Fagg v. State

• Decision Date: 16 June 1888
• Citation: 8 S.W. 829
• Parties: FAGG <I>v.</I> STATE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

8 S.W. 829

FAGGv.

STATE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 16, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Sebastian county; JOHN S. LITTLE, Judge.

Indictment for murder. Defendant appeals from a verdict and sentence for voluntary manslaughter.

Thomas Marcum and Duval & Cravens, for appellant. The Attorney General, for the State.

COCKRILL, C. J.

The defendant was indicted and tried for murder. The jury returned the following verdict, viz.: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, but cannot agree upon the punishment." The court sentenced him to three years and six months' imprisonment in the penitentiary. Several grounds for a new trial, assigned in the motion filed for that purpose, find no support in the bill of exceptions, and need not be noticed. Among these is the overruling of the motion for a continuance which is argued by counsel. It is contended by the appellant that the evidence adduced at the trial leads to but one of two conclusions,—that is, that the killing was murder in the first degree, or justifiable homicide; and therefore that the jury could not legally return a verdict of manslaughter. Conceding the premises to be correct, the conclusion does not follow. Where the evidence and the instructions of the court demand a verdict of murder, but the jury finds manslaughter, there is no alternative but to sentence the prisoner accordingly. 2 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 642. Such is the effect of the judgments in Allen v. State, 37 Ark. 435, and Green v. State, 38 Ark. 310. The principle of those cases is that the court cannot withhold from the jury the power to return a verdict according to their will for any grade of the offense charged against a defendant. The courts can only instruct juries as to their duty, giving them in charge the law applicable to the facts, and no other. If there is no evidence whatever tending to establish a lower grade of homicide than murder, in one instance, or voluntary manslaughter in another, the court should decline to give to the jury directions as to any lower grade of homicide, (Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328; Allen v. State, supra;) and it is the jury's duty to take the court's exposition of the law as that applicable to the case. But the court cannot direct a verdict for the higher offense, nor restrain the jury from returning it for the lower grade. Flynn v. State, 43 Ark. 289; Adams v. State, 29 Ohio St. 412. In this case the court, in the course of the charge, read to the jury the statute defining voluntary manslaughter, but said nothing about the lower grade of the offense. There was no exception to the charge upon this score, and no request to charge otherwise. There was not a scintilla of evidence tending to show that the offense of involuntary manslaughter had been committed. It would have been inappropriate, therefore, to have charged the jury upon that offense. It is argued that it was error to charge as to manslaughter at all. The appellant acquiesced in that part of the charge at a time when it seemed favorable to him, and he cannot be heard to complain now. But it is said the court erred in passing sentence on the defendant as for voluntary manslaughter. The verdict did not designate the degree of manslaughter, or assess the punishment. The duty of fixing the penalty devolved, therefore, upon the court. Mansf. Dig. § 2308. On conviction of murder, the statute requires the degree of the offense to be found by the jury. Id. § 2284; Thompson v. State, 26 Ark. 323; Ford v. State, 34 Ark. 652. It is not so as to manslaughter; it is only necessary that the court should have a certain guide to the intention of the jury. Verdicts receive a reasonable construction, in order to reach the jury's meaning, and when that is found they are enforced as though the intention was express. Strawn v. State, 14 Ark. 549. Viewing the verdict in this case in the light of the evidence and the court's charge, the conclusion is reasonable, if not irresistible that the jury intended a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The court had charged them specifically upon that offense, and had made no mention of involuntary manslaughter, and it is not probable that they knew there was a second grade of the offense; or, if so, that the defendant...