Fairview Hospital Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Service and Hospital and Institutional Emp. Union Local No. 113 A. F. L.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1954
• Docket Number: No. 36125,36125
• Citation: 64 N.W.2d 16,241 Minn. 523
• Parties: FAIRVIEW HOSPITAL ASS'N et al. v. PUBLIC BUILDING SERVICE AND HOSPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL NO. 113, A.F.L. et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 16

64 N.W.2d 16

241 Minn. 523

FAIRVIEW HOSPITAL ASS'N et al. v. PUBLIC BUILDING SERVICE AND HOSPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL NO. 113, A.F.L. et al.

No. 36125.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 2, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Early concept of strike as unlawful conspiracy has given way to its acceptance as a fundamental common-law right of labor to be used by latter as legitimate instrumentality for its economic advancement. Legislation which prohibits strikes constitutes taking of a property right of labor and, hence, must meet requirements of due process under Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Under police power, legislature may regulate or prohibit strikes in enterprises or fields of endeavor directly affecting public health, safety, or welfare.

3. The National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A., § 151, et seq., as amended by 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., § 141, et seq. (aside from fact that charitable hospital employees are exempt from its terms) does not operate to nullify regulatory power of states with respect to strikes in enterprises which affect public health, safety, or welfare, except in fields of endeavor preempted by federal government.

4. There are definite limitations upon legislative enactments made pursuant to police power which abridge or abrogate common-law rights or remedies such as the right to strike. The power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously; and when such rights or remedies are withdrawn, some adequate substitute remedy should be provided in lieu thereof.

5. Adequacy or sufficiency of substitute remedy required is governed by principle that reasonable and substantial substitute for common-law right or remedy withdrawn is essential for validity of legislation which nullifies or withdraws such rights.

6. Legislation which provides for compulsory arbitration of substantially all issues directly affecting welfare and security of employees in lieu of their right to strike cannot be held to indicate such an arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the legislature as to require judicial annulment thereof.

7. Court is without power to annul valid enactment of legislature which has reasonable relation to legislative purpose. Legislature is primarily judge of need or wisdom of legislation. Court cannot override its judgment unless there has been such arbitrary and discriminatory action on its part as to indicate clearly that the requirements of due process have not been met.

8. Operation of charitable hospital constitutes an endeavor directly affecting public health, safety, or welfare in which public has direct and vital interest distinct from that of other fields of human endeavor, and validity of legislation relative to the continued and safe operation of such institutions must be determined in light of this fact.

9. Provision for compulsory arbitration of 'maximum hours of work' and 'minimum hourly wage rates' construed to authorize arbitration of issues relative to daily hours of work; work days per week; relief intervals; days of sick leave; holidays and vacation days; hourly, daily, and weekly wage rates; rate advancements; health and welfare matters; and numerous others bearing directly upon defendant's welfare and security; but not those relative to union shop or questions of internal management.

10. Legislative exclusion of union shop issue from compulsory arbitration provided for in lieu of right to strike, motivated by knowledge that much of work in charitable hospitals may be performed by members of religious and charitable organizations and others, many of whom, because of religious beliefs, consider themselves ineligible for union membership, and who serve because of the charitable, humanitarian, and spiritual aspects involved, Held not such an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious action on part of legislature as to require judicial annulment of enactment under due process clause.

11. Legislative exclusion of issues relative to internal management or assignment of employees from compulsory arbitration provided for in lieu of right to strike, based on knowledge that hospital management so often bears directly upon questions of life or death that it would be extremely hazardous to entrust decisions relative thereto to any one but skilled medical technicians or staff members of such hospital, Held not such an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious action on part of legislature as to require judicial annulment of enactment under due process clause.

12. Equal protection clause does not require that an enactment operate with rigid sameness upon all persons. Legislature, under police power, may prescribe rules respecting rights, obligations, and duties of employers and employees as separate groups. M.S.A. §§ 179.36, 179.37, and 179.38, which limit bargaining power of both employers and employees, do not result in such an arbitrary and unreasonable legislative discrimination in favor of employers as to make their enactment invalid under the equal protection clause.

13. Delegation of legislative power must prescribe basic standard policy and rule of action for guidance of administrative agency which is to exercise such power. Statutes governing operation of § 179.38 (§§ 179.01 to 179.17 and 572.01 to 572.07) and statute defining public policy with reference to labor relations (§ 179.40) Held to supply adequate rules for conducting arbitration under § 179.38 and sufficient guides for just and equitable determination of issues presented thereunder.

14. This court in Northwestern Hospital v. Public Building Service Employes' Union, 208 Minn. 389, 294 N.W. 215, recognized charitable hospitals as institutions in their respective communities differing significantly from other enterprises therein operated for profit; and acknowledged legislative right to treat labor problems arising in such hospitals in a manner different from those in the latter classification.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

John A. Goldie & Samuel I. Sigal, Minneapolis, for appellants.

C. Donald Peterson & Herbert P. Lefler, Minneapolis, for respondents.

William D. Gunn, Donald C. Savelkoul, Minneapolis, for Minnesota State Federation of Labor, amicus curiae.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Actions by nine hospitals which come within the definition of charitable hospitals, M.S.A. § 179.35, subd. 2, to enjoin defendants, an unincorporated association of workers, hereinafter referred to as 'the union,' from causing, promoting, or participating in a strike or other work stoppage affecting plaintiffs' employees, pursuant to the union's strike notice filed with the Minnesota labor conciliator April 1, 1953.

The actions, which were consolidated for trial, were brought under the provisions of §§ 179.36 to 179.39, which provide:

§ 179.36. 'It is unlawful for any hospital employee or representative of the employee * * * to encourage, participate in, or cause any strike or work stoppage against or directly involving a charitable hospital.'

§ 179.37. 'It is contrary to public policy and is hereby declared to be unlawful for any charitable hospital to institute, cause, or declare any lockout.'

§ 179.38. 'In the event of the existence of any labor dispute which cannot be settled by negotiation between the charitable hospital employers and their employees, either such employers or employees may petition and avail themselves of the facilities of the department of labor * * *. If such dispute is not settled within ten days after submission to conciliation, any unsettled issue of Maximum hours of work and minimum hourly wage rates shall, upon service of written notice by either party upon the other party and the State Labor Conciliator, be submitted to the determination of a board of arbitrators whose determination shall be final and binding upon the parties. * * *' (Italics supplied.)

§ 179.39. 'The provisions of Minnesota Statutes 1945, Sections 185.02 to 185.19, shall not apply in the case of a threatened or existing strike or other work stoppage by hospital employees * * *, and such threatened or existing strike or other work stoppage * * * may be enjoined by a court of equity.'

Defendants appeared specially in opposition to plaintiffs' motions for temporary injunctions and moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that the aforesaid statutory provisions were unconstitutional and void. This motion was denied, and on April 29, 1953, the court enjoined defendants from encouraging, participating in, or causing a work stoppage of plaintiffs' employees Pendente lite. This is an appeal from such order.

On appeal the union asserts that §§ 179.35 to 179.39 are unconstitutional in that (1) they deny Equal protection to hospital employees and deprive them of common-law rights Without due process; (2) they constitute an Unlawful delegation of legislative power to boards of arbitration without providing Standards for their decisions; and (3) they are Vague and Indefinite and hence not susceptible of judicial construction.

The facts relative to the dispute are as follows: A considerable number of the union's members are employees of the nine hospitals operated by plaintiffs. Identical collective bargaining contracts with them cover certain of their nonprofessional employees. These include nurses aids, orderlies, maids, janitors, elevator operators, laundry workers, cooks, dishwashers, and a number of other classifications. The last of such contracts in effect between the parties expired February 28, 1953. Each contained the following provision:

Art. XI. 'This agreement shall be effective as of the date first above written except as otherwise provided herein and shall remain in full force and effect until March 1, 1953, and from year to year thereafter, unless either party shall notify the other party in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to March 1, 1953, or March 1 of any year thereafter, of its intention to change, modify or terminate this agreement.'

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