Fahey v. Clark
Citation | 125 Conn. 44,3 A.2d 313 |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Decision Date | 07 December 1938 |
Parties | FAHEY v. CLARK et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Alfred C. Baldwin Judge.
Action by Edmond Fahey against Charlotte C. Clark and another to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendants' negligence. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff after trial to a jury, and defendants appeal.
Error and new trial ordered.
Limitation of cross-examination of plaintiff in personal injury suit as to injuries sustained by him in previous accident by requiring defendant's counsel to claim in good faith that some of present injuries were effect of prior accident as condition of continuing such examination was abuse of court's discretion.
Robert J. Woodruff and Charles G. Albom, both of New Haven, for appellants.
John J. Cullinan, of Bridgeport, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS JJ.
The plaintiff, a pedestrian crossing Stratford Avenue in Stratford, was struck and injured by an automobile driven by the named defendant and owned by the other. There were thirty-six assignments of error, only seven of which are pursued on the defendants' brief. This course of action especially without notice to the plaintiff, placed an undue burden on him in briefing the case for this court.
Since we feel bound to send the case back for a new trial because of an important ruling on evidence our discussion of the case is confined to that point. The other rulings on evidence were obviously within the discretionary power of the trial court. The assignments of error directed to the charge do not raise questions likely to cause difficulty on a new trial.
The present accident occurred August 12, 1937. The plaintiff had been previously injured in an automobile accident in 1914. During cross-examination of the plaintiff by counsel for the defendants, an attempt was made to elicit from the plaintiff information as to the character and seriousness of the injuries sustained in the first accident for the purpose of showing that they probably affected him at the time of the injury of 1937. Most of these questions were excluded, little information was obtained and further inquiry was discouraged in no uncertain terms. Counsel for the defendants nevertheless pressed his examination and thereupon the court ruled that no further questions could be asked of the plaintiff about the former accident unless counsel for the defendants would claim in good faith ‘ that some of his injuries are the result of a prior accident.’ Mr. Woodruff: ‘ I cannot make that claim as I don't know about it.’ The court: ‘ Then we won't spend time on it.’ An exception to this ruling was taken.
The extent of and limitations on cross-examination were defined by Chief Justice Wheeler in Bishop v. Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 574, 114 A. 682, in the following language [page 683]: See also Gorman v. Fitts, 80 Conn. 531, 534, 535, 69 A. 357. The rule in other jurisdictions is the same. Ross v. Ackerman, 46 N.Y. 210, 211. See further citations infra.
These statements are, of course, in very general terms. It remains to apply them to the particular facts of this case. The trial judge described the attempted cross-examination as a ‘ fishing expedition.’ Such an expedition has no definite objective and the court has considerable control over it. The examination under consideration,...
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