Fair v. Cochran

Decision Date30 March 2012
Docket NumberNo. E2011-00831-COA-R3-CV,E2011-00831-COA-R3-CV
PartiesCHRISTY IRENE FAIR v. STEPHEN LYNN COCHRAN
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

February 1, 2012 Session

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County

No. 1-624-09 Dale C. Workman, Judge

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., dissenting.

I agree completely with the majority that return of "proof of service to the court" 412 days after process was issued by the trial court clerk is hardly a "prompt[]" return of proof of service. I also agree - as I must - that such a delay in the return of proof of service violates the clear mandate of the first sentence of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03(1): "The person serving the summons shall promptly make proof of service to the court . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Rule 4.03(1) does not expressly, or by clear implication, provide that a failure to "promptly" return proof of service of process to the court will prevent the filing of a complaint and the later proper service of process from "commenc[ing]" a civil action pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3. I believe the result reached by the majority, i.e., a failure to promptly return proof of service of process means the suit is not "commenced," is contrary to the holding in the McNeary case cited by the majority:

Tennessee law is clear that commencement of an action is accomplished only when a complaint is filed and process is served.

McNeary, 2011 WL 863006 at *8. To the extent that Faulks v. Crowder, 99 S.W.3d 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), by analogy, can be read to mean otherwise and to support the majority's conclusion, I disassociate myself from the holding in Faulks.

I would reverse the trial court's judgment. If the plaintiff can prove effective service of process, I believe her cause of action was commenced with the filing of complaint on

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December 11, 2009. The failure to promptly return proof of service to the court may call into question whether the process was properly served but, as previously noted by me, a lack of promptness in the filing of the return, standing alone, does not, in my judgment, prevent the commencement of the suit.

I respectfully dissent.

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE

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