Fainberg v. Dalton Kent Securities Group, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 January 2000
• Citation: 268 AD2d 247,701 N.Y.S.2d 41
• Parties: 2000 N.Y. Slip Op. 154 Jeffrey FAINBERG, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. DALTON KENT SECURITIES GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and Hugh O'Callahan, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 41

701 N.Y.S.2d 41

2000 N.Y. Slip Op. 154

Jeffrey FAINBERG, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. DALTON KENT SECURITIES GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellant and Hugh O'Callahan, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Jan. 11, 2000.

Brian J. Isaac, for Plaintiffs-Respondents.

Jacob H. Zamansky, for Defendant-Appellant.

SULLIVAN, J.P., NARDELLI, WALLACH, SAXE and FRIEDMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Tompkins, J.), entered February 10, 1999, which denied the motion of defendant Dalton Kent Securities Group, Inc. for summary judgment as untimely, unanimously reversed, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant-appellant Dalton Kent Securities Group, Inc. dismissing the complaint as against it. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered April 16, 1999, which denied defendant's motion to reargue, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as taken from a non-appealable order.

While it is true that a court has inherent power over the control of its calendar and the disposition of business before it (Public Admin. of County of N.Y. v. Cohen, 221 A.D.2d 297, 634 N.Y.S.2d 106; Heist v. Cameron, 211 A.D.2d 429, 620 N.Y.S.2d 385) and may, in its discretion, require that all summary judgment motions be made within 30 days after filing of the note of issue (CPLR 3212[a] ), it is also true that the court, upon good cause shown, may allow the filing of a late motion (CPLR 3212[a] ); Goodman v. Gudi, --- A.D.2d ----, 695 N.Y.S.2d 576.

In this matter, the IAS court improvidently exercised its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed defendant's motion for summary judgment as untimely. Defendant was unable to file a timely motion because it was required, pursuant to CPLR 3116(a), to wait beyond the court's deadline for the return of corrected, signed deposition transcripts upon which it intended to rely in making its motion (see, Kule v. Reliance Group, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 587, 427 N.Y.S.2d 612, 404 N.E.2d 734; Interfilm, Inc. v. Advanced Exhibition Corp., 249 A.D.2d 242, 672 N.Y.S.2d 309). Moreover, the delay was minimal and there is no discernible prejudice to plaintiffs who, by stipulation, had agreed to extend defendant's time to move for summary relief.

Turning to the merits of the motion, we first note that questions of whether an employee's actions fall within the scope of his or her employment are...