Farish v. Smoot

• Decision Date: 28 March 1952
• Citation: 58 So.2d 534
• Parties: FARISH v. SMOOT.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 534

58 So.2d 534

FARISH v. SMOOT.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.

March 28, 1952.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1952.

Paty, Warwick, & Paul and Farish, Farish, Downey & Anderson, all of West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Baynes, Garman & Phillips, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

SEBRING, Chief Justice.

The defendant below has appealed from a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff in a suit brought to recover damages for false imprisonment.

The admitted facts of the case are that the defendant was the municipal judge of the City of West Palm Beach. On August 12, 1949, the plaintiff was arrested by the City on a charge of violating a municipal ordinance. Trial on the charge was set for a later date and plaintiff was released from custody after posting with the municipal clerk a $500 cash bond conditioned that he appear at the trial. Thereafter, on August 15, 1949, the plaintiff voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities of the City and thereupon filed with the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County his petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking the sufficiency of the warrant and the validity of the ordinance under which he had been arrested. On the same day the Circuit Judge issued a writ of habeas corpus wherein he set the following day as the day for a hearing on the merits of the petition and ordered the release of the plaintiff from the custody of the municipal authorities upon his filing with the Clerk of the Circuit Court a bond in the sum $500 payable to the Governor of Florida.

Shortly after noon on the day the writ was issued, the city attorney of West Palm Beach informed the city clerk by telephone that a writ of habeas corpus had been issued by the Circuit Judge conditioned upon the plaintiff's posting bond with the Clerk of the Circuit Court in the sum of $500. He advised the city clerk to release to the plaintiff the $500 in cash had been deposited by him as an appearance bond in the municipal court proceeding. Immediately after this conversation the city clerk took the $500 to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court and deposited it there on behalf on the plaintiff to stand as a cash bond in the habeas corpus proceeding. Soon after the deposit was made the plaintiff was released by the police officials of West Palm Beach and went at large under the habeas corpus writ.

Later in the afternoon the municipal judge learned that the city clerk had released the appearance bond given to the City and that the plaintiff was not in custody. Thereupon, he ordered the nearrest of the plaintiff upon the same charge as was the subject of the inquiry in the habeas corpus proceeding and directed that the plaintiff be taken into custody and retained until another appearance bond was posted with the City. Acting upon the order given by the municipal judge, the police officals immediately placed the plaintiff in jail, where he remained until the following morning.

Subsequently the plaintiff brought suit against the municipal judge and the arresting police officers; the gist of the charge being that the municipal judge had ordered the rearest of the plaintiff, and the police officers had taken him into custody, with knowledge that plaintiff had been released on the habeas corpus bond by the Circuit Court; that as a consequence thereof of the plaintiff had been 'wrongfully, unlawfully, maliciously, wilfully and oppressively, without any reasonable or probable cause, and in utter disregard of [his] * * * legal and constitutional rights, placed * * * under arrest against his will and without legal process, and incarcerated * * * in the City jail of West Palm Beach, Florida * * *.'

A trial on the issues made by the declaration and the pleas addressed thereto was had, resulting in a verdict of not guilty against the police officers and a verdict of guilty against the municipal judge. Motions for a new trial were denied and a judgment was entered against the judge. The judge has appealed from the judgment.

Many grounds are urged by the defendant for the reversal of the judgment. Most of them are based upon the contention that no evidence was adduced at the trial to show that the municipal judge, at the time he ordered the rearrest of the plaintiff, knew that the plaintiff was then entitled to be at liberty under the habeas corpus writ.

In respect to this contention, a careful review of the evidence shows that the municipal judge knew of the institution, pendency and purpose of the habeas corpus proceeding. The evidence also shows that prior to the rearrest of the plaintiff, the judge had been informed by the City Attorney that a hearing on the petition for the issuance of the habeas corpus writ had been held before the Circuit Judge and that a writ had been issued returnable the following day. He had been informed by the City Attorney that a bond had been fixed in the habeas corpus proceeding in the sum of $500. He had been informed by the City Attorney of his conversation with the municipal clerk directing her to turn the $500 over to the clerk of the Circuit Court, so that the habeas corpus writ might be made effective. He had been informed by the Attorney 'that Mrs. Gardner's office [the clerk's office] had gone to the Court-house about that time with his [the plaintiff's] cash bond.' He had been told by the City Attorney 'that the bond, as far as the City was concerned, was turned in when the Circuit Court bond was made and therefore, the City did not have any bond, but we were protected by the Circuit Court bond * * * that I did not think the City had any right to insist on another bond because there was a Circuit Court bond.'

The evidence shows that after the municipal judge received this information he called Mrs. Gardner, the City Clerk, and was told by her that the bond posted with the City had been taken down upon the instruction of the City Attorney. Although the avowed purpose of his call was to learn from her the facts and circumstances surrounding the releasing of the bond posted with the City, the municipal judge made no effort, according to his own testimony, to learn from the Clerk whether in pursuance of the instructions given her by the City Attorney she had in fact actually deposited the bond money with the Circuit Court Clerk as she had advised the City Attorney she intended to do immediately; the reason for his failure to ask the question of the clerk being, 'I had no reason to ask her.'

After these conversations with the City Attorney and Clerk, the municipal judge, without making further inquiry into the question whether the habeas corpus writ had become effective by the posting of a bond with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, ordered the rearrest of the plaintiff. Pursuant to this order the plaintiff was placed in jail, at a time when all jurisdiction of the municipal court over the subject matter of the charge and over the person of the plaintiff had in fact become suspended or superseded by virtue of the habeas corpus bond having been posted. See State ex rel. Gallat v. Allen, 82 Fla. 149, 89 So. 398.

Under these facts we think that the jury was fully warranted in finding that the defendant, with full knowledge of the facts, had wilfully ordered the rearrest of the plaintiff at a time when the plaintiff was lawfully at large under a valid and effective writ of habeas corpus; for the picture...