Fairchild v. State, CR

Decision Date16 June 1980
Docket NumberNo. CR,CR
PartiesRobert Lee FAIRCHILD, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 80-53.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

John W. Achor, Public Defender, by James H. Phillips, Deputy Public Defender, Little Rock, for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by Catherine Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

MAYS, Justice.

Appellant, Robert Lee Fairchild, was convicted of aggravated robbery by a court sitting without a jury and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The only question raised by appellant on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Although we find sufficient evidence to support a conviction of robbery, we find insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of aggravated robbery. We, therefore, modify the judgment below by reducing it to the lesser included offense of robbery and impose a sentence of three years imprisonment, that being the minimum prison sentence prescribed by law for a conviction of robbery.

The evidence indicates that on July 27, 1979, between 11:00 p. m. and midnight, appellant saw Mrs. Frances Calva, the prosecuting witness, near a double-door back entrance of the Checkmate Club in North Little Rock, rushed over and jerked the outer door open which she was holding and, with his right hand under his shirt, said, "Give me your money!" When Mrs. Calva denied that she had any money, appellant grabbed her dress lightly and insisted that she was lying. As she turned and tried to go in the inner back door, displaying only car keys in her hands, appellant retreated. He was later apprehended outside the club and taken to the police station for interrogation where he volunteered to a police officer that he had tried to induce Mrs. Calva to believe that he had a gun by holding his hand under his shirt.

A person commits robbery if with the purpose of committing a theft or resisting apprehension immediately thereafter, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2103 (Repl.1977). Physical force means any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement or the threat thereof. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2101 (Repl.1977). A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery armed with a deadly weapon, or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2102 (Repl.1977).

In reviewing the record of appellant's conviction, we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976). Although appellant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to show that he employed physical force against Mrs. Calva, we find that jerking the door from her, cornering her in the back hallway and grabbing her dress is sufficient restraint and bodily impact to constitute physical force. Appellant's next argument, however, that the evidence fails to establish that he represented by word or conduct that he was armed with a deadly weapon has merit. We are not persuaded that appellant's hand under his shirt, even with the admitted intention of conveying to the victim that he was armed, is sufficient representation to satisfy the requirements of aggravated robbery in the absence of the victim's appreciation that he was armed. It is clear from Mrs. Calva's testimony that she did not attach any special significance to this conduct and certainly did not perceive it to be in any way threatening. In fact, she did not even mention this particular conduct during her testimony until the prosecutor specially raised it by a leading question. Since the appellant's subjective intent does not control what is objectively conveyed to another, a hand under a shirt has no meaning in the context of the aggravated robbery statute unless the victim at least perceives it to be menacing.

Affirmed as modified.

FOGLEMAN, C. J., and STROUD, J., dissent.

FOGLEMAN, Chief Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority. I would affirm the judgment. I submit that there is substantial evidence to support the trial judge's finding of fact that Fairchild represented by conduct that he was armed with a deadly weapon. In making the determination we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. --- (29 Oct. 1979), 588 S.W.2d 434; Thomas v. State, 266 Ark. 162, 583 S.W.2d 32. We must draw from the testimony all reasonable inferences favorable to the trial...

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24 cases
  • Austin v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • December 4, 2017
    ...her dress [lightly]." United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 641 (8th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting Fairchild v. State, 269 Ark. 273, 600 S.W.2d 16, 16 (1980) ). The panel explicitly overturned its pre- Johnson decision to the contrary. See Eason, 829 F.3d at 641 (citing Unit......
  • Brown and Thornhill v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 29, 2001
    ...the jury to acquit on the charge of aggravated robbery and convicted on the lesser charge of robbery. We agree. In Fairchild v. State, 269 Ark. 273, 600 S.W.2d 16 (1980), this court held that the victim's perception about a weapon was the key in determining whether there was sufficient proo......
  • United States v. Taylor
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • February 7, 2017
    ...even when there was "no threat of force and no actual injury befell the victim." Eason, 829 F.3d at 641 (citing Fairchild v. State, 600 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Ark. 1980)). Plainly, such a crime does not satisfy the force clause, so the Eighth Circuit ruled that Arkansas robbery is not a violent fel......
  • State v. Muir
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 17, 1981
    ...danger. Because fear involves the reasonable perception of the victim, the actions of the head teller are irrelevant. See Fairchild v. State, 600 S.W.2d 16 (Ark.1980). Moreover, a lesser-included offense should not go to the jury unless the element that distinguishes the two offenses is dis......
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