Fairbanks v. Pavlikowski
| Decision Date | 06 February 1967 |
| Docket Number | 5271,Nos. 5270,s. 5270 |
| Citation | 83 Nev. 80,423 P.2d 401 |
| Parties | Ace FAIRBANKS, Petitioner, v. Joseph S. PAVLIKOWSKI, Justice of the Peace, Las Vegas Township, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, Respondent. Yerker Elvira TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. Herman E. FISHER, Jr., Justice of the Peace, Las Vegas Township, Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
The above petitions were ordered consolidated for hearing and, in conference with the court, counsel for the respective parties stipulated the petitions might be construed as seeking quo warranto as well as prohibition, for the reason that if respondents have no jurisdiction, neither do they legally occupy the offices.
Petitioners were charged with crimes in the justice court of Las Vegas township, Clark County, Nevada. At preliminary hearings, each objected to the jurisdiction of the named justice of the peace, contending he had no jurisdiction in the matter, nor that he lawfully occupied the office. Respondents ruled against petitioners. The issue is that the statute cannot be constitutionally applied under the circumstances hereinafter described, because, while appearing to be general on its face, it is in fact a special statute. We conclude petitioners are in error and deny the petitions seeking either quo warranto or prohibition.
The national census tabulated in April 1960 showed that Las Vegas township, as then existing geographically, had a population of 106,755 people and that the City of North Las Vegas (then included in the Las Vegas township) had a population of 18,422. On June 20, 1960, the Board of Commissioners of Clark County created a new township out of the Las Vegas township and designated it North Las Vegas township.
The 1965 session of the Nevada legislature enacted NRS 4.020(3), which reads:
1
At the general election held on November 8, 1966 respondents were elected justices of the peace of Las Vegas township. They assumed office January 3, 1967 and have since been exercising the civil and criminal jurisdiction of their office, including the performance of marriages.
Petitioners content respondents have no jurisdiction, requiring that they be prohibited from further proceedings for the reason that neither occupies the office lawfully. Petitioners' arguments are that Las Vegas township no longer had a population of 100,000 persons when North Las Vegas township was created out of it, but was reduced to 88,333 by a simple computation deducting 18,422 from 106,755. They say, the enactment of NRS 4.020(3) in 1965 operated nowhere within the State of Nevada because there was no township having a population of 100,000 (including Las Vegas township.) Further, that it was improper and unlawful to certify to the electors of Las Vegas township that they were entitled to elect two justices of the peace because it was no longer the same geographical area with 100,000 or more population as shown in the 1960 census. Finally, though entitled to one justice of the peace in that township, it would be impossible to say which of respondents would have been elected had there been but one office to fill rather than two. In fact, they argue that persons other than either respondent might have been chosen by the people had they voted for but one office holder. Thus, while the statute NRS 4.020(3) is not unconstitutional, neither respondent was lawfully elected, holds office, nor has jurisdiction over these petitioners.
NRS 4.020(3), while inartfully drawn, was obviously intended by the legislature to operate in any township in Nevada, which by the 1960 census had 100,000 or more population within it. The fact it might apply only to Las Vegas township is of no moment, for if there were others, the statute would then too apply. It therefore conforms to the constitutional mandate that there shall be no local and special laws, and that general laws shall have uniform operation. Nev. Const., Art. 4, Sec. 20, 2 and 21; 3 Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677 (1947).
We are required to give a legislative enactment the effect intended if we can determine the intention. Ex parte Siebenhauer, 14 Nev. 365 (1879); Ex parte Iratacable, 55 Nev. 263, 30 P.2d 284 (1934). We cannot refuse to apply a law though inartfully drawn or worded if by interpretation the legislative purpose can be reasonably determined, or the means to accomplish it ascertained. State ex rel. Copeland v. Woodbury, 17 Nev. 337, 30 P. 1006 (1883).
The obvious purpose of NRS 4.020(3) was to provide an additional justice of the peace in any township in Nevada having an enlarged population. This would allow criminal and civil cases to be heard and disposed of expeditiously and not unusually delay the determination of valuable personal and property rights. The vast majority of people whose rights are judicially determined appear in inferior courts of our state.
The legislature chose in this case to use as a standard or measure the decennial census of the people living in any given township in this state. This may have been a poor choice of standards to employ because, as this controversy shows, its use has created confusion and uncertainty. That, however, is the right and prerogative of the legislature to use what measure or standard its wisdom directs. The census, regularly taken each 10 years, is a reliable, accurate count of population in a given area as of a given period of time. Perhaps it was that reliability which promoted the legislature to adopt it as the measure of population. The difficulty arises in the manner in which they directed it to be used as the measure or yardstick. Factually, it is undeniable that as of the 1960 census Las Vegas township did have over 100,000 people. Whether Las Vegas township had more or less than 100,000 people in 1965 when the act was passed or even in 1967 when petitioners assumed their office is immaterial and not controlling. By calculation, respondents suggest we should say, as a matter of law, Las Vegas township had but 88,333 population when North Las Vegas township was created out of it. But that is not the standard or measure the legislature directed to be used, and we say application of the standard directed by the legislature, the 1960 census and those following each 10 years, is a reasonable one rendering the statute capable of intelligent interpretation. Perhaps standards such as the number of civil and criminal cases docketed in the justice court of any township in a given year, or the vote cast and counted in that township for the member of Congress in the preceding general election would have been a better standard, generating less confusion and creating a continuing standard of accuracy. The legislators chose to use the census and they, not this court, create law.
We feel the present legislature might see fit, notwithstanding this opinion, to review NRS 4.020(3) and clarify other points of confusion which may exist or arise. The welfare of the people affected by the statute is, however, within their exclusive province.
The petitions seeking writs of prohibition and quo warranto are denied and the proceedings dismissed.
I concur with the result enunciated by Justice COLLINS but I readily concede the merit of the dissenting opinion. We are bound, however, to uphold the application of a valid statute wherever it is reasonable to do so. In this case the legislative intent is apparent, but the statutory standard compels a strained interpretation. Yet since Las Vegas Township did exist in 1960, as Justice COLLINS recites, and the population of that township was over 100,000, the yardstick of NRS 4.020, Subsection 3, can be made to apply.
The respondents are the newly elected Justices of the Peace of Las Vegas Township. These consolidated proceedings in quo warranto challenge their right to...
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