Falwell v. City of Lynchburg, Virginia

Decision Date08 February 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV. A. 6:01CV00075.,CIV. A. 6:01CV00075.
Citation198 F.Supp.2d 765
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
PartiesJerry FALWELL, as Pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church, and the Trustees of Thomas Road Baptist Church, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA; Jerry Kilgore,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> in his official capacity as Attorney General of Virginia; Clinton Miller, in his official capacity as Chairman of the State Corporation Commission; Larry B. Palmer, in his official capacity as Clerk of the Court for the 24th Judicial Circuit; Honorable M.G. Perrow, III, in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the 24th Judicial Circuit; and William Petty, in his official capacity as Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Lynchburg, Defendants.

Jerry Falwell, Jr., Lynchburg, VA, Mathew D. Staver, Joel L. Oster, Erik W. Stanley, Longwood, FL, for plaintiffs.

Walter C. Erwin, III, Lynchburg, VA, William Henry Hurd, Office of Atty. Gen. Richmond, VA, Alexander Wayne Bell, Mary V. Barney, Law office of Alexander W. Bell, Lynchburg, VA, for City of Lynchburg, defendant.

William Henry Hurd, Office of Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, for Randolph A. Beales, Jerry W. Kilgore, defendants.

Rebecca K. Glenberg, ACLU of Virginia, Richmond, VA, for American civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc., amicus.

H. Robert Showers, Greber, Simms & Showers Leesburg, VA, Stuart J. Lark, Gregory S. Baylor, Christian Legal Society, Annandale, VA, for Southern Baptist Conservatives of Virginia, Christian Legal Society, amicus.

Guy Winston Horsley, Jr., Office of Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, Philip R. de Haas, State Corp. Com'n, Richmond, VA, for Clinton Miller, defendant.

William F. Etherington, Beale, Balfour, Davidson & Etherington, P.C., Richmond, VA, for Larry B. Palmer, defendant.

Elaine Scott Moore, Office of Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, for M.G. Perrow, defendant.

Edward Meade Macon, Office of Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, for William Petty, defendant.

OPINION

MOON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case, Rev. Jerry Falwell and the Trustees of Thomas Road Baptist Church raise significant First Amendment concerns about certain Virginia laws, the histories of which trace their roots to the founding of the republic and the pen of Thomas Jefferson. In response, some Defendants assert the doctrine of sovereign immunity which, though a less noted constitutional issue, is no less important. In addition, this Court must analyze this case in accordance with the case or controversy requirement of Article III, in order to determine whether it may consider the merits of Plaintiffs' claims at all.

Having examined each of these questions, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants may, at some future time, via some hypothetical mechanism, injure them in some indeterminable manner.

Because these allegations do not as yet present a case or controversy, and Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits this Court from rendering advisory opinions on nonjusticiable matters, the following Defendants must be dismissed from this case: the Attorney General, the Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Lynchburg, the Chief Judge of the 24th Judicial Circuit, and the Clerk of the 24th Judicial Circuit.

Finally, because the City of Lynchburg has repealed its challenged ordinance, the Plaintiffs' claims against the City must be dismissed as moot.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Since 1956, Thomas Road Baptist Church, and its Pastor, Rev. Jerry Falwell, have provided a home for Christian prayer, worship, and education for the people of Lynchburg, Virginia, the nation, and the world. Today, the Trustees of Thomas Road Baptist Church own the Church and its sanctuary, which stands on 28.88 acres in a residentially-zoned area of the City of Lynchburg. Because the Trustees believe the Church to have outgrown its current sanctuary, they have started to construct a new facility on approximately sixty acres elsewhere in Lynchburg. The Trustees hold title to the land on which the current sanctuary stands, and seek to take title to the sixty-acre tract on which the new sanctuary will be located.

In doing so, the Plaintiffs contend that a provision of the Constitution of Virginia, two statutes of the Code of Virginia, and an ordinance of the City of Lynchburg frustrate their plans. The Trustees and Rev. Falwell argue that these provisions violate the Constitution of the United States and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. (West 2001). In this suit, the Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the following four laws on their faces and as applied:

(1) The portion of Article IV, § 14(20) of the Virginia Constitution which reads as follows: "The General Assembly shall not grant a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination ...,"

(2) Va.Code Ann. § 57-12 (Michie 2001),2 which imposes limits on (a) the amount of real property that a church may own, and (b) the amount of personal property that a church may own,

(3) Va.Code Ann. § 57-15,3 which provides that trustees of a church may not sell church land or engage in certain other real estate transactions without a finding, in a circuit court of the Commonwealth, that the sale or other transaction is the wish of the church or congregation, and

(4) § 18-46 of the City Code of Lynchburg,4 which, prior to its repeal, prohibited a church from owning more than fifty acres of land.

In challenging the offending provisions, the Trustees and Rev. Falwell first sought declaratory, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief against the City of Lynchburg and the Attorney General of Virginia. After the Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on November 9, 2001, the City of Lynchburg, acting through its City Council, repealed § 18-46 on November 27. In an accompanying report, City Attorney Walter C. Erwin first noted that the City adopted § 18-46 in 1985 "at the request of local churches," who wished to own up to the statutory maximum of fifty acres. Mr. Erwin concluded with the following statement: "In order to help the City try to get out of the lawsuit, the City Attorney's Office recommends that City Council repeal Section 18-46 of the City Code. If the State statutes are found to be constitutional the City can reenact Section 18-46 at the appropriate time."

Subsequent to their initial complaint, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint which added, in their official capacities, the following defendants: Clinton Miller, Chairman of the State Corporation Commission, Larry B. Palmer, Clerk of the Court of the 24th Judicial Circuit, M.G. Perrow, III, Chief Judge of the 24th Judicial Circuit, and William Petty, Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Lynchburg.

In response to Plaintiffs' Complaint, the following Defendants moved to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the Attorney General, Judge Perrow, and Mr. Petty. Mr. Palmer has moved for summary judgment, and Chairman Miller responded to Plaintiffs' Complaint but did not move for its dismissal. Finally, the City of Lynchburg seeks to dismiss this case on a suggestion of mootness and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

III. DISCUSSION
A. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND THE COURT'S SUA SPONTE INQUIRY
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. A court may consider matters of subject matter jurisdiction either upon a defendant's motion, see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(1), or sua sponte, see Rule 12(h)(3).5 In this case, Defendants Kilgore, Perrow, Petty, and the City of Lynchburg move to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The Court shall begin with the first three Defendants and Defendant Palmer; it will consider the City of Lynchburg's Motions, infra, in Section B.

Both sovereign immunity and standing lie at the heart of federal subject matter jurisdiction, and many of the same facts are relevant to both inquiries. Nevertheless, while Defendants Kilgore, Perrow, and Petty base their 12(b)(1) Motions largely upon sovereign immunity, this Court, sua sponte, shall first determine whether Plaintiffs have presented a case or controversy with respect to the Defendants. "It is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking." Univ. of S. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.1999). See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) ("The question of standing is not subject to waiver.... `The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the most important of the [jurisdictional] doctrines.'"); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986).

Only a minimal amount of case law discusses the standard of review that courts must apply to a standing analysis. Nevertheless, when standing becomes an issue in the contexts of a motion to dismiss, "general factual allegations of injury" may be sufficient to show standing. Bischoff v. Osceola Cty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasis added). In a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs are accorded more latitude to state a claim than in motions for summary judgment, where a court examines evidence, not merely pleadings, in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Id. (citing Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902 (D.C.Cir.1987)). In this case, because the Court is examining standing in the context of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, it will do so pursuant to this same lenient standard of review. "Obviously, if a plaintiff cannot establish standing to sue, relief from this [C]ourt is not possible, and dismissal under...

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