Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2947,97-2947
• Citation: 147 F.3d 567
• Parties: 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 251, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,550, 13 NDLR P 50 James R. FAIRCHILD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORMA SCIENTIFIC, INC. and Life Sciences International, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 567

147 F.3d 567

77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 251,

74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,550, 13 NDLR P 50

James R. FAIRCHILD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORMA SCIENTIFIC, INC. and Life Sciences International Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-2947.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 20, 1998.

Decided June 10, 1998.

T. Evan Schaeffer (argued), Carey & Danis, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert J. Tomaso (argued), Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, St. Louis, MO, Robert L. Jackstadt, Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, Belleville, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before CUMMINGS, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

James R. Fairchild sued his former employer, Forma Scientific, Inc. ("Forma") alleging that Forma fired him because of his age and disability in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Fairchild also alleged that Forma denied him disability benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. Fairchild sued Life Sciences for the ERISA violation, alleging that Life Sciences is "an affiliate" of Forma, that both companies "exercise functional control over the administration" of Life Sciences' health benefit plan, and that the two companies are "sister corporations ... owned or controlled by Life Sciences International PLC of London." The district court granted summary judgment on each count in favor of Forma and on the ERISA count in favor of Life Sciences. Fairchild appeals. Because we find that Fairchild failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext in the ADEA claim, that Fairchild's ADA claim was not timely filed, and that Fairchild cannot support his ERISA claim, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I. HISTORY

Fairchild worked as a salesman for Forma from 1983 until his termination in 1994. Art Fad was his direct supervisor. In 1990, Fad promoted him to Regional Sales Manager for the Central Region, an area encompassing fourteen midwestern states. At this time, Fad told Fairchild that being Regional Sales Manager for the Central Region was the most difficult job at Forma. Fairchild continued to report to Fad, while Fad reported to Doug Bergen, Forma's Senior Vice President of Sales and Marketing.

Fairchild experienced performance problems in his new position. For example, in 1991 the Central Region met only 81% of its quota. In response to concerns raised by Fairchild, Forma reduced the region's quota for the following years. During the same time period, the other regions had their quotas increased. Notwithstanding this decrease in expectations, in 1992 and 1993 the Central Region again failed to meet quota. In the years Fairchild managed the Central Region, it consistently finished last in the company in sales.

Throughout this time period, Fairchild received performance reviews from Fad. Fad consistently indicated that he expected the region to show improvements and warned Fairchild about his performance. However, Fairchild always received annual salary increases. In December 1993, Fad told Fairchild that if the Central Region did not show improvements in the first half of 1994, Fairchild's position in the company would not be secure. Fairchild's March 1994 review again listed his performance as unsatisfactory.

Fad also had concerns about Fairchild's requests for expense reimbursements. Specifically, on February 17, 1994, Fad questioned Fairchild about a receipt Fairchild submitted dated March 2, 1994. Fad was concerned because it appeared that Fairchild was submitting receipts for expenses that had yet to be incurred.

In the early 1990s, Fairchild experienced breathing difficulties. He was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, a potentially fatal lung disease. Fad pursued disability benefits for Fairchild. Specifically, Fad asked Bergen and Craig Piersall, Forma's Vice President for Human Resources, whether "disability were an option" for Fairchild. Fad testified in his deposition that "there wasn't much response" from Bergen and Piersall. Fad then went to Lewis Rosenblum, the President of Forma. Rosenblum wanted to know what Fad was doing about Fairchild's performance. When Fad asked Rosenblum about Fairchild "going on disability," Rosenblum responded, "Fuck him." Fad had no other conversations with Rosenblum, Piersall, or Bergen about Fairchild's medical condition or the possibility of disability benefits.

During the spring of 1994, Forma's management notified Bergen that he needed to make substantial cuts in his sales and marketing budget. Bergen decided to restructure his sales force by terminating Fairchild's employment, reassigning the Central Region to the Manager of the Western Region and assuming the duties in the Western Region himself. Bergen also terminated Fad.

Bergen communicated the decision to Fairchild by phone in May 1994. Fairchild was fifty-four years old at the time. Bergen told Fairchild that he was not being terminated "for cause" and that Bergen would act as a reference for Fairchild.

In June 1994, Fairchild filed an age discrimination charge with the Illinois Human Rights Commission and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In October 1995, Fairchild amended his discrimination charge, alleging that he had been selected for termination because of his age and because of his disability. In January 1996, the EEOC issued Fairchild a right-to-sue letter. This suit followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing our own conclusions of law and fact from the record before us. See Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179, 181 (7th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, neither "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

B. Fairchild's ADEA Claim

The ADEA prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination "because of [an] individual's age," 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), but limits the class of persons protected by the statute to those persons 40 years of age and older. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). To succeed in an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must establish that he would not have been terminated "but for" his employer's intentional age-based discrimination. See Konowitz v. Schnadig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir.1992).

A plaintiff may prove age discrimination in two ways. " 'She may try to meet her burden head on by presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the determining factor in her discharge. Or, as is more common, she may utilize the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof for Title VII cases originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), ... and later adapted to age discrimination claims under the ADEA.' " McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988)).

Fairchild does not contend that he has direct evidence of discrimination. Instead, he focuses on the McDonnell Douglas approach. In order to prevail under the burden-shifting approach, a plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination. "[T]he prima facie case requires 'evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion....' " O'Connor, 116 S.Ct. at 1310, 116 S.Ct. 1307 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)) (emphasis in O'Connor removed). To establish such a case under the ADEA, Fairchild must show (1) he was in the protected age group of 40 or older, (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily, (3) he was discharged, and (4) substantially younger, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably. ¹ See Maier v. Lucent Technologies 120 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir.1997); Denisi v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 99 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir.1996); see also O'Connor, 116 S.Ct. at 1310.

A successful prima facie showing creates a presumption of discrimination that obligates the employer to produce a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision. See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir.1994). Production of this legitimate nondiscriminatory reason rebuts this presumption of discrimination, see Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir.1994), shifting the burden back to the employee to show that the employer's stated reasons for its action are pretextual. See Denisi, 99 F.3d at 864. A plaintiff can establish pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credence. See Sarsha v. Sears,...