Farley v. State

• Decision Date: 25 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 29803,29803
• Parties: Joe R. FARLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 885

163 N.E.2d 885

240 Ind. 318

Joe R. FARLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 29803.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 25, 1960.

John D. Clouse, Carrol F. Dillon, Evansville, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Owen S. Boling, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harriette Bailey Conn, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ARTERBURN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Vanderburgh Circuit Court convicting the appellant of a crime in making a false statement namely, that he had 'lost' the original certificate of title in an application for a duplicate certificate. The affidavit charging the offense was based upon the Acts of 1945, ch. 304, § 16, p. 1308, being § 47-2506, Burns' 1952 Replacement, which reads as follows:

'False statement--Stolen cars--Forgery--Penalty.--Any person who shall make, or cause to be made, any false statement, either in an application for certificate of title, or in any assignment thereof, or who, with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, semi-trailer or house car, which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen, shall accept or transfer title or possession to the same, or who shall use, operate or occupy any motor vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen, shall be guilty of a felony. This provision shall supplement and be in addition to any other penalties prescribed by law for the theft or unauthorized taking or use of any such vehicle. Any person, who shall alter or forge any certificate of title issued by the department pursuant to the provisions of this act, or any assignment thereof, of who shall hold or use any such certificate or assignment, knowing the same to have been altered or forged, shall be guilty of a felony.'

Appellant first attacks the statute on the ground that it is vague and indefinite because it does not name the person to whom the application must be made and does not provide for any presentation or delivery as an act constituting the offense. As to the first contention, we take judicial notice that the Bureau of Motor Vehicles under the statute is the governmental unit to which application for motor vehicle licenses is made. Acts of 1945, ch. 304, § 11, p. 1308, being § 47-2501, Burns' 1952 Replacement. As to the second contention that there is no act or delivery provided for the offense described in the statute, it is our position that the word 'application' itself necessarily implies the act of presentation of the form or paper commonly called a form of application. In other words, a form of application cannot be or become 'an application' until it is actually presented to the proper person. The word 'application' as quoted in Sparacino v. Ferona, 1956, 9 Ill.App.2d 422, 133 N.E.2d 753, 755, is as follows:

'* * * 'Application' is defined, in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Copyright, 1951, as 'an appeal or petition, esp. as written or presented.' 'Application' is defined, in Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, as 'a putting to, placing before, preferring a request or petition to or before a person.' 'Application' is defined, in 1 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 214, as 'The act of making a request for something. It need not be in writing.' * * *'

We therefore hold that the act in question is sufficiently definite and certain to constitute a valid statement of an offense. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 410, p. 435; Morris v. State, 1949, 227 Ind. 630, 88 N.E.2d 328.

The point is next urged that there is no evidence that the 'application' was ever presented to the proper official as an application for title and therefore the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction.

The evidence shows that the appellant had mortgaged his automobile and delivered the original certificate of title to the mortgagee; that thereafter he made out a form of application before a Notary Public and stated therein that the original certificate of title for his car had been 'lost'. The evidence then shows that he attempted to sell the car. The State introduced a photostatic copy of the form of application made for a 'lost' certificate of title. It has stamp markings thereon showing certain dates and figures, including the words 'title service', but very little, if anything, on the photostatic copy would indicate that it was presented to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. There was no evidence introduced as...