Fargo v. Hays-Kuehn

• Decision Date: 30 June 2015
• Docket Number: 111,416.
• Citation: 352 P.3d 1223,2015 OK 56
• Parties: Misty Dawn FARGO and the Estate of Jason Patterson by and through Mother and Personal Representative Norma Patterson, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Teresa HAYS–KUEHN,Defendant/Appellee, and Angeline Sankey and Ginger Merrill, Defendants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

352 P.3d 1223

2015 OK 56

Misty Dawn FARGO and the Estate of Jason Patterson by and through Mother and Personal Representative Norma Patterson, Plaintiffs/Appellants

v.Teresa HAYS–KUEHN¹ Defendant/AppelleeandAngeline Sankey and Ginger Merrill, Defendants.

111,416.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 30, 2015.

Charles Gregory Smart, Tye H. Smith, CARR & CARR, Misty Dawn Fargo, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Charles F. Alden, III, Mitzy G. Fryer, Estate of Jason Patterson, by and through mother and Personal Representative, Norma Patterson, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Micheal L. Darrah, Hilary S. Allen, Durbin, Larimore & Bialick, Teresa Hayes–Kuehn, for Defendant/Appellee.

Opinion

WATT, J.:

¶ 1 We granted certiorari in this matter to determine if facts relevant to the question of primary negligence are in dispute or whether uncontroverted facts result in conflicting inferences. We have carefully reviewed the merits of the summary judgment record in light of the heavy burden imposed on the moving party in a negligence action. Before a court may grant this definitive relief, it must clearly appear that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing the proffered material in the light most favorable to the opposing party.³ Summary judgment is unwarranted where, as in this matter, relevant facts are in dispute or where reasonable persons exercising fair and impartial judgment could differ.⁴

¶ 2 Drivers of motor vehicles have a duty to exercise due care in the operation of their vehicle.⁵ Ginger Merrill (“Merrill”), whom plaintiffs dismissed from this suit, drove the only vehicle that collided with the motorcycle. Although Kuehn had no direct contact with Patterson or Fargo, whether she operated her vehicle with due care when she abruptly swerved into the motorcycle's lane without a signal knowing Merrill was directly behind, is a question to be resolved by the fact finder.⁶ The Oklahoma Highway Patrol (“OHP”) Investigator determined the collision was created by Kuehn's inattention and failure to stop. However, the record contains disputed key facts and differing expert opinions. This case requires a factual inquiry of the conflicting evidence which leads to the formation of different inferences. Because more than one conclusion can be reached, this matter must be resolved by a jury. Upon de novo review, we hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 On July 25, 2008, Jason Patterson died at the scene when the southbound motorcycle he was driving at highway speed impaled onto the front driver side windshield of Merrill's northbound vehicle after it crossed into Patterson's lane of traffic. Plaintiff, Fargo, a passenger on the motorcycle, was thrown from the motorcycle, receiving multiple injuries. Plaintiffs initially filed this action against Kuehn, Merrill and Angeline Sankey (“Sankey”) for negligence in the operation of their respective vehicles, but later filed a dismissal without prejudice against Merrill and Sankey. Kuehn is the only remaining defendant in this matter.

¶ 4 The three defendants were all separately traveling northbound in succession at highway speeds, on a rural two lane highway. Vehicle 1 was driven by Sankey who slowed and then stopped at an intersection waiting for oncoming traffic to clear, including the motorcycle, before making a left turn. Kuehn, the driver of vehicle 2, a “larger” truck, did not slow down or stop behind Sankey. Instead, Kuehn continued at highway speed and passed Sankey on the left, crossing the centerline into the oncoming traffic lane. Both Sankey and her passenger describe Kuehn as “flying by” their truck and coming so close that they thought Kuehn was going to hit and take off their driver's side rear view mirror.

¶ 5 Merrill, in vehicle 3, was also driving at highway speed directly behind Kuehn. While Kuehn's larger truck remained in front of Merrill, blocking her view, Merrill was unable to see Sankey and thus, did not realize she was swiftly approaching a stopped vehicle. Without slowing or using a turn signal, Kuehn abruptly swerved left, at which time Merrill's view opened and she saw Sankey's stationary smaller truck. Attempting to avoid a collision, Merrill followed Kuehn into the oncoming lane to avoid hitting Sankey. Merrill could not see the rapidly approaching motorcycle, because Kuehn's “larger” truck blocked her view. When Kuehn swerved back into the northbound lane, Merrill became aware of the impending motorcycle and her efforts at evasive action failed. Merrill attempted to swerve back into her lane of traffic to avoid the motorcycle, but instead hit Sankey's left rear panel and then the motorcycle.

¶ 6 When interviewed by OHP, Merrill described Sankey's vehicle as a “smaller truck” and that Kuehn was driving a “large truck”. Merrill told OHP and testified in her deposition that she saw Sankey's truck as they drove out of town, but did not see it again until right before the accident because it was hidden by Kuehn's larger truck. Merrill is certain that Kuehn did not brake or signal immediately before making a sudden swerve into the oncoming traffic lane to pass Sankey. A span of seconds passed from the time that Kuehn entered the oncoming traffic lane to pass Sankey and the collision between the motorcycle and Merrill.

¶ 7 Three days after the accident, Kuehn explained to OHP she initially realized that Sankey was slowing, but as she got closer, she saw Sankey was stopped. Kuehn explained to OHP that if she had observed brake lights she would have stopped and that if she had seen a left turn signal, she would not have passed Sankey. However, she explained to OHP that she is not completely certain she did not see brake or turn signal lights on Sankey's truck. Kuehn said she passed Sankey because she did not know what Sankey was doing sitting in the middle of the north bound lane.

¶ 8 Seconds after passing Sankey, Kuehn heard a loud boom, then pulled over and stopped. When she saw a collision had occurred, she backed her vehicle to the accident scene. Kuehn then walked over to Merrill sitting in her wrecked vehicle and apologized, stating Sankey had slammed on her brakes. Three years later in a deposition, Kuehn testified that she never saw the Sankey vehicle stop at the intersection and that Sankey's truck was actually moving when she passed it.

¶ 9 OHP collected data from Merrill's air bag module and the bulbs from the rear lights of the Sankey vehicle. Their analysis showed Merrill's brakes were activated prior to impact, with decelerating speeds ranging from 65 mph at five seconds prior to impact to 45 mph at one second prior to impact. OHP also determined from the physical evidence and testing that Sankey's left turn signal was activated at the time her vehicle was hit from behind.

¶ 10 OHP concluded the collision was created by the inattention and failure of Kuehn to reduce her speed for Sankey, and that Merrill was following too close behind Kuehn, not allowing enough distance to react to hazards in front of her. Even though Kuehn's vehicle did not physically collide with Sankey or with the motorcycle, OHP determined that Kuehn's actions were a direct cause of the accident. OHP recommended that charges of operating a motor vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable or proper for the conditions be filed against both Kuehn and Merrill.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

¶ 11 An order granting summary judgment in favor of Kuehn was filed on December 20, 2012. Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, finding at most (1) Kuehn's actions were a “condition”, (2) it was not foreseeable that Merrill, who was following directly behind Kuehn, would follow into the oncoming traffic lane and hit the motorcycle injuring Patterson and Plaintiff Fargo and (3) that Kuehn's actions were not the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages. Plaintiffs appealed, urging the resolution of proximate cause was a question of fact for a jury to decide. We granted certiorari on February 3, 2015.

¶ 12 Summary judgments are disfavored and should only be granted when it is clear there are no disputed material fact issues.⁷ This Court has consistently held that summary judgment should be denied where there are controverted material facts or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions from the undisputed material facts.⁸ The facts and inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non moving party.⁹ Thus all inferences must be viewed most favorably to plaintiffs in this matter.

DISCUSSION OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE INVOLVING MULTI VEHICLE TORT ACTIONS

¶ 13 The three necessary elements to a finding of negligence are (1) a duty owed by the defendant to protect plaintiff from injury (2) failure to fulfill that duty and (3) injuries to plaintiff proximately caused by defendant's failure to meet the duty.¹⁰ In applying these principles to automobile negligence cases, we have long recognized that drivers have a duty to operate their vehicle with due care.¹¹ To fulfill this duty, a driver must do what a prudent person would do under the circumstances of each particular case.¹² Whether Kuehn's actions meet the standards of due care, is exclusively a question for the jury unless under the facts, reasonable minds could not differ.¹³ Likewise, negligence is not actionable unless it is the proximate cause of the harm for which plaintiff seeks recovery.¹⁴ Proximate cause is always a question for the jury unless there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a causal connection.¹⁵

¶ 14 We first address Kuehn's duty to drive her vehicle with due care. Although a number of important facts are undisputed, the reasonableness of Kuehn's actions must be viewed in light of steps taken by Sankey in stopping to make a left hand turn. It is undisputed that at the time Kuehn decided to cross into the oncoming traffic lane to pass Sankey, (1) Kuehn was aware that Sankey was stopped or...