Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. A--94,A--94
• Citation: 47 N.J. 92,219 A.2d 505
• Parties: Italo J. FALCONE, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 92

47 N.J. 92

219 A.2d 505

Italo J. FALCONE, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

No. A--94.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 8, 1966.

Decided May 2, 1966.

Edward G. D'Alessandro, Newark, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-respondent (Friedman & D'Alessandro, Newark, attorneys, Louis M. Minotti, Newark, on the brief).

John E. Toolan, Perth Amboy, for defendant-respondent and cross-appellant (Toolan, Haney & Romond, Perth Amboy, attorneys).

PER CURIAM.

The Appellate Division (87 N.J.Super. 486, 210 A.2d 78 (1965)) affirmed a judgment of the Law Division (82 N.J.Super. 133, 196 A.2d 808 (1964)) which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment but only partially. We granted cross petitions for certification. 45 N.J. 591, 214 A.2d 29 (1965).

On September 22, 1958 Dr. Falcone instituted a proceeding in the Law Division to compel his admission to the Middlesex County Medical Society. After trial, he obtained a judgment dated July 21, 1960 granting the relief he sought. 62 N.J.Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324. On appeal, we affirmed. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 89 A.L.R.2d 952. Our opinion was filed on May 8, 1961 and, apparently acting in due course after its summer recess, the Middlesex County Medical Society admitted Dr. Falcone to full membership in September 1961. At no point during the course of the litigation had Dr. Falcone asserted any claim for money damages against the Society. If he had wished to assert any such claim it could readily have been set forth in his complaint. See Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., 11 N.J. 294, 304--305, 94 A.2d 332, 35 A.L.R.2d 1125 (1953); Steiner v. Stein, 2 N.J. 367, 373--374, 66 A.2d 719 (1949). And under the 'single controversy' doctrine which our cases have repeatedly applied, it should have been so set forth. She Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9, certiorari denied 348 U.S. 835, 75 S.Ct. 58, 99 L.Ed. 659 (1954); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343, 356, 173 A.2d 225 (1961); Thatcher v. Jerry O'Mahony, Inc., 39 N.J.Super. 330, 335, 121 A.2d 50 (App.Div.1956). See also Silverstein v. Abco Vending Service, 37 N.J.Super. 439, 117 A.2d 527 (App.Div.1955):

'Since Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9 (1954), there remains no basis to misapprehend that the courts of this state are determined to enforce the prime aim of the new practice for '* * * the just and expeditious determination In a single action of the ultimate merits of an entire controversy between litigants' (Id., 14 N.J., at page 485, 103 A.2d at page 10); Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 307--309, 78 A.2d 572 (1951); cf. New Jersey Highway Authority v. Renner, 18 N.J. 485, 492, 114 A.2d 555 (1955). (Emphasis supplied) 'The piecemeal litigation of fragments of a single controversy is too evident an evil to remain unchecked', within present-day philosophies as to the efficient functioning of litigation.' 37 N.J.Super., at p. 449, 117 A.2d at p. 532.

If Dr. Falcone had asserted a claim for money damages along with his claim for admission, the Society might well have chosen a different course or our decision might well have been made prospective. See State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 558, 161 A.2d 520 (1960) (concurring opinion), certiorari denied 364 U.S. 936, 81 S.Ct. 383, 5 L.Ed.2d 367 (1961); Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 95, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); cf. Levy, 'Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling,' 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1 (1960); Currier, 'Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling,' 51 Va.L.Rev. 201 (1965). In any event, elemental considerations of fairness to the other party and the urgent need for eliminating the delay and wastage incident to the fragmentation of litigation dictated that all of the aspects of the plaintiff's controversy with the defendant be included within his legal proceeding. See 2 Schnitzer and Wildstein, New Jersey Rules Service A--IV--933 et seq. (1957).

The Appellate Division properly recognized the mandatory nature of the single controversy doctrine in contrast to the permissive terms of R.R. 4:31--1 which deals with the joinder of independent or alternate claims. 87 N.J.Super., at pp. 490--491, 210 A.2d 78. But it took the position that, while the plaintiff was barred by the single controversy doctrine from...