Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach

Decision Date30 September 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-746,86-746
PartiesFAITH FELLOWSHIP MINISTRIES, INC., Appellant, v. LIMBACH, Tax Commr., et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. For the purposes of R.C. 5709.07, "public worship" means the open and free celebration or observance of the rites and ordinances of a religious organization. (Gerke v. Purcell [1874], 25 Ohio St. 229; and Watterson v. Halliday [1907], 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N.E. 962, approved and followed.)

2. To qualify for exemption from real property taxation as a house used exclusively for public worship under R.C. 5709.07, such property must be used in a principal, primary, and essential way to facilitate the public worship.

3. R.C. 5713.04 permits real property to be split into exempt and nonexempt parts if the part which is used in the exempt manner can be precisely delineated, and this delineation is not the product of a calculation of a ratio of the part to be exempted to the whole of the property.

Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc., appellant, seeks exemption of real estate taxes under R.C. 5709.07 for tax year 1982, and abatement of the same taxes under Sub. H.B. No. 493, effective July 6, 1972, for tax years 1978 through 1981, for its complex of buildings located in Cincinnati, Ohio.

Building A, also known as the sanctuary, is where the members of the congregation come together to worship a good part of the year. Apparently, the sanctuary also contains classrooms, church offices and a counseling room. The Tax Commissioner exempted this building from taxation, but did not exempt the remainder of appellant's property.

Building B, referred to as the parlor, contains Sunday school classrooms, nurseries to care for the children of the attendees of the worship service, restrooms, a storage room, a chapel which is now used for Sunday school classes, and quarters for guest speakers. The Board of Tax Appeals ("BTA") found that this building was used in conjunction with the sanctuary, necessary to the use and enjoyment of the worship services, and exempted it.

Building C has several distinct sections. The western portion houses a cafeteria, meeting rooms, and sleeping rooms for retreats. The eastern end of the building houses a chapel that is referred to as the Agape room. This section of the building is used for church meetings and services in the cold weather to avoid the expense of heating the sanctuary, mid-week children's meetings, and children's church in the summer. It is estimated that the room is used nine months of the year. This section of the building also contains the pastor's offices and a secretarial office. Attached to the Agape room is another section called the gymnasium that is used as a play area for the children. Storage of donated furniture and odd items for the poor is also located in this portion. The BTA denied exemption to Building C.

Building D, the annex, contains a large meeting room, which is used for classrooms and seminars, and twelve sleeping rooms. A garage for staff parking is adjacent to the building. This building is apparently used in the retreat function of the church. The BTA denied exemption for this building.

Building E has five steam boilers to provide heat for the other buildings. The BTA determined that this building did not qualify for exemption as its use is not primary. It determined that the facility provided heat for a series of buildings, most of which did not qualify for the exemption.

Building F, known as the Crestwood, is used for storage. The BTA could not determine what was stored in this building and denied exemption for Building F.

Building G is a vacant building for which no future use is planned. Originally it was built for residential use. The BTA denied exemption for Building G.

To recapitulate, Buildings A and B, the sanctuary and the parlor, have been exempted from taxation and are not challenged in this appeal. The BTA also exempted ten acres of land, believing that this was a reasonable amount necessary for the proper occupancy and use of the buildings that were exempted. The remainder of the complex was denied exemption.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Rogers & Olivas and R.T. Rogers, Hamilton, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and James C. Sauer, Columbus, for appellees.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

Appellant presents five propositions of law, two of which will be disposed of as one. For the reasons which follow, the decision of the BTA is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

I

By its first proposition of law, appellant urges this court to liberally apply the exemption provided in R.C. 5709.07.

As the appellees argue, such an application would be inconsistent with the well-established rule that "[e]xemption is the exception to the rule, and statutes granting exemptions are strictly construed." White Cross Hospital Assn. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 199, 201, 67 O.O.2d 224, 225, 311 N.E.2d 862, 863. Appellant's first proposition of law is overruled.

II

Next, appellant asks this court to adopt a definition of worship which is not restricted to any particular form of worship but would include all acts that give expression to an individual's relationship to God. Testimony before the BTA indicated that the witnesses for the appellant were proponents of worship being defined as any act that would draw that individual closer to his or her God. One of the witnesses testified that her presence to testify on behalf of the church at the BTA hearing was a form of worship. Appellant argues that its broad definition of "worship" is in conformity with Section 7, Article I of the Ohio Constitution which provides for the right of religious worship, and that a more restrictive definition would be in violation of this constitutional provision.

A review of the contemporary cases reveals that this court has not recently stated a definition of "public worship." However, past decisions have described "public worship" in terms of what real property is used exclusively as a house of public worship and what property is not. The exemption is constitutionally incorporated and legislatively enacted. The language of R.C. 5709.07 has remained relatively unchanged since the creation of the exemption:

" * * * [H]ouses used exclusively for public worship, the books and furniture therein, and the ground attached to such buildings necessary for the proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment thereof, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit * * * shall be exempt from taxation. * * *"

In the very early case of Gerke v. Purcell (1874), 25 Ohio St. 229, this court considered virtually the same language as appears in R.C. 5709.07 in reviewing a petition to enjoin the collection of taxes levied upon parochial schoolhouses, playgrounds, and parsonages for which an exemption was claimed. While discussing the schoolhouses and playgrounds, the court considered the term "public." The court stated the following at 241-242:

"The word 'public' is used in various senses. It is sometimes applied to describe the use to which the property is applied; at others, to describe the character in which it is held. The circumstance that the use of the property is free, is not a necessary element in determining whether the use is public or not. If the use is of such a nature as concerns the public, and the right to its enjoyment is open to the public upon equal terms, the use will be public whether compensation be exacted or not. * * *

" * * *

"The exemption of 'burying-grounds,' 'houses used exclusively for public worship,' and 'institutions of purely public charity,' does not depend on the ownership of the property. The uses that such property subserves, constitute the grounds for its exemption. The burying-grounds may be either public or private; but the houses of worship must be houses of public worship, and the institutions of charity must be of a charity that is purely public."

When the Gerke court considered the exemption of the parsonage, it decided that it was not used exclusively for public worship. It was a place of private residence, even though the presence of the pastor was essential to conduct the services of public worship. Other persons, such as those in the congregation, were necessary to carry on public worship, and it was equally necessary that they have a place to live. Their residences, however, would not be considered exempt. The parsonage was viewed to be only supportive of public worship and not used as a place of public worship.

"Public" to the Gerke court meant that the use be an open use, a use that was equally available to the public. Since the use was to be one without a view to profit, the public use must be free as well.

This court again considered the exemption of parsonages in Watterson v. Halliday (1907), 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N.E. 962. While again rejecting tax exemption to parsonages, the court described the distinction between a place of public worship and the parish house:

"The religious rites and ordinances of the church organization are celebrated or observed in the places of public worship, although occasionally the confessions of men are heard and the marriage ceremony is performed in the house of the priest. * * *" After describing the function of the parish house and the church building, the court said, "[b]ut it is clear that such houses are primarily places of residence, as the church building is primarily a place of public worship; * * *

"The exemption is not of such houses as may be used for the support of public worship; but of houses used exclusively as places of public worship." Id. at 172-173, 82 N.E. at 966.

This court described the celebrations which occur in a house of public worship as the religious rites and ordinances of the church organization. Although functions which are important to the administration of the church and its public worship occurred...

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