Falk v. Falk, No. M2003-02134-COA-R3-CV (TN 1/21/2005)
| Decision Date | 21 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. M2003-02134-COA-R3-CV.,M2003-02134-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | JANNA SHEYA FALK v. GEARY FALK. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Gary M. Williams, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Geary Falk.
David W. Garrett, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Janna Sheya Falk.
OPINION
This is a divorce case involving an invalid marriage resulting from the existence of a subsisting previous marriage at the time of the parties' marriage ceremony in 1995. At the time of the parties' marriage ceremony, the purported wife's divorce from a previous marriage was still pending. The wife's divorce from her prior marriage did not become final until three and one-half months following the parties' marriage ceremony. The parties lived together as husband and wife until the wife filed for divorce in 2003. The trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to section 36-4-101(2) of the Tennessee Code. The trial court then classified the parties' "marital" and separate property, making an equitable division of the "marital" property. The husband appeals the trial court's order granting a divorce and awarding certain property to the wife. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On July 15, 1995, Plaintiff/Appellee Janna Sheya Falk ("Mrs. Falk") and Defendant/Appellant Geary Falk ("Mr. Falk" or collectively, with Mrs. Falk, "the parties") participated in a marriage ceremony in Hendersonville, Tennessee. At the time of the parties' purported marriage ceremony, Mrs. Falk was still legally married to Richard James Bond ("Mr. Bond"), a resident of California. Mrs. Falk and Mr. Bond were married in California and lived together for three months before Mr. Bond filed a pro se petition for divorce (the "California divorce"). The California divorce did not become a final judgment until November 2, 1995, approximately three and one-half months after the Falks' Tennessee marriage ceremony.
Mrs. Falk testified that she and Mr. Falk discussed the fact that the California divorce was pending, but the parties agreed to proceed with the marriage despite the fact that the California divorce was not yet final. Mrs. Falk further testified that, throughout the duration of the marriage, the parties discussed and "joked" with themselves and others about the California divorce and its effect on their marriage. In his testimony, Mr. Falk vehemently denied ever discussing or "joking" about the California divorce and believed that the parties were legitimately married up until he was informed otherwise during a hearing held after the commencement of the parties' divorce action. What is undisputed is that, throughout the nearly eight years that the parties lived together, they neither consulted an attorney about the validity of their Tennessee marriage nor attempted to solemnize their marriage after the California divorce became final.1
On November 15, 1995, after the marriage ceremony, Mr. Falk purchased a home in Millersville, Tennessee (the "Millersville house"). The Millersville house was conveyed by warranty deed to Mr. Falk, as a "single man." The deed conveying the Millersville house to Mr. Falk makes no mention of Mrs. Falk. Neither party disputes the fact that the entire amount of the $35,621.40 down payment on the Millersville house came exclusively from Mr. Falk's separate funds.2 With regard to the manner in which the mortgage on the Millersville house was paid, the parties testified that Mr. Falk would write a check from his business account, which Mrs. Falk would deposit into the parties' joint checking account. She would then make the mortgage payment from the parties' joint account. In or around 2002, the parties refinanced the Millersville house withdrawing $11,000.00, which was deposited into the parties' joint checking account. According to the parties' testimony, Mrs. Falk's name was "added" to the loan papers for this second mortgage.3
During their relationship, Mr. Falk operated a home improvement and repair company ("Kriste Maintenance") out of the Millersville house, while Mrs. Falk worked primarily as an administrative assistant for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (the "TBI"). Mrs. Falk testified that she paid for the parties' household expenses out of her income from the TBI, including expenses for food, utility bills, her car payment, and Mr. Falk's daughter's student loan. In his testimony, Mr. Falk claimed that the expenses for the house payment, car payment, and his daughter's student loan were covered by income generated by Kriste Maintenance, income he earned as County Commissioner, and cash gifts of $400.00 from Mr. Falk's son to Mrs. Falk. Mrs. Falk testified that, from at least 1997 through 2002, the parties filed their income tax returns jointly.
On February 18, 2003, Mrs. Falk initiated this divorce action. After a series of opposing pleadings and intervening motions, Mrs. Falk filed an amended complaint on June 18, 2003, wherein she asserted that she and Mr. Falk were married prior to the finalization of the California divorce and that Mr. Falk knew of this fact. Additionally, she asserted that the parties did not obtain a marriage license until two days after the marriage ceremony. In her amended complaint, she requested that the trial court enter an order declaring either a divorce or annulment. She further requested that the court make an equitable division of all jointly-held assets and liabilities, including the equity in the Millersville house. In addition, she requested, among other things, that certain items be awarded to her as her separate property, including two dogs and a 1999 Subaru vehicle. In his answer to Mrs. Falk's amended complaint, Mr. Falk denied having knowledge of the subsisting nature of Mrs. Falk's previous marriage and asserted that the parties' resulting marriage was void. Therefore, Mr. Falk sought a decree declaring either the parties divorced or that they were never married. Mr. Falk also requested, among other things, that the court award him the entire value of the Millersville house and divide the parties' remaining assets and debts.
In its Final Decree of Divorce, the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to section 36-4-101(2).4 The trial court awarded Mrs. Falk as her separate property sundry items of furniture, electronic equipment, and compact discs; her personal checking and retirement accounts; the Subaru vehicle; and two dogs. Mr. Falk was awarded as his separate property the value of Kriste Maintenance prior to the parties' marriage; certain items of work equipment and tools; his checking and business account; and the remaining pets. The trial court awarded the Millersville house to Mr. Falk, but Mrs. Falk was granted a lien in the amount of $28,800.00 against the residence as her "marital" equity interest. Additionally, the trial court ordered Mr. Falk to pay Mrs. Falk $7,500.00 as a further division of the "marital" estate. The court further ordered each party to be responsible for his/her respective credit card debts, and Mr. Falk was assigned responsibility for his daughter's student loan. The court found that any federal income taxes owed for 2002 were a joint debt, with each party being responsible for one-half of the debt or entitled to one-half of any refund. The trial court ordered each party to pay his/her own attorney's fees, and other litigation expenses were divided equally between the parties.
Mr. Falk appeals from the judgment of the trial court presenting, as we perceive them, the following issues for our review:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in declaring the parties divorced pursuant to section 36-4-101(2) of the Tennessee Code;
(2) Whether the trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Falk $28,000.00 as her equity in the Millersville house;
(3) Whether the trial court erred in its valuation and consideration of certain property and thereby erred in awarding Mrs. Falk an additional $7,500.00 in the division of the marital estate; and
(4) Whether the trial court erred in its division of disputed personal property.
Mrs. Falk raises the following additional issue:
Whether Mrs. Falk should be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal.
For the reasons contained herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In matters heard by a trial judge sitting without a jury, our review of the trial court's findings of fact is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2004). We will not reverse the trial court's factual findings unless the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings. Jahn v. Jahn, 932 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). A trial court's conclusions on questions of law are reviewed de novo, but without any presumption of correctness. Id. (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993)).
Before we address the propriety of the trial court's order granting a divorce to the parties, we will first address the validity of the underlying marriage in the case at bar. It is undisputed that, at the time the parties participated in their marriage ceremony, Mrs. Falk was still legally married to Mr. Bond and remained married to Mr. Bond for three and one-half additional months. Therefore, although Mrs. Falk's divorce from Mr. Bond eventually finalized, her marriage to Mr. Falk on July 15, 1995...
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