Farkas v. Farkas, 82-417
| Decision Date | 09 February 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-417,82-417 |
| Citation | 426 So.2d 1213 |
| Parties | Jeannie FARKAS, Appellant, v. Richard FARKAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Don Lacy and Earle Lee Butler of Butler & Pettit, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Hans C. Feige, Coral Springs, for appellee.
On November 27, 1979, in contemplation of a dissolution of marriage, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement. Subsequently, in January, 1980, a final judgment was entered dissolving the marriage and ratifying and incorporating the property settlement agreement. The provisions of that agreement material to this appeal are:
Furthermore, notwithstanding the incorporation of this Agreement in any Judgment in the suit for Dissolution of Marriage now pending between the parties, or in any future suit for Dissolution of Marriage brought by either party hereto this Agreement shall not be merged in such Judgment but shall survive the same and be binding on the parties for all time.
a. The child dies.
b. The child reaches the age of eighteen (18).
c. The child becomes self-supporting, and/or
d. The child marries.
e. The child no longer lives with the Wife and is not attending school.
It is further agreed that the Wife shall have exclusive right to occupy the property from and after the date of this Agreement until such time as the Husband's obligation for child support terminates pursuant to Paragraph VI of this Agreement.
The only real property mentioned in the agreement is the marital residence.
Appellant wife remarried subsequent to the dissolution and continued living in the marital home with the minor child and her new husband. However, none of the conditions set forth in Article VI occurred.
On June 9, 1981, appellee husband filed a Motion for Enforcement and Clarification of Rights Under Final Judgment of Dissolution and Property Settlement Agreement, alleging that because the wife had remarried her right to exclusive occupancy should terminate.
The issue went to hearing before a general master who determined that, as a matter of law, husband was entitled to partition of the former marital domicile upon the remarriage of the wife. The general master's report was adopted and ratified by the trial court.
The issue we are asked to determine is whether the trial court erred in modifying the provision of the property settlement agreement which granted the wife exclusive use and occupancy of the marital home to create an exception when the former wife remarried.
[A] spouses right, as custodian of the children of the dissolved marriage, to exclusive possession of a marital home granted by a dissolution decree terminates upon...
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