Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corporation

• Decision Date: 09 February 1945
• Docket Number: No. 33939.,33939.
• Citation: 219 Minn. 306,18 N.W.2d 249
• Parties: FANNON v. FEDERAL CARTRIDGE CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

18 N.W.2d 249

219 Minn. 306

FANNON v. FEDERAL CARTRIDGE CORPORATION et al.

No. 33939.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 9, 1945.

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1945.

Certiorari to Division of Employment and Security; Victor Christgau, Director.

Certiorari upon the relation of Federal Cartridge Corporation, employer, to review the decision of Victor J. Christgau, Director of Division of Employment and Security, holding that separation from her employment of Katherine B. Fannon was involuntary and for good cause attributable to employer and that all wage credits earned by her in such employment should be allowed, and that she was qualified for benefits under Employment and Security Act.

Decision affirmed.

Henry F. Simons, of Minneapolis, for relator.

William D. Gunn, of St. Paul, for Employe.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., and Knute D. Stalland, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Director.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Certiorari upon the relation of Federal Cartridge Corporation, employer, to review the decision of the director of the state division of employment and security holding that the separation from her employment of Katherine B. Fannon, hereinafter referred to as claimant, was involuntary and for good cause attributable to the employer; that all wage credits earned by claimant in such employment be allowed; and that she be qualified for benefits under Minn.St.1941, § 268.09, as amended by L.1943, c. 650, § 5, Mason St.1944 Supp. § 4337-27[A].

On March 16, 1944, claimant was first disqualified by a claims deputy of the division, on the ground that she "voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer" discontinued her employment with the employer, and on the further ground that she had failed to establish that her return to employment would have imperiled her health.

On April 15, 1944, an appeal tribunal of the division, after hearing the evidence, vacated the order of the claims deputy and determined that claimant was not disqualified for benefits, holding that her separation from employment was because of illness due thereto, and hence involuntary and for cause attributable to the employer.

On July 28, 1944, on appeal, the director determined that "the findings of fact and decision appealed from are in accordance with the evidence and the law * * * and the same hereby are affirmed." The appeal here is taken pursuant to Minn.St. 1941, § 268.10, as amended by L.1943, c. 650, § 6, Mason St.1944 Supp. § 4337-28.

On March 7, 1942, claimant commenced working at the Twin Cities Ordnance Plant at New Brighton, operated by the Federal Cartridge Corporation. It is not disputed that prior thereto she was in perfect health. Her employment there continued until June 22, 1943. In connection therewith, she worked first as a visual inspector for eight months and thereafter in the incendiary bullet department for three months. In the latter employment she was required to work with gunpowder, which seriously affected her physical condition. Her face, hands, and feet began to swell and her skin turned a greenish shade. She testified: "I couldn't pick them [her feet] up and at night my feet would go that way. Finally they swelled up so big and I was so nervous I couldn't stand it. I went up to the doctor then." The foreman thereupon caused her to be transferred to a position as a "move woman," in which work she continued until May 1943. In this work she was required to move heavy iron trucks loaded with shells. It was "a regular man's job." She worked in a temperature of 132 degrees.

Her condition did not improve, and about the first of May 1943 she collapsed. She requested and was granted a 14-day regular sick leave. She went to a hospital under the care of Dr. John Alden, who advised her not to return to work at New Brighton, as she was allergic to the gunpowder at the ordnance plant and would not recover as long as she continued there. At the expiration of her 14-day leave, she advised her employer that she was still ill, and she was granted an extension of leave from June 1 to June 22, 1943.

Just prior to the expiration of her extended leave of absence, she returned to the plant and told her foreman that upon her doctor's orders she could not work there again. After some discussion she was granted a release.

As a result of the illness contracted at the ordnance plant, claimant was in bed until September 1943. She was almost blind during this period. In September 1943, she recovered sufficiently to resume employment. It is undisputed that she would have been physically unable to resume work as a "move woman" then or at any time thereafter.

In September 1943, she commenced working for the Mollan Home Permanent Wave Company and continued there until November 1943. At that time she started working for the Northwestern Aeronautical Corporation and remained there until January 13, 1944, when she was "laid off" because of material shortage. On February 25, 1944, she registered and filed the claim for benefits here involved. At that time she had been advised by the employer here that no employment was available for her at the Twin Cities Ordnance Plant — that they "were not hiring." Counsel for the employer concedes that if claimant had been physically able then to return to the plant the employer would have been unable to rehire her because of seniority rules.

Claimant filed her claim on February 25, 1944, nearly 10 months after her separation from employment with the Twin Cities Ordnance Plant. At that time she was available for employment and unemployed through no fault of her own. If her wage credits with the Twin Cities Ordnance Plant in the sum of $1,312 were cancelled in accordance with the contention of the employer here, claimant would not be entitled to any benefits under the act, because her subsequent employment was so limited that the wage credits therefrom were insufficient to entitle her to such benefits.

On appeal, the employer contends that (1) because claimant voluntarily resigned her employment; (2) because her illness was not due to good cause attributable to her employer; and (3) because she did not attempt to resume her former employment upon her recovery in September 1943, she must lose her wage credits with the Twin Cities Ordnance Plant and hence be disqualified for benefits under the act.

1. The statute here involved, L.1943, c. 650, § 5, Mason St.1944 Supp. § 4337-27[A], provides: "An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: A. If such individual voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer discontinued his employment by such employer and all wage credit earned in such employment shall be cancelled." (Italics supplied.)

Prior to July 1, 1943, § 4337-27(A)¹ provided: "* * * if it is found by the director that such individual voluntarily and without good cause discontinued insured work from any base-period employer; available benefits shall be reduced as if the full weekly benefit amount had been paid for each such week;".

It is to be noted that the clause "attributable to the employer" was added by the 1943 amendment.

The unemployment compensation law seeks to provide for payment of benefits to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. It provides for the charging of a portion of such benefits to the employer's account, with the result that such charges are reflected in and increase the employer's rate of contribution to the state fund. It is therefore to the interests of the employer to maintain stable employment whenever possible. See, Minn.St. 1941, § 268.06, as amended by L.1943, c. 650, § 2, Mason St.1944 Supp. § 4337-24. The public policy declared in the act itself provides (§ 268.03 [Mason St.1940 Supp. § 4337-21]): "As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burdens. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance.

The legislature, therefor, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this state will be promoted by providing, under the police powers of the state for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own."

There is nothing in this language to justify the conclusion that benefits under the act accrue...