Falldin v. City of Seattle

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Writing for the Court: DUNBAR, J.
• Citation: 97 P. 658,50 Wash. 561
• Decision Date: 15 October 1908
• Parties: FALLDIN et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

97 P. 658

50 Wash. 561

FALLDIN et ux.
v.
CITY OF SEATTLE.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 15, 1908

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam, Judge.

Action by John A. Falldin and wife against the city of Seattle. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

Douglas, Lane & Douglas, for appellants.

Scott Calhoun and James E. Bradford, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J.

This is an action for personal injuries. The complaint alleges the injury of the plaintiff Alma C. Falldin by reason of falling through a sidewalk which it alleged to be in a defective and neglected condition. The court held that the notice which was required to be given to the city did not sufficiently describe the defect in the sidewalk, and a demurrer was sustained to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Judgment of dismissal was entered, and appeal from such followed.

The claim, omitting the formal parts, reads: 'On the evening of September 21, 1907, at about 8 o'clock p. m., the undersigned, Alma C. Falldin, while passing along the sidewalk at the northwest corner of Twenty-Eighth avenue and East Union street in the city of Seattle, and in all things exercising due care on her part, fell through said sidewalk, [50 Wash. 562] owing to its defective condition, into a hole thereunder about seven or eight feet deep, and sustained severe and painful injuries; that the sidewalk at the place above [97 P. 659.] named had been for a long period of time in a defective condition, and such defective condition was known to the city.' This court has uniformly held that requirements of this kind must be reasonable, and that a reasonable compliance with such requirements was all that could be demanded; that the object of the notice was notice, and nothing else; and that, when the city was reasonably notified of the place and the defect in the walk, such requirements were reasonably met. It is not necessary to review the cases. They all breathe this sentiment. Does this notice meet this requirement? We think it does, and that the respondent's contention that the notice only attempts to describe the hole under the sidewalk, and not the defect in the sidewalk itself, is too technical to meet the liberal spirit of our Code in regard to pleadings, and no more technical rule should be applied to notices of this kind than to any other pleading. Hence, if a person of common understanding can...