Faribault Daily News v. International Typographical Union

Decision Date05 April 1952
Docket NumberNo. 35744,35744
PartiesFARIBAULT DAILY NEWS, Inc. v. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION et al.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where interstate commerce is involved and a strike is peaceful and for a lawful purpose, it is Held that that part of M.S.A. § 179.06 which provides that it shall be unlawful for any labor organization or representative to institute or aid in the conduct of a strike unless notice of intention to strike has been served upon the state labor conciliator and upon the other parties to the labor dispute at least ten days before the strike is to become effective is invalid, since congress by § 7 of the so-called Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157, which section does not require such notice, has occupied the field of regulation of peaceful strikes for a lawful purpose and closed it to state regulation.

2. A primary strike for recognition is not prohibited notwithstanding the fact that the union, because of its failure to file the so-called noncommunist affidavit, has not been certified as a bargaining representative of the employees.

Alternative writ of prohibition made absolute.

John A. Goldie and Samuel I. Sigal, Minneapolis, for relators.

Eugene A. O'Brien, Minneapolis, Charles N. Sayles, Faribault, for respondent.

Douglas Hall and Hall, Smith & Hedlund, all of Minneapolis, amici curiae, for Hennepin County C.I.O. Council.

Donald C. Savelkoul, St. Paul, amici curiae, for Minnesota State Federation of Labor.

Felhaber & Larson, Mark H. Gehan, all of St. Paul, amici curiae, for St. Paul Committee on Industrial Relations, Inc., et al.

Leavitt R. Barker and Curtis L. Roy, Minneapolis, Thomas M. McCabe, Duluth (Dorsey, Colman, Barker, Scott & Barber, Minneapolis, of counsel), amici curiae, for Associated Industries of Minneapolis.

MAGNEY, Justice.

Petition by relators for a writ of prohibition to restrain the district court for Rice county, fifth judicial district, from enforcing a temporary restraining order, from holding a hearing on an order to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue, and from holding any further proceedings in the matter. Relators are the International Typographical Union, Joe Rhoden, representative thereof, Faribault Typographical Union, Local 739, and its members. Relators will be referred to as defendants and respondent as plaintiff.

Defendant Faribault Typographical Union, Local 739, is a member of the International Typographical Union (hereinafter referred to as the Local and International respectively). Plaintiff, Faribault Daily News, Inc., publishes a daily newspaper in the city of Faribault. The Local was recently organized by the 13 employes of plaintiff. The Local had never been certified as a collective bargaining agent either by the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) or by the state authorities. After organization, the Local made a demand upon plaintiff to negotiate a contract and presented to it a copy of a proposed contract. Plaintiff thereupon presented a petition to the Board asking that an appropriate bargaining unit be established at its plant. In response, the Board notified plaintiff that International was not a certified union, since it had failed to file certain required noncommunist affidavits and therefore was not entitled to relief under the program of the Board. On November 20, 1951, the Local notified plaintiff that if plaintiff did not recognize the union the members would walk out. Plaintiff said it could not recognize the Local until it had been certified by the Board. The union employes immediately walked out. The plant was picketed. The first day the pickets carried banners bearing the words 'On Strike.' The next day the banners were worded: 'Faribault Daily News Refuses To Negotiate with Local Union 739, A.F. of L.' Later the banners read: 'Faribault Daily News Unfair to Typographical Union Local 739 A.F.L.' The strike was peaceful.

Plaintiff thereupon instituted an action asking that the union and its members be enjoined and restrained from picketing plaintiff's place of business unless and until an organization was duly authorized as a collective bargaining agent and until appropriate notice of intention to strike was filed with the state labor conciliator, and that all picketing and banners carried be peaceful and truthful. After an ex parte hearing, the court issued a temporary restraining order in form and terms as prayed for. The required bond was furnished. The court further ordered that defendants at a specified time and place show cause why a temporary injunction of like purport and effect should not be granted to continue in full force and effect until final judgment should be entered. Before hearing was had on the order to show cause, the writ of prohibition, petitioned for by defendants, was issued by this court restraining the district court from enforcing the temporary restraining order it had issued, from holding a hearing on the order to show cause, and from holding any further proceedings in the matter.

The main question involved is: In a labor dispute affecting interstate commerce, does the state court have jurisdiction to restrain peaceful picketing in furtherance of a strike for a lawful purpose for failure to comply with a state statute, M.S.A. § 179.06, requiring the service of a ten-day notice of intention to strike? In answering this question, careful consideration must be given to the federal and state statutes involved and the federal court decisions. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157, the so-called Taft-Hartley Act, reads as follows: 'Rights of Employees. Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, * * *.'

Minnesota has a similar statute, § 179.10, subd. 1, which reads: 'Employees shall have the right of self-organization and the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in Lawful, concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; * * *.' (Italics supplied.)

It is apparent that the two statutes are identical in meaning and almost identical in wording, except for the italicized word 'lawful,' which is found in the state statute and not found in the federal statute. The words 'concerted activities' used in both statutes include strike action. When the state statute used the words 'lawful, concerted activities' it must refer to lawful concerted action under Minnesota statutes.

The particular Minnesota statute which the legislature must have had in mind when it incorporated therein the word 'lawful' is § 179.06, which provides first of all the procedure for the employer and the representative of employe or labor organizations to endeavor in good faith to reach an agreement respecting demands from either side. If no agreement is reached, the statute provides that a notice of intention to strike or lockout may be given, 'but it shall be unlawful for any labor organization or representative To institute or aid in the conduct of A strike or for an employer to institute a lockout, Unless notice of intention to strike or lockout Has been served by the party intending to institute a strike or lockout Upon the labor conciliator and the other parties to the labor dispute at least ten days before the strike or lockout Is to become effective.' (Italics supplied.) Failure to serve the ten-day notice of intention to strike is made an unfair labor practice under § 179.11(2), which reads:

'It shall be an unfair labor practice:

'(2) For any employee or labor organization to institute a strike if the calling of such strike is in violation of sections 179.06 or 179.07;'

Thus, under the Minnesota statute, calling a strike without the service of the ten-day notice of intention to strike is an unfair labor practice and unlawful.

Plaintiff admits that an application for a writ of prohibition is an appropriate means to test the jurisdiction of the state court; that plaintiff is engaged in interstate commerce; that congress does have the authority under the commerce clause to enact legislation in the field of labor disputes where interstate commerce is involved; that where there is a conflicting or concurrent provision in the state and federal act the federal act preempts the field, but that the conflicting or concurrent provisions must be in the particular provision; that a labor dispute exists here within the meaning of both federal and state acts; that a strike for recognition is a strike for a lawful purpose; that the picketing here is peaceful; and that there is a right to strike and to conduct peaceful picketing as an exercise of the right of free speech, but that such rights are not unqualified or uncontrolled rights. In the situation we have here, defendants contend that the state court has no jurisdiction to restrain peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose for failure to comply with § 179.06, requiring the service of a ten-day notice of intention to strike, and that the state court may not by attempted exercise of jurisdiction under a state law limit the exercise of rights guaranteed to employes by § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, namely, the unconditional right to strike and to carry on other concerted activities.

1. Congress exercised and asserted its constitutional power to regulate employer-employe relationships and labor disputes in the field of interstate commerce by enacting the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and its amendment, the so-called Taft-Hartley Act, in 1947. In Norris Grain Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 232 Minn. 91, 99, 46 N.W.2d...

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