Meadows v. Northrop Grumman Innovation Sys., Inc.

Decision Date29 January 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 7:19-cv-00394
Parties Jeffrey S. MEADOWS, Plaintiff, v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN INNOVATION SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Carrol Mullen Ching, Daniel Jacob Martin, John Palmer Fishwick, Jr., Fishwick & Associates, PLC, John Reed Thomas, Jr., Healy Hafemann Magee, Monica Lynn Mroz, Strelka Law Office, Roanoke, VA, for Plaintiff.

Eric Daniel Chapman, James K. Cowan, Jr., CowanPerry PC, Blacksburg, VA, Joshua Richard Treece, Thomas M. Winn, III, Woods Rogers PLC, Roanoke, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael F. Urbanski, Chief United States District Judge

This matter comes before the court on plaintiff Jeffrey Meadows' motion to remand, ECF No. 19, defendant Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, Inc.'s ("NGIS") motion to dismiss, ECF No. 3, and defendant BAE Systems, Inc.'s ("BAE") motion to dismiss, ECF No. 5. For the reasons stated below, the court will GRANT (i) Meadows' motion to remand in part as it pertains to the defamation claims, (ii) NGIS's motion to dismiss in part as it relates to the business conspiracy and common law conspiracy claims, and (iii) BAE's motion to dismiss in part as it relates to the wrongful termination, business conspiracy, and common law conspiracy claims and DENY (i) Meadows' motion to remand in part as it pertains to the wrongful termination, business conspiracy, and common law conspiracy claims and (ii) BAE's motion to dismiss in part as it relates to the defamation claims.

I.

Meadows filed his original complaint in the Montgomery County Circuit Court on May 11, 2018, and an amended complaint on April 24, 2019. Meadows' complaint contains five counts: Counts I and II claim a violation of state common law for defamation and defamation per se against BAE; Count III claims a violation of state common law for wrongful discharge under Bowman v. State of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), against BAE; and Counts IV and V claim a violation of state common law and statutory law for business conspiracy against both BAE and NGIS. On May 24, 2019, this case was removed from the Montgomery County Circuit Court upon BAE's motion and NGIS's consent. NGIS and BAE then filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Meanwhile, Meadows filed a motion to remand the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Meadows began his employment with Orbital ATK, Inc. ("Orbital ATK"), NGIS's predecessor in interest, in 2007 in Radford, Virginia as a scientist before being assigned to projects in Australia in 2010 and Utah in 2015. ECF No. 16, at 116. He then accepted a position with BAE in Radford, Virginia at the Radford Arsenal1 in December 2015 and resigned in writing to Orbital ATK. Id. at 117. However, according to Meadows, upon request from Orbital ATK, he agreed to maintain employment with Orbital ATK while simultaneously working for BAE. Id. at 118. Meadows asserts that he informed both parties of his concurrent employment, which he maintained until his eventual termination by both BAE and Orbital ATK in 2017. Id.

In his amended complaint, Meadows alleges that BAE wrongfully terminated and defamed him, and that BAE conspired with Orbital ATK to do so. Id. at 129-42. Meadows alleges that during his concurrent employment with BAE and Orbital ATK, BAE asked Meadows multiple times to provide them with proprietary Orbital ATK documents, which he refused to do. Id. at 120. On May 1, 2017, Orbital ATK, in retaliation for Meadows not taking a new job, falsely reported to BAE that Meadows had accepted the job. Id. at 123.2 On May 4, 2017, Orbital ATK fired Meadows. Id. at 124.

BAE also suspended Meadows on May 1, 2017 based on the alleged conduct. ECF No. 20, at 3. On June 23, 2017, BAE terminated Meadows through a letter delivered to his home in Montgomery County, Virginia on conflict of interest grounds for his continuing employment with Orbital ATK. ECF No. 16, at 135-37. According to Meadows, BAE then made a false report to the Department of Defense's ("DOD") Office of the Inspector General located in Alexandria, Virginia on July 25, 2017, and to the Department of the Navy ("DON"), in Washington, D.C., resulting in a debarment proceeding. Id. at 129-35. The debarment proceeding prevented Meadows from obtaining further employment. Id. Finally, Meadows alleges he is entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $12,218,083.34 stemming from the defendants' wrongful discharge, defamation, and conspiracy. Id. at 142.

Meadows asks the court to remand this case to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for lack of jurisdiction because the amended complaint only brings claims under Virginia common and statutory law. In response, NGIS and BAE argue that the claims arose at the Radford Arsenal and that the Radford Arsenal is a federal enclave, subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Meadows argues that the Radford Arsenal is not a federal enclave, and, even if it is a federal enclave, his claims did not arise there. NGIS and BAE also seek to dismiss Meadows' complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II.
A. Federal Enclave Jurisdiction

Meadows asserts that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because his amended complaint alleges state law claims against BAE and NGIS. Meadows also argues that the events leading to his amended complaint did not occur at the Radford Arsenal or, in the alternative, that the Radford Arsenal is not a federal enclave. Meanwhile, BAE and NGIS allege that the events leading to Meadows' claims all occurred at the Radford Arsenal, and that the Radford Arsenal is a federal enclave subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. As a threshold issue for Meadows' motion to remand and defendants' motions to dismiss, the court must determine if it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation ... over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, [D]ock-Yards, and other needful Buildings." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. When the federal government obtains land from the states for federal use, the land becomes a federal enclave, and the federal government may exercise exclusive jurisdiction. See Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930) ("It long has been settled that, where lands for such a purpose are purchased by the United States with the consent of the state legislature, the jurisdiction theretofore residing in the state passes, in virtue of the constitutional provision, to the United States, thereby making the jurisdiction of the latter the sole jurisdiction"); see also Hall v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 18-cv-244, 2018 WL 4928976, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2018) ("Courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, have held that federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over tort claims that arise on federal enclaves.") (citing Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 665-66 (4th Cir. 1959) ); Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over tort claims that arise on federal enclaves.").3 "To exercise federal legislative jurisdiction on enclaves, (1) the federal government must acquire land within a state, (2) the state must cede or consent to federal jurisdiction over the land, and (3) the federal government must accept jurisdiction." Hall, 2018 WL 4928976, at *2 (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264, 267, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963) ). The Supreme Court found that "if the United States acquires with the consent of the state legislature land within the borders of that State by purchase or condemnation for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ... the jurisdiction of the Federal Government becomes exclusive." Paul, 371 U.S. at 264, 83 S.Ct. 426.

When a state cedes control over a tract of land to the federal government and it becomes a federal enclave, "only the state law in effect at that time of the transfer of jurisdiction continues in force as surrogate federal law, provided that the state law does not conflict with federal policy." Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1881, 1890, 204 L.Ed.2d 165 (2019) ; see also Paul, 371 U.S. at 268, 83 S.Ct. 426 ("[O]nly state law existing at the time of the acquisition remains enforceable, not subsequent [state] laws."). From the acquisition date on, only federal law applies. See Stokes, 265 F.2d at 665 ("It is also clear that only the state laws in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdiction continue in effect and that subsequent statutes of the state are not part of the laws of the ceded area unless Congress takes action to keep them current."); Allison v. Boeing Laser Tech. Servs., 689 F.3d 1234, 1235 (10th Cir. 2012) ("The central principle of federal enclave doctrine is that Congress has exclusive legislative authority over these enclaves. But in the absence of applicable federal legislation displacing state law, those state laws that existed at the time that the enclave was ceded to the federal government remain in force.").

Here, while employed by defendants, Meadows worked out of building 220 at the Radford Arsenal.4 The record indicates that pursuant the 1942 Deed of Cession, ECF No. 20, at 11, the Radford Arsenal, including building 220, was ceded to the United States and the United States obtained exclusive federal jurisdiction over it.5 Further, in Adams v. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d 792, 795-96 (W.D. Va. 2002), the court found that the Radford Arsenal was a federal enclave. Meadows does not...

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