Fales v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1887
• Citation: 32 F. 673
• Parties: FALES, Adm'x, v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

32 F. 673

FALES, Adm'x, v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division.

November Term, 1887

Henderson Hurd, Daniels & Keisel, for petitioners.

W. J Knight, for defendant.

SHIRAS J.

This action was originally brought in the district court of Dubuque county, and upon the application of defendant was removed to this court, hence it is sought to have the same remanded for want of jurisdiction.

The motion to remand requires for its determination a construction of the second section of the act of March 3 1887. To ascertain the true reading of this section, it is necessary to collate with the several clauses thereof portions of the first section of the act, as that section is expressly referred to in the second section, and is thereby made part thereof. Reading the one, therefore, in connection with the other, it appears that removals from the state to the federal courts may be had in the following classes of cases:

(1) Suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States involving over $2,000, exclusive of costs or interest, may be removed by the defendant, whether he be or not a resident of the state wherein suit is brought.

(2) Suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, in which the United States are plaintiffs, without reference to the amount involved, may be removed by the defendant, if he is a non-resident of the state wherein suit is brought.

(3) Suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, between citizens of different states, involving over $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, may be removed by the defendant, if he is a non-resident of the state wherein suit is brought.

(4) Suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states, irrespective of the amount involved, may be removed by the defendant, if he is a non-resident of the state wherein suit is brought.

(5) Suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, between citizens of a state and foreign states or subjects, involving over $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, may be removed by the defendant, if he is a non-resident of the state wherein suit is brought.

(6) In suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, in which there is a controversy between a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another state, any defendant being a citizen of a state other than the one wherein suit is brought, may, irrespective of the amount involved, remove said cause, by making it to appear to the United States circuit court that, owing to prejudice or local influence, he cannot obtain justice in the state court in which the cause is pending, or to which it may, under the state laws, be removed for trial.

(7) Suits of a civil nature, at law or in equity, between citizens of the same state, involving the title to land, the amount in dispute exceeding $2,000 exclusive of interest and costs, may be removed by either plaintiff or defendant, if it be made to appear, in the mode provided in the statute, that the adverse parties claim title under grants from different states.

From this classification of the cases removable under the provisions of the act in question, it appears that a plaintiff is not granted the right, except in the class of cases falling under the seventh head, which covers cases involving title to land claimed under grants from the different states. In all other removable cases, under this act, the defendant alone can exercise the right of removal, and the defendant's right is limited in the majority of instances.

Thus in cases falling in the first class named, to-wit, those arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, the defendant may remove the cause without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties.

In cases included within the second, third, fourth, and fifth classes, the defendant cannot remove the cause, unless he is a non-resident of the state wherein suit is brought.

In cases arising under the sixth head, or local prejudice provision, the defendant may remove the cause if he is a citizen of another state.

In cases arising under the first, third, fifth, and seventh classes, the amount involved must exceed $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs. In cases arising under the second, fourth, and sixth classes, the removal may be had irrespective of the amount involved in the controversy.

In this case, of Catherine Fales, Adm'x, v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., the plaintiff is and was, when the action was brought in the state court, a citizen of the state of Iowa, and the defendant company was and is a corporation created and organized under the laws of the state of Wisconsin, and, therefore, for jurisdictional purposes, is deemed and held to be a citizen of that state. The amount involved in the controversy exceeds $2,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and the case, therefore, falls within the third class of removable cases; that is to say, it is a case which is removable by the defendant, if the latter is a non-resident of the state of Iowa.

In support of the motion to remand it is argued that the United States courts cannot take jurisdiction, by removal, of any case which could not have been originally brought in such court, and in support of this view is cited the case of the County of Yuba v. Mining Co., decided by the circuit court for the Northern district of California, and reported in 32 F. 183.

It will certainly seem an act of presumption on my part to question the correctness of the views expressed by the learned court in that case; yet the conclusion therein reached, it seems to me, completely nullifies a large part of the provisions of the act of congress, and I cannot yield assent to it as a correct exposition of the statute in question. In principle, also, the conclusion reached is at variance with that announced by the circuit judge of this circuit in the case of Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 32 F. 337.

The doctrine of the California case is, that section 2 of the act of 1887 does not authorize the removal of a suit from a state to a federal court, which could not have been originally brought in the latter tribunal; that a corporation can be an inhabitant only of the state under whose laws it is created, and that under the act of 1887 the United States courts have not jurisdiction of actions between citizens of different states, except in the state whereof the defendant is an inhabitant.

In the first section of the act it is declared that--

'No person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action before a circuit or district court; and no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process of proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant.'

The latter sentence expressly declares that where the jurisdiction is founded on diverse citizenship, the suit may be brought only in the districts of the residence of either plaintiff or defendant.

Under the express language of the act of 1875, suit by original process might have been brought in any district whereof the defendant was an inhabitant, or in which he should be found at the time of serving process. Hence if, by reason of diverse citizenship, or by reason of the subject-matter, the cause was one cognizable by a federal tribunal, the case might, under the act of 1875, have been brought in any district wherein the defendant could be found for purpose of service.

Under the act of 1887, the place wherein the suit may be brought is limited to the district in which the defendant resides, save in cases wherein jurisdiction depends solely on the fact of diverse citizenship, and in these the suit may be brought in the district of residence of either plaintiff or defendant.

We must not confound the question of federal jurisdiction with that of the place of bringing suit. The first section of the act of 1887 was intended to define the classes of cases of which the United States circuit courts should have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, and also to define the place or places where such suits might be brought by original process.

Two general grounds of federal jurisdiction are recognized in the statute, to-wit, subject-matter and diverse citizenship. Cases arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or in which the title of land is involved claimed under grants from different states, are cognizable in the United States courts by reason of the subject-matter, whereas controversies between citizens of...