellant also appeals the trial court's award of attorneys fees to Appellees. On appeal, Appellant contendsthat the trial court 1) erred and abused its discretion in holding that Appellant denied Appellees due process and the equal protection of the laws in applying R.C. 923.52; 2) erred and abused its discretion in awarding Appellees attorney fees; 3) erred and abused its discretion in issuing an injunction against future enforcement by Appellant of Ohio's feed label laws against Appellees' feed product labels; and 4) erred and abused its discretion in holding that Appellant engaged in illegal rulemaking.
{¶2} Based upon our conclusion that Appellees did not avail themselves of the administrative process available to them in the form of a condemnation hearing, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding Appellant's issuance of a stop sale order resulted in a deprivation of due process. Additionally, as Appellees have not demonstrated that they were a member of a suspect class, that they were subjected to an arbitrary exercise of power, or that they were treated differently than other persons under like circumstances, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding an equal protection violation. As such, Appellant's first assignment of error is sustained. Based upon our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Appellees, Appellant's second assignment of error is sustained and the issue of attorney fees is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶3} Further, based upon our conclusion that the trial court erred in granting injunctive relief beyond what was reasonable and necessary, Appellant's third assignment of error is sustained, in part. Specifically, we uphold the injunction, but only to the limited extent that it enjoins Appellant from issuing stop sale orders or revoking Appellees feed registrations based upon the inclusion of raw milk as an ingredient. Finally, in light of our conclusion that Appellant engaged in illegal rulemaking in violation of R.C. Chapter 119 when it implemented a de facto rule prohibiting the use of milk, or raw milk, as an ingredient in pet food, Appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶4} Appellees, Linda Fagan and Donna Betts, are manufacturers of pet food, the primary ingredient of which is milk, or raw milk, and have been in this business since 2001 and 2002, respectively. Appellees were previously issued commercial feed registrations by the Ohio Department of Agriculture, "ODA," and sold their products at local farmers markets. On February 14, 2006, Appellees were issued "Stop Sale/Withdraw from Distribution" orders from the Ohio Department of Agriculture, pursuant to R.C. 923.52. The basis for the orders, according to the language contained in the orders themselves, was that Appellees were Appellees complied with the orders. Having no feed on hand at the time the orders were issued1 , Appellees ceased further production of their pet food.
{¶5} Subsequently, by letters dated April 24, 2006, the ODA notified Appellees of their intent to revoke Appellees' commercial feed registrations pursuant to R.C. 923.42. In the letters, the ODA also notified Appellees of their right to administrative hearings under R.C. 119. Both Appellees obtained counsel in order to prepare for their requested hearings, which were scheduled on July 12, 2006. However, having apparently determined that Appellees were no longer marketing their commercial feed, the ODA withrew its proposed revocations and the scheduled hearings were cancelled. At that point, the situation essentially came to a standstill, with Appellees having never commenced their production and the ODA having never pursued the revocation of Appellees' commercial feed registrations.
{¶6} On July 31, 2006, Appellees filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive and other relief against the ODA. Then on September 24, 2007, Appellees filed an amended complaint. In theiramended complaint, Appellees alleged that 1) R.C. 923.52 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them; 2) neither the director of the ODA nor his staff can withdraw a proposed action under R.C. 119 once an adjudication hearing is requested; 3) that a person who requests an adjudication hearing once an agency issues a proposed action becomes a prevailing party if the agency chooses to withdraw the proposed action prior to the hearing; and 4) ODA engaged in illegal rulemaking. Further, as part of their prayer for relief, Appellees specifically requested that the court declare them to be "prevailing parties" under R.C. 119.092 and award them attorney's fees and costs pursuant to that statute, as well as R.C. 2335.39 and 2721.11.2 The ODA responded by filing an amended answer on October 9, 2007, and the matter proceeded with discovery.
{¶7} ODA filed a motion for summary judgment on November 16, 2007. In support of their motion for summary judgment, Appellant attached an affidavit by David Simmons, averring that in addition to containing the prohibited ingredient of milk, Appellees' labels also failed to contain a guaranteed analysis,3 disclosures of minimum and maximum percentages of crude protein, crude fat, crude fiber and moisture, intended animal species for the pet foods, or statement of nutritional adequacy and purpose of theproduct. Although Appellees opposed the motion for summary judgment, they did not address Appellant's claims regarding the additional deficiencies in their product labels. The trial court ultimately denied the motion for summary judgment, without addressing the additional alleged labeling deficiencies.
{¶8} The matter proceeded to a trial on the merits to the court on August 25, 2008. After hearing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court ordered closing arguments, as well as findings of fact and conclusions of law to be submitted by the parties. The trial court then adopted, almost verbatim, Appellees proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issued its order and decision on October 29, 2008.
{¶9} In its order and decision, the trial court found that R.C. 923.52 was constitutional on its face, but was unconstitutional as applied by the ODA to Appellees. As a result, the trial court found Appellees' complaint for injunctive relief to be well taken and vacated the ODA's stop orders. The trial court further found that Appellees' pet food labels complied with ODA regulations and that because Appellees had not been afforded a hearing on the validity of their labels, the court deemed the labels to be in compliance with Ohio law and enjoined the ODA from further action to prohibit Appellees' use of their commercial feed licenses for the manufacture of petfood, on the basis that their labels did not comply with Ohio law. Further, the trial court determined Appellees to be "prevailing parties" under Ohio law and ordered that Appellee Fagan recover attorney fees in the amount of $9,647.46, and Appellee Betts recover attorney fees in the amount of $9,773.43.
{¶10} Additionally, the trial court reserved the right to impose additional fees upon the application of Appellees for fees and costs incurred during the hearing and the post-hearing period. The trial court further granted Appellees' motion to voluntarily dismiss counts two and three of their amended complaint. The trial court's order and decision did not contain language indicating that it was a final, appealable order.
{¶11} Subsequently, and as essentially invited to do by the trial court's order, Appellees filed a post-trial motion for attorney's fees and costs on November 4, 2008. In their motion, Appellees requested additional fees be awarded to them for the period from June of 2008 to the date the motion was filed. Appellant, ODA, filed a memorandum contra to the motion on November 18, 2008, to which Appellees filed a reply on November 19, 2008. All of these pleadings remained pending at the time ODA filed its first appeal in this matter on November 26, 2008. As such, this Court dismissed the prior appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.
{¶12} After the dismissal, on May 25, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the issue of attorney fees and ultimately awarded Appellee Fagan an additional $3,576.25 in fees and costs, and awarded Appellee Betts an additional $3,559.75 in fees and costs. It is from this decision and entry that Appellant now brings its timely appeal, assigning the following errors for our review.
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