Faribault v. Northern States Power Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1933
• Docket Number: No. 29212.,29212.
• Citation: 188 Minn. 514,247 N.W. 680
• Parties: FARIBAULT v. NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

247 N.W. 680

188 Minn. 514

FARIBAULT v. NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.

No. 29212.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 31, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Richard D. O'Brien, Judge.

Action by Fred P. Faribault, as special administrator of the estate of Francis O. Faribault, deceased, against the Northern States Power Company. Verdict for defendant. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Samuel A. Anderson and Russell M. Carlson, both of St. Paul, for appellant.

Briggs, Weyl & Briggs, of St. Paul, for respondent.

DIBELL, Justice.

Action to recover damages for death by wrongful act. The court directed a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial. The plaintiff's intestate was working for a house-mover, and was killed by an electric shock from high tension wires of the defendant strung on poles along the roadway when helping get the house from the roadway onto the adjoining land.

1. It is the rule that one making use of electricity must exercise an amount of care commensurate with the danger involved. The degree of care is properly defined as ordinary care; but what constitutes ordinary care increases as the danger increases. A high degree of diligence may be required to constitute ordinary care, and the care exercised must be a care commensurate with the dangers reasonably to be apprehended. Gilbert v. Duluth General Electric Co., 93 Minn. 99, 100 N. W. 653, 106 Am. St. Rep. 430; Musolf v. Duluth Edison Electric Co., 108 Minn. 369, 122 N. W. 499, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451; Hoppe v. City of Winona, 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. W. 577, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 449, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 247; Drimel v. Union Power Co., 139 Minn. 122, 165 N. W. 1058; Davidson v. Otter Tail Power Co., 150 Minn. 446, 185 N. W. 644; Thornton Bros. Co. v. Northern States Power Co., 151 Minn. 435, 186 N. W. 863, 187 N. W. 610; Pattock v. St. Cloud P. S. Co., 152 Minn. 69, 187 N. W. 969; Bunten v. Eastern Minn. Power Co., 178 Minn. 604, 228 N. W. 332; Neumann v. Interstate Power Co., 179 Minn. 46, 228 N. W. 342; Weber v. J. E. Barr Packing Corp., 182 Minn. 486, 234 N. W. 682.

2. The case of Christianson v. C., St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 640, 641, not involving an injury coming through the use of electricity, but stating the fundamental principle upon negligence and proximate cause, is cited and discussed by counsel. It is pointedly valuable as applied to the charge of negligence in this case. The court said: "If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; but, if the act itself is negligent, then the person guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not. Otherwise expressed, the law is that if the act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did happen. Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow."

The rule was applied to the use of electricity in Hoppe v. City of Winona, 113 Minn. 252, 129 N. W. 577, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 449, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 247; Bunten v. Eastern Minn. Power Co., 178 Minn. 604, 228 N. W. 332; Neumann v. Interstate Power Co., 179 Minn. 46, 228 N. W. 342.

3. The question now comes whether the facts were such that a jury might find negligence in the defendant. If so it was error to direct a verdict for the defendant. The question is not whether the jury might have found for the defendant. It is whether they must have found so.

The accident occurred on July 16, 1931, on Lexington avenue, also referred to as highway No. 62, about eight miles northerly of the business portion of the city of St. Paul. The highway is paved. One Prodger was moving a small one-story house from the downtown portion of the city to a point near where the accident occurred. On the westerly side of the street the defendant maintained three electric wires carrying a voltage of 2,300. It could be found that one was 16 feet and one of the other two was 12 feet 10 inches from the surface of the ground at the place of the accident. At least one of the lower two was insulated. The others were not, and none were guarded or protected; nor was there a warning sign. On the westerly side of the avenue was Lake Josephine, where there was a nucleus of houses. The space between the road and the lake had been leveled and lowered so as to be substantially even with the surface of the roadway. There was an open space there, and some improvements had been going on. A plat or map of the surroundings would have been immensely helpful as an illustration of the situation of things.

The house was 22 feet high when upon the moving apparatus. It was moved by electric motors. When it reached the open space mentioned it was turned to the left or west until nearly at right angles with the roadway. There was traffic upon the roadway...