Fahy v. Town of Trumbull

• Decision Date: 26 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. 110923,110923
• Citation: 163 A.2d 574,22 Conn.Supp. 105
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Francis L. FAHY et al. v. TOWN OF TRUMBULL et al.

Page 574

163 A.2d 574

22 Conn.Supp. 105

Francis L. FAHY et al. v. TOWN OF TRUMBULL et al.

No. 110923.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Fairfield County, at Bridgeport.

April 26, 1960.

Curtis, Buckley & Hilgendorff, Bridgeport, for plaintiffs.

Clancy & Kenney, Bridgeport, for defendants.

MacDONALD, Judge.

This is an action brought by the individual members of the civil service board of the town of Trumbull against the town of Trumbull, a municipal corporation, and the prosecutors of its Town Court, claiming, first, a judgment declaring that an ordinance adopted on January 25, 1960, by the representative town meeting of Trumbull and forbidding, under penalty, members of the civil service board from engaging in 'political activity' is invalid; and, secondly, an injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the ordinance. The complaint attacks the ordinance on three grounds: (1) that the defendant town had no authority to enact an ordinance restricting the plaintiffs' exercise of political activity, (2) that the ordinance prohibits the exercise of constitutional rights, and (3) that the ordinance is too vague. The second ground has been abandoned, and plaintiffs have relied in argument principally upon the first ground.

The facts necessary for our consideration are undisputed and have been stipulated to be as follows: The defendant town is a municipal corporation created by the General Assembly. Its legislative authority is embodied in a representative town meeting under the provisions of Special Act No. 27 of the January, 1953, Session of the General Assembly, as amended. 26 Spec.Laws 704, No. 27, as amended, 27 Spec.Laws 639, No. 662; 28 Spec.Laws 77, No. 56; 29 Spec.Laws 47, No. 2. On July 1, 1959, the defendant town adopted a merit system for town employees under part 1 of chapter 113 of the General Statutes, and the three named plaintiffs were thereafter duly appointed, and are presently serving, as members of the civil service board contemplated by chapter 113. On January 25, 1960, the representative town meeting of the town of Trumbull, at a meeting duly called for the purpose, and with a quorum present throughout, enacted the following ordinance, effective, February 8, 1960; 'Be it Resolved, Enacted and Ordained as follows: 1. No person who has been appointed to the Civil Service Board or the Personnel Appeals Board of the Town of Trumbull shall engage in political activity during his term of office on said boards. 2. Political activity shall include for purposes of this ordinance the following: (a) Holding office as a member of any committee of any political party. (b) Campaigning for the election of any candidate for political office in government or in a political party organization. (c) Making or soliciting financial contributions to any political party organization. 3. Any person who violates this ordinance may be fined not more than $25 for each violation.' The plaintiffs Francis L. Fahy and Edward M. Keefe, in addition to being duly appointed members of the civil service board of the town of Trumbull, are also members of the Democratic town committee of said town.

Originally, plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction restraining enforcement of the ordinance in question pending decision of the issues presented, but abandoned such claim upon defendants' written assurance that no action would be taken under the ordinance until such time as these issues are decided by the court. The question which would appear to determine the issues raised is as to whether or not the town of Trumbull, through its representative town meeting or otherwise, had the authority, either express or implied, to enact the ordinance.

The special act creating the Trumbull representative town meeting (Spec.Act No. 27, Jan.Sess., 1953, as amended) gives it no new legislative powers which the town did not already have, and since Trumbull had no charter, it is necessary to examine the general statutes and court decisions to determine the town's legislative powers. As summarized in 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) § 10.09: 'A municipal corporation is a creature of the law established for special purposes and its corporate acts must be authorized by its charter, or other laws applicable thereto. Excluding the question as to the existence of so-called inherent powers of a municipal corporation, the powers of a municipal corporation include (1) powers expressly conferred by the constitution, statutes or charter; (2) powers necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; and (3) powers essential to the declared objects and purposes of the municipality, the latter often being classified as among the implied powers. This enumeration of powers is exclusive and no other powers exist, the rule being so well settled without dissent that it is deemed a waste of space to do more than to refer to a few of the later decisions so stating the rule * * *' (italics supplied). It should be pointed out briefly at the outset that what McQuillin has referred to as the 'inherent powers of a municipal corporation' do not exist in Connecticut towns. See Baldwin v. Town of North Branford, 32 Conn. 47, 54; Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 124; Webster v. Town of Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131, 136-139; State ex rel. Bulkeley v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 149, 35 A. 24, 421, 48 L.R.A. 465, affirmed 170 U.S. 304, 18 S.Ct. 617, 42 L.Ed. 1047; 30 Conn.B.J. 376, 385 n. 77.

Apparently, as claimed by the defendants, the source of the ordinance making power of the town of Trumbull is chapter 98 of the General Statutes, and more specifically § 7-154, which provides: 'Any town may make ordinances concerning matters not regulated by statute, which ordinances may provide for the imposition of a fine not exceeding twenty-five dollars for any violation thereof.' The scope of this statute (then Rev.1918, § 411) as a claimed general grant of legislative authority was discussed by our Supreme Court in Keegan v. Town of Thompson, 103 Conn. 418, 130 A. 707, involving the power of the town of Thompson to...