Farley v. Board of Ed. of City of Perry
| Decision Date | 09 January 1917 |
| Docket Number | 6538. |
| Citation | 162 P. 797,62 Okla. 181,1917 OK 83 |
| Parties | FARLEY v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF PERRY. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
A public officer is one whose duties are fixed by law and who in the discharge of the same knows no guide but established laws. Employment arising out of a contract whereby the person employed acts under the direction or control of others, and which employment depends for its duration and extent upon such a contract, is not an office.
A city superintendent of schools under the laws of the state of Oklahoma, is not an "officer," but an "employé" of the board of education of the city. The board of education of a city is a body corporate, and a change in the personnel of the membership does not affect the entity of the corporate existence. Where there is nothing in the statutes limiting the authority of outgoing members, they may, as a board, before their term of office expires contract for superintendent of schools under their control for the ensuing year, though the services contracted for may extend beyond the expiration of their terms of office, and such contracts will be binding upon the board of education notwithstanding a change in the personnel thereof, to the same extent as if the new members as such board had made the contract and no further.
The existing law of the state is implied and presumed to be a part of every contract, and such contracts are made with reference to the laws governing the same in force at the time, notwithstanding the express terms therein apparently to the contrary.
The board of education of a city has no power to waive or contract away any right or authority concerning its duties fixed by the statutes in force at the time of making any such contract, it being the rule that such board is acting for the public, and the rights of the public as defined by law cannot be contracted away. A right given by duly enacted law to the board to discharge a city superintendent at pleasure is meant to protect the school, and cannot be waived or contracted away by the board.
Under the law as it existed in this state prior to January 1, 1914 the board of education of a city had the right to employ a superintendent of city schools and remove such superintendent at the pleasure of the board. Such action on the part of the board cannot be inquired into by the courts, but is final and conclusive, and any superintendent so employed is entitled to compensation only up to the time that he has notice that it is the pleasure of the board to dispense with his services.
In such a case of discharge of a city superintendent of schools by a city board of education, the superintendent is entitled to compensation from the time of entering upon his duties to the date he is notified of his discharge.
Such superintendent is entitled to pay from the time of entering upon his duties under his contract to the date of notice of discharge, notwithstanding the contract made was consummated between him and the outgoing board for services for the ensuing year that extended beyond the term of office of the outgoing members.
Facts in this case examined, and found that the plaintiff is entitled to pay for services as superintendent of city schools under his contract with the outgoing board from July 1, 1913, the date of beginning of his duties, to July 7, 1913, the date of his receiving due notice of discharge, both dates included, though such time extended beyond the term of office of members of the outgoing board.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1. Error from County Court, Noble County; L. B. Robinson, Judge.
Action by A. C. Farley against the Board of Education of the City of Perry, Okl. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed, and cause remanded, with instructions to enter judgment for plaintiff and against defendant.
P. W. Cress, of Perry, for plaintiff in error.
H. E. St. Clair, of Perry, for defendant in error.
On the 22d day of November, 1913, the plaintiff filed a petition in the county court of Noble county, alleging that he was a teacher by profession and duly licensed to teach school under the laws of Oklahoma and in the city of Perry in said state; that the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract in writing on the 3d day of May, 1913, which was duly signed pursuant to a resolution duly and regularly passed by the defendant, board of education, at a regular meeting thereof, held on the 8th day of April, 1913, whereby the plaintiff was employed to teach and superintend the schools in the city of Perry, beginning on the 1st day of July, 1913, and ending on the 30th day of June, 1914; that pursuant to said contract on the 1st day of July, plaintiff entered upon his duties and continued to perform the same up to the 17th day of September, 1913, at which time the defendant wrongfully procured an injunction, enjoining and restraining the plaintiff from further performance of his duties; that the plaintiff has at all times been ready and willing to perform his duties; that the salary contracted for between plaintiff and defendant was $1,500 per year, payable monthly in the sum of $125 per month; that the plaintiff has duly presented to the clerk of said board his claim for warrants as provided for in his contract for the months of July, August, September, October, and November, 1913; that said board has refused to issue said warrants or to pay plaintiff for his services or for loss of time incurred; that there is due and owing plaintiff the sum of $625, together with interest, for which the plaintiff prays judgment. The defendant answers first by way of denying the allegations in said petition, except such as are afterwards in defendant's answer admitted, qualified, or explained. Defendant makes a number of allegations in its special answer--the only allegations therein necessary to be considered in this opinion being that the contract, having been made with the schoolboard as it existed prior to reorganization of said board on the first Monday in May, 1913, was not binding upon the succeeding school board, and, further, that the statutes of Oklahoma fix the tenure of office of superintendent of schools to be during the pleasure of the board of education, and that on the 7th day of July, 1913, the defendant, board of education, passed a resolution, declaring it to be the pleasure of the board that said plaintiff should not act in the capacity of superintendent of schools during the year for which plaintiff had contracted, said resolution revoking and annulling any pretended contract with the plaintiff, and relieving plaintiff from the assumption or performance of any duties as such superintendent. By agreement, the case was tried before the court without a jury, evidence was introduced, and on the 9th day of March, 1914, the court rendered judgment, filing a journal entry thereof, showing findings both of law and of fact, and the conclusion of the court thereon. The judgment of the court was that the plaintiff take nothing, and that the defendant recover costs of the action from the plaintiff. The plaintiff duly filed a motion for new trial, which motion was, by the court, overruled and exceptions allowed, and the plaintiff brings error to this court.
The plaintiff makes numerous assignments of error, all of which merely raises the question as to whether or not, under the law in this case, the evidence sustains the judgment.
The entering into of the contract in question and the various acts of the board of education in this case all happened prior to chapter 219 of the Session Laws of 1913 coming into effect--such chapter becoming operative January 1, 1914. Section 14, art. 6, of said chapter authorizes the board of education in cities by a three-fourths vote to elect a superintendent for not to exceed three years, but this case must be considered under the law in force prior to January 1, 1914.
The material facts in this case are practically undisputed, and the only thing left for this court is to apply the law to such facts, which may be summarized as follows: That the plaintiff held the position of superintendent of public schools of the city of Perry, during the school years of 1912-13. By resolution of the board of education prior to the first Monday in May, 1913, the plaintiff was re-elected as superintendent for the year beginning July 1, 1913, and ending June 30, 1914, with a salary of $1,500 per year payable monthly, in the sum of $125 per month, and a contract was executed accordingly. That in pursuance of said contract and said resolution of the board, the plaintiff, on July 1, 1913, entered upon his duties as such superintendent, and discharged all duties incumbent upon him up to the time of the regular session of the board of education held on July 7, 1913, at which time the board met, the plaintiff being present, and the board at that time resolved, among other things, that in the opinion of the board it was necessary that the positions of superintendent and principal of the high school should be in one person, at a salary not to exceed $1,100 per year, and that, whereas the said board of education, as it existed prior to the last annual election and before the present board was organized, met and entered into a contract with Prof. A. C. Farley for his services as superintendent for the coming school year, and said contract was made and entered into before the assessment of the school district under the jurisdiction of said board had been completed, and before it was known what the revenues of said district would be, and whereas the said superintendent, as provided by the law, shall only continue to hold said office at the pleasure of the board, it is hereby declared the pleasure of this board...
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