Faraday v. Blanchette

• Decision Date: 27 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 3:03cv1520 (SRU).,3:03cv1520 (SRU).
• Parties: William FARADAY, Plaintiff, v. Edward BLANCHETTE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

596 F.Supp.2d 508

William FARADAY, Plaintiff, v. Edward BLANCHETTE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:03cv1520 (SRU).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

January 27, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Erin Marie Kallaugher, Kimberly Coleman, Norman A. Pattis, Law Offices of Norman A. Pattis, LLC, Bethany, CT, for Plaintiff.

Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Neil D. Parille, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, District Judge.

William Faraday, a prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Corrections ("DOC"), brings this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Faraday claims that defendant Dr. Edward Blanchette, Clinical Director of the DOC and the sole remaining defendant in this case, was deliberately indifferent to his known medical needs—specifically, several herniated migrated discs in his lower back—by failing to: (1) order an MRI, (2) provide him with palliative care to manage his pain and discomfort, and/or (3) order surgery to relieve and reduce his back pain. I previously denied summary judgment, finding sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could find that Blanchette was deliberately indifferent to Faraday's medical needs. Faraday v. Lantz ("Faraday I"), 2005 WL 3465846, at *6 (D.Conn.2005). At the request of the parties, I subsequently agreed to hold the case in abeyance, pending the outcome of Faraday's state habeas petition before the Connecticut Supreme Court.

Blanchette moved for summary judgment on the ground that collateral estoppel bars Faraday's federal claims against him, pointing to the Connecticut Supreme Court's recent decision to dismiss Faraday's state habeas petition: Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction ("Faraday II"), 288 Conn. 326, 344-45, 952 A.2d 764 (2008). At oral argument of Blanchette's motion, I orally denied the motion, subject to the preparation and filing of a written ruling. For the reasons that follow, my oral order is vacated and summary judgment is granted in favor of Blanchette.

I. Background

I presume familiarity with the comprehensive factual background set forth in Faraday I, 2005 WL 3465846 at *1-4. I will, therefore, only briefly summarize the pertinent facts, adding additional relevant facts that have occurred subsequent to my first decision in this case.

Since his incarceration began in October 1999, Faraday has consistently reported back pain to the DOC medical staff and has filed numerous requests for MRI's, an egg crate mattress pad, a second pillow, and any other necessary medical care for his herniated disks, including surgery. After his numerous internal request forms and medical grievances were denied, in December 2002, Faraday filed a state habeas petition claiming that his conditions of incarceration were inhumane or dangerous because he was being denied necessary medical attention for his back pain. He sought the following medical care for his back pain: (1) An MRI to confirm his herniated migrated disk condition; (2) an operation to "remedy the condition;" (3) a foam pad, such as an egg crate mattress pad; and (4) a second pillow.

In April 2003, the state habeas court held a hearing on Faraday's petition. Blanchette testified that he did not believe the request for an MRI was necessary based on several factors, including that Faraday's back pain "comes and goes" and that he did not meet the typical criteria that called for surgery, and for that reason, declined to have an MRI performed on Faraday. Although Faraday claimed to have had an MRI in 1992, neither party was able to recover the results of any test, despite a diligent search of Faraday's medical records. Blanchette testified that the results of the 1992 MRI were nonetheless irrelevant because his present conditions did not warrant an MRI. Blanchette further testified that an egg crate mattress pad and a second pillow were not medically necessary and he was not inclined to make an exception in Faraday's case. At the conclusion of the hearing, the habeas court dismissed Faraday's petition, concluding that the evidence did not support Faraday's claims.

Faraday filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted. At the second hearing in February 2005, the court considered the results of the 1992 MRI and an MRI that was performed on Faraday in October 2003. The respondent submitted an affidavit from Blanchette, in which he stated that he had reviewed the 2003 MRI and that it confirmed his "clinical impression" of Faraday's condition, namely, that Faraday had "mild to moderate degenerative joint disease with no clinically significant disc herniation" and was not, in his opinion, a candidate for surgery. Def. Ex. B at ¶ 10.

On the basis of the results of the 1992 and 2003 MRI reports, the habeas court concluded that the Commissioner had exhibited deliberate indifference to Faraday's medical needs because "there is a substantial, possibility that the petitioner has a herniated disk and it is not a major thing to have him examined and evaluated by a neurosurgeon." Def. Ex. E at 24. The habeas court stated that the two MRI results, showing "a bulge at L4-5" and "a herniated disk at L5-S1," were sufficient to require a neurological evaluation by a specialist. Id. The habeas court concluded that the decision "not to go forward with a simple neurological evaluation at the UCONN Health Center which is under contract with the DOC to provide medical care to the Department of Corrections inmates ... amounts to deliberate indifference to the medical needs of the petitioner." Id. at 25. In April 2006, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the grant of habeas relief.

On August 12, 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the habeas court could not have "reasonably" found that the Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to Faraday's serious medical needs. Faraday II, 288 Conn. at 341, 952 A.2d 764. The Court first set forth the test for establishing an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, stating that a prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by demonstrating that: (1) objectively, the alleged deprivation was "sufficiently serious," and (2) the government official acted "with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Id. at 338, 952 A.2d 764. On the second prong, "[a]n official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 338-39, 952 A.2d 764 (internal quotation omitted).

The Court assumed for purposes of the appeal that Faraday's chronic back ailment satisfied the first prong of the deliberate indifference standard requiring an objectively serious medical condition. Id. at 336 n. 11, 339 n. 12, 952 A.2d 764.

Focusing on the second prong of the deliberate indifference standard, the Court concluded that the record before the habeas court was not sufficient to support its finding that the respondent had acted with the requisite culpability. Id. at 343, 952 A.2d 764. First, the Court noted there was no evidence that Blanchette's recommended care and treatment did not meet the applicable medical standard of care. Id. at 341, 952 A.2d 764. Acknowledging that an inmate need not always present expert evidence that his treatment fell below the requisite standard of care, the Court nevertheless concluded that the evidence on Faraday's condition "did not so clearly and unequivocally indicate[] the need for" an evaluation by a neurologist or neurosurgeon so as to permit the habeas court to have reasonably found that such an evaluation was necessary in the absence of any expert testimony. Id. ("[W]e are not persuaded that the habeas court was qualified, on the basis of the evidence presented, to render its own opinion that such an evaluation was medically necessary."). Therefore, "[h]aving failed to produce evidence tending to establish that the care he received was medically inappropriate, the petitioner cannot prevail on his claim that the respondent's conduct was constitutionally inadequate." Id. at 342, 952 A.2d 764.

The Court further concluded that, even assuming Blanchette had disregarded an excessive risk to Faraday's health, the record was devoid of any evidence upon which the habeas court could have found that "Blanchette was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm to the petitioner existed and that Blanchette actually drew the inference." Id. at 343, 952 A.2d 764 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). According to the Court, it was significant that the record contained no evidence tending to suggest that Blanchette "did not `sincerely and honestly' believe" his treatment of Faraday was medically justifiable. Id. (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 281 (2d Cir.2006)). "Thus, even if the evidence was sufficient to establish that Blanchette's care and treatment of the petitioner had been inadequate, there was no evidence indicating that Blanchette knew that his refusal to have the petitioner examined by a specialist created an undue risk of serious harm to the petitioner." Id. Having concluded that there was not enough evidence to support the habeas court's finding that the Blanchette's refusal to have Faraday examined by a neurosurgeon or neurologist constituted an Eighth Amendment violation, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 345, 952 A.2d 764. According to court records, the lower habeas court entered judgment of dismissal on Faraday's habeas petition on October 15, 2008.

II. Standard of Review

Summary...