Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. L--10615,L--10615
• Citation: 82 N.J.Super. 133,196 A.2d 808
• Parties: Italo J. FALCONE, Plaintiff, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY, an unincorporated Association, Middlesex County Medical Society, a corporation of the State of New Jersey Middlesex General Hospital, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, and St. Peter's General Hospital, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 133

82 N.J.Super. 133

196 A.2d 808

Italo J. FALCONE, Plaintiff, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY, an unincorporated

Association, Middlesex County Medical Society, a corporation

of the State of New Jersey Middlesex General Hospital, a

corporation of the State of New Jersey, and St. Peter's

General Hospital, a corporation of the State of New Jersey,

Defendants.

No. L--10615.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

Jan. 7, 1964.

Friedman & D'Alessandro, Newark, for plaintiff.

Toolan, Haney & Romond, Perth Amboy, for defendant Middlesex County Medical Society.

MOLINEUX, J.C.C. (temporarily assigned).

This is a motion for summary judgment made on behalf of defendant Middlesex County Medical Society in an action in stituted by plaintiff against it and against Middlesex General Hospital and St. Peter's General Hospital. An understanding of the issue herein raised calls for a resume of prior litigation between plaintiff and said medical society.

On October 22, 1958 plaintiff filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs against the Society alone, in which the complaint alleged generally that he had been duly licensed to practice medicine and surgery in the State of New Jersey by the State Board of Medical Examiners of New Jersey; that he had been denied membership in said Society notwithstanding that its constitution provided that its membership should be open to doctors of medicine who are registered to practice medicine in New Jersey subject to provisions of its bylaws; that such hospitals as St. Peter's General Hospital and Middlesex General Hospital would appoint no physicians as members of their staffs, or permit any physician to treat any patient in the hospitals, or gain admission of a patient to the hospitals, unless the physician was a member of defendant society; that as a result of his having been barred from such membership, plaintiff was barred from any connection with either of said hospitals; and that as a consequence thereof he had been denied the right to earn a livelihood and obtain the economic advantages to which he was justly entitled by reason of his license to practice medicine. The complaint in said action asked for relief by way of an order directing defendant Society to admit plaintiff as an active member, to adjudicate his rights with respect to the grievances alleged in his complaint, and for such other judgment as may be just and legal. After answer filed, pretrial, final hearing, and pursuant to an opinion of the late Judge Vogel reported in 62 N.J.Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (Law Div.1960), Judge Vogel signed a judgment directing defendant Society to forthwith admit plaintiff to full membership in said Society, enjoining and restraining the society from taking any action questioning his right to membership, and directing the Society to pay him the costs of the action to be taxed. On appeal the decision of Judge Vogel was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 89 A.L.R.2d 952. The decision of the Supreme Court was handed down on May 8, 1961.

On February 7, 1962 plaintiff filed his complaint herein, naming as defendants the Society, Middlesex General Hospital and St. Peter's General Hospital. Count 1 alleges the malicious denial to plaintiff of membership by the Society and malicious denial by the hospitals of his use thereof, alleges damage to him, by reason thereof and asks for a money judgment. Count 2 repeats in general the allegations of count 1 and adds a malicious conspiracy between the Society and the hospitals to injury plaintiff and destroy his professional practice. Count 3 alleges a conspiracy existing prior to September 1961 (apparently the date of the mandate of the Supreme Court in the prior case), and that the society and the hospitals continued the conspiracy in that plaintiff is denied the use of the operating rooms of said hospitals and is refused admittance to their respective surgical staffs. Count 4 appears to be directed against the two hospitals alone, omitting the allegation of the conspiracy and alleging that each of said hospitals still continues to deny plaintiff admittance to the operating rooms of said hospitals and refuses to admit him to the surgical staffs. It appears that the fourth count is not directed against the Society.

Motion for summary judgment is made herein on the ground that the judgment in the prior litigation between plaintiff and the Society bars the instant action in that it was incumbent upon plaintiff, to process his claim for money damages in his first action, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, and that his failure to do so bars a subsequent suit.

Obviously, this argument does not apply to the third count, which alleges a conspiracy by this defendant and the hospitals in failing to carry out the mandate of the court in the first action.

As noted above, the fourth count is not directed against the Society, so that this motion is not directed to said count.

That the policy of our courts is to avoid multiplicity of suits is beyond question. In Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9 (1954), Mr. Justice Brennan said:

'The policy of the new practice contemplates that the Superior Court litigant not only should initially plead any legal and equitable claims or defenses, whether or not consistent, supporting his position in the controversy and seek all legal or equitable remedies which he may desire, but also, with the aid of the broad discovery and pretrial procedures by which he may obtain all the facts material to the positions of both sides, that he should avail himself of the liberality allowed to form and reform his pleadings and the pretrial order accordingly, the opportunities for such amendment being restricted, in any substantial degree, only by R.R. 4:29--1(15) and 4:15--2 applicable to amendments offered after the entry of the pretrial order, or during trial.' (at p. 485 of 14 N.J., at p. 10 of 103 A.2d)

In Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 173 A.2d 225 (1961), the Supreme Court again said 'The sound administration of a judicial system requires that all facets of a single dispute between parties be completely determined in one action. Thus, to end wasteful division of authority between the court of law and the court of chancery in our former judicial system our 1947 Constitution provided that 'the Law Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined.' Constitution of 1947, Art. VI, sec. III, par. 4. To implement this policy of judicial administration, we have held that a defendant must assert all matters which will defeat a claim against him and a plaintiff must seek complete relief for vindication of the wrong he charges. See Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 78 A.2d 572 (1951); Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9 (1954); Thatcher v. Jerry O'Mahony, Inc., 39 N.J.Super. 330, 121 A.2d 50 (App.Div.1956); Vacca v. Stika, 21 N.J. 471, 122 A.2d 619 (1956).' (at p. 356 of 35 N.J., at p. 231 of 173 A.2d)

The Appellate Division said in Silverstein v. Abco Vending Service, 37 N.J.Super. 439, 117 A.2d 527 (1955):

'* * * Since Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9 (1954), there remains no basis to misapprehend that the courts of this state are determined to enforce the prime aim of the new practice for '* * * the just and expeditious determination In a single action of the ultimate merits of an entire controversy between litigants' (Id., 14 N.J. at page 485, 103 A.2d at page 10); Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 307--309, 78 A.2d 572 (1951); cf. New Jersey Highway Authority v. Renner, 18 N.J. 485, 492, 114 A.2d 555 (1955). (Emphasis supplied.) 'The piecemeal litigation of fragments of a single controversy is too evident an evil to remain unchecked', within present-day philosophies as to the efficient functioning of litigation. Schnitzer, Civil Practice and Procedure, 10 Rutgers L.Rev. 351, 371 (1955); Id. 9 Rutgers L.Rev. 307, 334 (1954). * * * ' (at p. 449 of 37 N.J.Super., at p. 532 of 117 A.2d)

Also see the concurring opinion of Justice Proctor in Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.J. 277, 196 A.2d 513 (Supreme Court, decided December 16, 1963), referring to '* * * our firm commitment to the enlightened policy that just and expeditious...