Family Court v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations

• Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware
• Writing for the Court: QUILLEN
• Citation: 320 A.2d 777
• Decision Date: 02 May 1974
• Parties: 75 Lab.Cas. P 53,524 -Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Defendant-Respondent, and Council 81, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFLCIO, Intervenor-Respondent. Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County

Page 777

320 A.2d 777 75 Lab.Cas. P 53,524 The FAMILY COURT of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff-Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Defendant-Respondent,
and
Council 81, American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, AFLCIO, Intervenor-Respondent. Court of Chancery of Delaware, New Castle County. May 2, 1974.

Page 778

Victor F. Battaglia of Biggs & Battaglia, Wilmington, for plaintiff-petitioner.

David K. Brewster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for defendant-respondent.

Harvey B. Rubenstein, Wilmington, for intervenor-respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS.

QUILLEN, Chancellor:

This is an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief brought by The Family Court of the State of Delaware (Family Court). The respondent is the Department of Labor (Department), an agency of the State of Delaware; and Council #81, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO (Council 81) is an intervening respondent. The issue presented is whether the Department has the jurisdiction under 19 Del.C., Ch. 13 to certify a bargaining representative for public employees with which a branch of the State Judiciary must collectively bargain.

The facts are not in dispute. On December 17, 1973, Council 81 filed a petition with the Governor's Council on Labor asking that a hearing be held for the purpose of certifying itself as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain classifications of employees of the Family Court. ^* 29 Del.C. § 8514(d). Anticipating the voluntary withholding of official action pending the resolution of this lawsuit, this Court denied temporary relief as requested by the petitioner. An administrative hearing was held at which the petition was accepted with the following exclusions: Judges, Judges' personal secretaries, court administrators, their personal secretaries, chief clerks of the court, all casual employees not employed more than 90 days, and all others not included specifically. Although the petitioner does not object in principle to collective bargaining, it has challenged the jurisdiction of the Department on two grounds. First, the petitioner contends that a branch of the State Judiciary is not a 'public employer' as that term is defined at 19 Del.C. § 1301. Second, the petitioner contends that, if 19 Del.C., Ch. 13 is applicable to the Family Court, it is an unconstitutional invasion on the powers of the Chief Justice under Article IV, § 13 of the State Constitution, Del.C.Ann. At the suggestion of the Court the Secretary of the Department of Labor has held in abeyance the determination of the bargaining unit pending the outcome of this litigation.

Initially, I must consider whether the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law in the form of a writ of prohibition as the respondents contend. If such a remedy exists, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to determine the merits of this case. 10 Del.C. § 342. In effect, the respondents have moved to dismiss the complaint.

Article 4, Section 11(6) of the Constitution of the State of Delaware

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grants to the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of prohibition to inferior courts. Abrahams v. Superior Court, 11 Terry 394, 131 A.2d 662 (Sup.Ct.1957). But the power in the Supreme Court is not exclusive. 10 Del.C. § 562 states that: '(t)he Superior Court may frame and issue all remedial writs, including writs of habeas corpus and certiorari . . .' See also Article 4, Section 7, Constitution of 1897, and Article 5, Section 3, Constitution of 1831. Although the power of the Superior Court to issue a writ of prohibition is not specifically mentioned either in the Constitution or the statute, it has been recognized that the Superior Court has the power to issue all common law writs including the writ of prohibition. Knight v. Haley, 6 W.W.Harr. 366, 376, 176 A. 461, 462 (Super.Ct.1934); Fouracre v. White, 7 Boyce 25, 48, 102 A. 186, 195--196 (Ct. in Banc 1917); 1 Woolley, Delaware Practice, § 17 (1906); Matushefske v. Herlihy, 9 Storey 117, 214 A.2d 883 (Sup.Ct.1965). For historical development, see also Rash v. Allen, 1 Boyce 444, 76 A. 370 (Ct. in Banc 1910); Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948).

Although the Superior Court may issue a writ of prohibition to an inferior court, the question arises whether such a writ may issue to an administrative body such as the Department of Labor. In Knight v. Haley, Supra, 6 W.W.Harr. at 374, 176 A. at 464, Chief Justice Layton stated that a writ of prohibition may issue to a 'tribunal, possessing judicial powers'. This phrase is certainly of broad scope and could reasonably be taken to include administrative bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. But the question has not been expressly determined by any Delaware case brought to the Court's attention. See Matushefske v. Herlihy, Supra, (prohibition to a justice of the peace and the Court of Common Pleas); Bennethum v. Superior Court, 2 Storey 92, 153 A.2d 200 (Sup.Ct.1959) (prohibition to Superior Court); Canaday v. Superior Court, 10 Terry 332, 116 A.2d 678 (Sup.Ct.1955) (prohibition to Superior Court); Clendaniel v. Conrad, 3 Boyce 549, 83 A. 1036 (Sup.Ct.1910) (prohibition to Superior Court); Knight v. Haley, Supra, (prohibition to a justice of the peace). One case in which prohibition was sought against a nonjudicial body is Fouracre v. White, Supra, (prohibition to a body possessing executive powers, the Levy Court of New Castle County). Although the Court denied petitioner's application, it was there indicated that prohibition might issue not only to tribunals with judicial or quasi-judicial duties but to any body whose legal existence was merely a sham, irrespective of whether the act sought to be prevented was judicial or ministerial.

The general rule in other jurisdictions is that a writ of prohibition may issue to an inferior administrative body where that body is performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Annot. 159 A.L.R. 627 (1945); Annot. 115 A.L.R. 3 (1938); 63 Am.Jur.2d, Prohibition, § 15 (1972); 73 C.J.S. Prohibition § 6 (1951). Of particular application to our situation is In re First Congressional District Election, 295 Pa. 1, 144 A. 735 (1928) where it was held that:

"The writ of prohibition lies from a superior court, not only to inferior judicial tribunals, but also to inferior ministerial tribunals, possessing incidentally judicial powers, and...